Appeal from a decision  of the  Court of  Tax Appeals affirming an order of the respondent  Collector of Internal Revenue requiring the petitioner to pay deficiency amusement taxes, including surchages and  real estate  dealer's fixed tax, in the aggregate sum of P61,586.85.

Petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, operating jai alai games (Pelota Basca) with betting in  accordance  with the  provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 485 and  601.   It began  operating sometime in 1940,  and in accordance  with said Acts  the land on which the building is erected and the buildings thereon shall become the property of  the Government of the Philippines  after 25 years of  operation.

On  October  26,  1954,  an examiner of the respondent Collector  of Internal Revenue  made an  assessment  of amusement tax on  gross receipts derived from admissions to the Jai Alai from June 18,1949 to the end of December, 1954, totalling P62,586.85.  Petitioner  contests the assessment on various grounds, the first of  which  is,  that it is exempt from  any  and all  taxes not  embraced in  Commonwealth Act  No. 485,  and the imposition  of  the taxes against it violates  the provisions of the Constitution impairing  the obligation of  contracts.  This contention  is based on the theory that Commonwealth Act 485, as implemented by  Executive Orders Nos.  135 and 168, both series of  1948,  has  created  a  contractual  relationship between the Government and the  petitioner, and the imposition of taxes  other than  those  mentioned  in  said statutes is  unconstitutional.     
Section one  of  the Commonwealth Act 485 provides as follows :

"Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding1, it shall be permissible in the game of Basque pelota, a game  of skill  (including games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta,  remonte and mano), in which professional  players  participate, to make  either direct bets or bets  by means  of a totalizer; Provided That no operator or maintainer of a Basque  Pelota court shall collect  as commission a fee in excess of twelve per centum on such bets,  or twelve per centum of the  receipts of the totalizer, and of such per centum there shall be paid  to the Government of the Philippines, for distribution in equal shares between the General Hospital and the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society."

Executive Order No. 135, s. of 1948, regulates the establishment, maintenance and operation  of Basque pelota games.  The executive order provides that city or municipal  mayors shall  supervise the establishment, maintenance and  operation of such games within their respective jurisdictions  (sec. 2); that said mayors shall enforce laws, as well  as  regulations, regulating  jai alai games and the construction and maintenance of buildings where the games are played, etc.  (Sec. 3); prohibits operation of such games without  a permit from  the mayor  (Sec.  4); imposes a license fee of P500 annually for each basque pelota fronton and P18.00  each annually for pelotaris, judges, or  referees and  superintendents (Sec. 5); prohibits  persons under 16 year  of  age from  carrying firearms or deadly weapons inside any basque pelota fronton (Sec. 9); prohibits card games  or  any  of the  prohibited  games  within  the premises of any fronton (Sec. 10); fixes the days and hours of operation (Sec. 14); requires the licensing of pelotaris, judges, referees, etc. (Sec. 15); requires the  installation of an automatic electric totalizator in the premises where the games are played  (Sec. 16); fixes the face value of wager tickets in an amount not exceeding P5.00 for each, and requiring that said face values be the basis of the  payment of dividends after eliminating fractions of P0.10 (Sec. 18); regulates the participation of the corporation in the dividends and the share of the National Treasury  therein, thus: 10-½% commission on the total bets,  for  the operator; 4-½% of  such bets, for the National Treasury; 85% of the total bets,  to be distributed in the form of dividends among  holders of winning  numbers or  combinations; a" tax of ½% of the total bets  (to be taken  from the  10 ½% of the operator) to cover the expenses of  the personnel assigned to supervise the  operation  of the  games (Sec. 19);  and provides  supervision over the conduct of the games  (Sec.  20).  Executive Order  No. 168,  dated August 25, 1948, amends the above executive order on the days and hours of operation and on the distribution of wager funds.   In accordance with this executive order, the commission  of  operators is 11-½%  of the total bets,  the share of the National Treasury is 3%; the expenses of personnel supervising operation of games is  ½% of total bets, and 85%  of the total bets is  retained for distribution as dividends among the holders of numbers or combination of numbers.

We find no  provision in  Commonwealth  Act  No.  485 supporting the theory that petitioner is a franchise holder and is not responsible for any  tax or assessment  not enumerated in the said act.  The practice heretofore adopted by the  National Legislature is  to  enact a special law, if it decides to create a special franchise for a corporation, and insert in the franchise an express provision that taxes or assessment  included in the  franchise shall be "in lieu of taxes."   These common features of a special franchise are absent  in  the case at bar.  In the first place,  there is no special law creating the Jai Alai Corporation, neither is there  a provision that  such  corporation is free from payment of taxes other than those enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 485.

