The plaintiff-appellee filed an action against the  defendant-appellant  in  the  Court of First Instance of Eizal  for the collection of a sum of money.  The trial was set  for October 1, 1951, notice of  which  was served upon counsel for appellant on  September 24, 1951.   The next day Attys. Tirona  and Navarro,  counsel for appellant, filed an  ex-parte urgent  motion  for postponement (signed by Atty. Navarro) based  on the ground that counsel  had a case in the Court of First  Instance of  Manila set for  hearing for the same day.   On October  1  neither  the appellant nor his counsel  appeared,  whereupon the court denied  the motion  for postponement  and proceeded to  receive  the evidence presented  by the appellee,  and accordingly  to render a decision in  appellee's favor.  A motion  (signed by Atty. Tirona) was filed to set aside said decision and for a new trial, and  as the same was denied the  present appeal was interposed by  the  appellant.

The latter, in assailing the action taken by the trial court, argues that  early  action  should have been taken by it on the  motion for postponement so that in case of denial,  counsel  for appellant could act accordingly;  that at any rate  no  prejudice would  be caused  to any of  the parties by  its  granting whereas its denial on the very day of the trial in  effect deprived the  appellant of his day in court.

We  are of the opinion that  appellant's position is well. taken.  The motion for postponement, which was the first, was filed several days before the trial.  While attorneys should not assume that  a motion for postponement would be  granted, they are none the less entitled to  a timely notice of its denial,  to know  what to do to protect the interest of  their client, it being the business  or concern of  the law  office representing the party  (and not for the court to assume) to determine whether  one or the other of two or more partners can handle the trial.  It is noteworthy, in  this connection, that the  answer sets up the defenses of partial payment and the fact that the appellant was a mere accomodation party which,  if proven, would. naturally alter the appealed  decision.

Wherefore,  the  appealed  decision  is  hereby  set  aside and the case remanded  to the lower court for a  new trial and corresponding judgment

So ordered, without  costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A,, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.  B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.