It has also been the practice  to grant a franchise only to public utilities,  in which capital requirements are enormous and returns slow.  Some  of the franchises granted by the Government are those given the Manila Railroad Company, the Manila Electric Company and the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.  The Jai Alai is not a public service or a public utility.  The Corporation is organized under a general  act.   The provisions in the law and in the executive orders implementing it giving a share in the bets to the National  Treasury is in consonance with the policy of  requiring games  of a gambling  nature to contribute funds for. charitable  institutions.  Unless such a share for charitable institutions is  given, such  games, which are strictly a form of gambling, would have  no justification for their existence or maintenance.  But such authority to conduct gambling games, where bets are made, is no reason or argument for the claim that such gambling institutions may not  be subject  to the ordinary fees collected from  other  gambling establishments.

Neither is the provision that after 25 years  the  building and  land belonging to the  corporation shall become properties of the  Government  a  ground  or reason for relieving the Jai Alai Corporation of the ordinary taxes. The   ordinary  game or amusements  tax also find's  no similarities  between the case of the petitioner with the Manila Railroad Company, the Manila Electric Company, because the said  companies were taxed  at the rate  of from 1-½% of their gross earnings "in lieu of all taxes", which is  not  the  same  as in the case before us.  We, therefore, find no merit in the first claim of petitioner-appellant.

The second  question  raised in the  appeal  is, whether or not petitioner  is liable  for the 20% deficiency amusement tax on unclaimed dividends, differences or breakages, management fees, and  admission fees from May 4, 1948 to June 17,1949,  It is to be noted in connection with this question that wager funds,  management  fees, differences or breakages and unclaimed dividends all go to the corporation  and  form part of  the  gross receipts  of the petitioner.  There is no valid reason for not  including these  in the gross receipts and therefore subject to tax.

The third question relates to  a  claim from absolute exemption from  the graduated  percentage taxes, because of  the amendment of Republic Act No.  39 by Republic Act No.  418.  Third paragraph of  Section 8 of Republic Act No. 39  specifically  contains the word  "Jai Alai"  as liable  to 20 of  the gross receipts, together with race tracks.  Said third paragraph reads as follows:

"In the case of cockpits, cabarets,  and night clubs, there shall be collected from the proprietor,  lessee or operator a tax equivalent to ten  per centum,  and in the  case of  race-tracks and Jai alai, twenty per centum  of the gross receipts, irrespective of whether or not any  amount is charged  or paid  for admission:  Provided, however,  that  in the case  of race-tracks, this tax is in  addition to the  privilege tax  prescribed in section one hundred and ninety-three.  For the purpose of amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the  amusement place." 

In Republic Act No. 418,  said third  paragraph was amended, and the  words "and Jai Alai" were eliminated, so that only race tracks  are subject  to  20%  of the gross receipts, thus:

"In the case of cockpits, cabarets, and night-clubs, there shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee, or operator a tax equivalent to ten  per centum, and in  the case of  race-tracks, twenty per centum of the gross receipts, irrespective of whether or not any amount is charged or paid for admission: Provided, however.  That in the  cave of race-tracks,  this tax is in addition to the privilege tax prescribed in section one hundred ninety-three.  For the purpose of amusement tax, the term "gross receipts" embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the amusement place." (Sec. 2, par.  3 of Republic Act No. 418).

It is contended that the Jai. Alai is exempt from payment of  the other amusement taxes, graduated according to the amount of receipts and specified in sub-paragraphs a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h and i of paragraph 1 of Section 260, C.A. 466. No stretch of the imagination  or amount of  reasoning can produce the conviction that the change which, exempts  the Jai Alai from the 20 % of gross receipts imposed  by said paragraph 3, had the  effect of exempting said Jai  Alai from  the graduated taxes specified in paragraph one of Sec. 260, G.A. 466, and in its sub-paragraphs. The records  of the proceedings show that the original House bill No. 1461, which was later promulgated  into Republic Act No. 418, did not contain  said  elimination, but said elimination was made in the  Senate, without explanation of any kind.  We can not go beyond the actual terms of the statutes to determine what the legislative intent was.  If such intention had been  to  exempt  the Jai Alai  from payment of the graduated scales of taxes contained in paragraph 1  of Section  260, the exemption should also have been expressly stated in the amendatory law.

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 39, the Jai Alai  was liable to graduated  taxes  under paragraph 1 of Section 260 of  the National  Internal Revenue Code.  By Republic Act  No. 39, the tax was  changed from such graduated taxes to 20% of the gross receipts.  But when Republic Act No. 418  was passed on June 18, 1949, and Jai Alai  was suppressed from those that should be liable to the 20%  on gross receipts, the apparent intention of the Legislature was  to make the Jai  Alai  responsible as previously, that is before Republic Act No. 39 took effect. The theory raised  on petitioner's  behalf, that it ceased to be responsible for the graduated taxes, under paragraph 1 of Section 260 is not  supported by the records of the proceedings in relation to the enactment of Republic Act  No. 418.  Exemptions  are  never  presumed.   They must  be  expressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language, and not left to mere implication.  (N.Y. ex rel Schrurz, et al., vs. Cook,  148 U.S. 397; Govt. of P.I.  vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil., 42; Asiatic Petroleum Co., vs, Llanes, 49 Philippines 466;  Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club,  Inc., 98 Phil.,  670).  The only reasonable inference to be derived from Republic Act No. 118 is to revert the Jai Alai to its former status as a place of amusement, subject to tax under paragraph 1 of Section 260,  as it had  always been prior to the enactment  of Republic Act No. 39.

It is claimed under the fourth assignment of error that the petitioner cannot be  held liable for the payment of the real estate dealer's  fixed tax because a real estate dealer includes only persons engaged  in the business of letting or renting  property  on their own account and holding themselves  as dealers in real estate, and it is claimed that the Jai Alai is  not such  business.  The  petitioner, however, has overlooked or ignored the last part of the law, that is, Section 194  (s),  C.A. No. 466, as amended by Republic Act No.  588, which took effect  on September 22, 1950, in which it provides:

" * * * 'Real estate  dealer' includes  any person engaged in  the business of  buying, selling, exchanging, leasing, or renting property on his own account as principal and holding himself out as a full or part-time dealer in real estate or as an owner of rental property or properties rented or offered to rent for an aggregate, amount of three thousand pesos or more a year."

It is true that the Jai  Alai is not engaged in the real estate business, but it is an owner  of a rental  property or property offered  for rent for more than P30,000 a year, because the  "Keg  Room,"  the "Bamboo  Bar"  and  the "Popular  Bar," are leased to  Joaquin Lopez  for P2,500 a month.   It is true that this rented property is part of the Jai Alai building, but  it is not  directly or indirectly connected with the Jai Alai games.  The petitioner is not made to pay the taxes because of operating the Jai Alai "Sky Room," which overlooks the floor used for the "pelota" games.  The "Keg  Room," and "Popular Bar,"  are separated from the floor  used for the  "pelota" games. In  short it is  true the  Jai Alai  is  not engaged in the business of real estate, but it falls  under the last provision of the law because it is an owner of  rental property, and this rental property  is not connected with the  premises used for the Jai Alai games.

In its fifth assignment of error, it is claimed that petitioner herein is entitled  to the return of P75,000  deposited on various dates by installments to prevent distraint and levy during  the pendency, reinvestigation and reconsideration of the  case in the Bureau of Internal  Revenue.

The court below  found that this amount was  paid in installments "in  partial payment of taxes  due  from  the petitioner.  The  accountant of the petitioner on January 25, 1953, stated thus:  "We hereby certify that the following payments  were made on our amusement taxes and obligations with the Bureau of Internal Revenue."  The Collector of  Internal  Revenue applied the said amounts on the deficiency amusement tax  on  gross receipts from May 4, 1948 to  June 17,  1949, amounting to P73,879.89. Note that the  other deficiency taxes  were due on admission fees collected from June 18, 1949 to December, 1954, amounting to P59,969.44, on the operation of the Sky Room, amounting to P1,875.02,  and real  estate dealer's  fixed tax for the period from the second quarter of  1949 to the 4th quarter, 1954,  amounting to P862.50.

There is no  merit in  petitioner's claim for the  return of the  amount of P75,000 deposited  with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the reason that this amount was paid by the petitioner expressly for the purpose  of covering the deficiency taxes  due from it.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby affirmed in toto.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,  Endencia, Barrera,  and  Gutierrez  David,  JJ., concur.