Jose Geukeko appears to be the registered lessee of Lot No.  18, Block 20 of the Tambobong Estate, with an area of 2,890  square meters, formerly owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a  portion  of  which he sub-leased to  Elena Jacinto, Hilarion Encarnacion,  Leonila Rocal, Mercedes Veles,  Francisco Caro, Alejandro Morales, Inocencia  Lumtao,  Adriano  Simeon  and  Onofre  Enriquez. When the Republic oi the  Philippines acquired the Tambobong Estate by  purchase  in  1947, pursuant to Commonwealth Act  No. 539, Jose Geukeko filed an application with the Director of Lands, who was entrusted with sale and disposition  of  said  estate, to  purchase the lot  leased by him, but the sub-lessees registered opposition thereto and likewise filed  applications  to purchase the respective portions actually  occupied  by them.   This controversy was docketed in the Bureau of Lands as B.  L. Conflict No. 41 (N), D. L.  E. Conflict No. 2.

On  June  12, 1952, the Director of Lands recognizing Jose Geukeko as the bonafide tenant of  Lot No. 18,  Block 20, rendered decision giving due course to his application and dismissing the  protests  and  counter applications of the sub-lessees.   Whereupon, the parties adversely affected by said decision  instituted Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 on August  4 and September  8,  1952, respectively, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to annul the same and praying for  the  approval of their applications to purchase the portion of  the lot occupied by  them.  Two years later, or on October 11, 1954, the Court issued an  order holding that as therein plaintiffs had not exhausted all the administrative remedies available to them,  it appearing that they failed to appeal  to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources before going to Court,  an action for mandamus could  not  be entertained and thus dismissed the 2 civil  cases filed therein.

The  sub-lessees then brought  the matter on appeal to the  Secretary of  Agriculture  and Natural  Resources on October 23, 1954, (DANR Case No. 987)  who  required the sub-lessees to pay the corresponding docketing fee and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Jose Geukeko interposed an objection to the institution of this appeal  and  correspondingly filed with  the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case  No. 3453) a petition for mandamus and prohibition praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be restrained from taking cognizance of DANR Case No. 987 and from taking further action in said appeal; that said official be  ordered to certify that the decision of the Director of Lands in B. L. ,conflict No. 41 (N), D. L. E. Conflict No. 2 was final and the corresponding deed of sale of Lot No. 18, Block 20 of the Tambobong Estate be executed in his favor.   He alleged as ground for the petition that the period to appeal had already prescribed; that  the filing of Civil  Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 amounted to  a waiver of appellants' right to appeal to the Secretary of  Agriculture and Natural Resources;  that  the Court's order dismissing said civil cases was an adjudication on the merits; and that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had lost jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the decision of the Director of  Lands was already  final  and  executory.

The Secretary  of  Agriculture and Natural Resources filed an  answer  contending that he could lawfully take cognizance of the appeal filed in DANR  Case No.  987 because the filing of Civil Cases  Nos.  1826  and  1865 with the Court of  First Instance  of Rizal suspended the running of  the  prescriptive period within  which to  appeal from decisions of the Director of Lands, as  provided for by Land Administrative Order No. 6; that the decision of the  Director  of  Lands had  not become final; that the Court had no jurisdiction over the  subject matter  of the action; and that the petition  did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  It  was  thus prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs  against petitioner.

After  due  hearing  and submission by  the  parties of their respective memoranda,  the Court rendered decision dated July 12, 1955, holding that in  view of the existence of the policy of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources  of  considering  the filing  of a  civil  action in Court  as having  the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period within which appeal could be Interposed to the Department Secretary, a policy  that was reasonable  and sound, the Secretary of Agriculture and. Natural Resources  did not abuse his discretion in taking  cognizance  of the appeal after Civil  Cases Nos.  1826 and 1865  of the  Court  of First  Instance of Rizal  were dismissed.  The  lower Court also  observed that the records showed that the  protestants  or sublessees never intended to waive or abandon  their rights to appeal  from the decision  of the  Director of Lands.  As the motion for the reconsideration of said decision  filed  by therein petitioner was denied for lack of merit, the matter was brought to Us on appeal, appellant maintaining  that the lower Court erred:

1. In  holding  that the  respondent  Secretary of  Agriculture and Natural Resources did  not act without or  in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in  entertaining and taking  cognizance of  DANR Case No. 987 which seeks for the review of the decision of the Director of Lands  dated June 12, 1952;  and
   
2. In dismissing and in not  issuing' the  writ of  prohibition and mandamus prayed  for by  petitioner therein.

The main question at issue hinges  on the interpretation of Section  2 of  the Lands Administrative  Order No.  6, promulgated  by  the Secretary  of  Agriculture and  Commerce  on May 1, 1934, providing for the filing" of appeals from decisions or orders of the Director of  Lands to the said Department  Secretary, which reads  as follows:

SEC. 2.  APPEAL FROM DECISION ON  ORDER  OF THE  DIRECTOR OF LANDS,  MOTION  FOR RECONSIDERATION. An appeal  shall lie  from a decision of the Director of  Lands to the  Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce  within a  period of sixty (60)  days to be counted from the date  the  interested party  received notice thereof  unless a motion for reconsideration is  filed within  the  said  period,  in which case,  appeal shall be made within sixty (60)  days from his  receipt of notice of  the order  or decision of the  Director of Lands disposing of  the motion for reconsideration. * *  *.

This Lands Administrative  Order  No. 6 governing the promulgation  of  decisions  and orders of the Director of Lands and providing for the prescriptive period within which appeals may be interposed was issued pursuant to the provisions of section 79(5)  of the Revised Administrative Code,  section 5 of Act No. 2874 and Act No.  3038.

Although the exact date when the sub-lessees received copies of the decision of the Director of Lands does  not appear on record,  the parties admit that the action filed by the former with the Court of First Instance of  Rizal (Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865) on August 4 and September 8, 1952, respectively, were instituted  within 60  days. There is likewise no controversy that the order of dismissal in said cases  was  promulgated on October 11,  1954, thus  when the  matter was brought on  appeal to  the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources on October 23, 1954, more than 2 years from the date of their receipt of the decision  of the Director of  Lands had elapsed. Despite this fact, the Secretary of Agriculture  & Natural Resources took cognizance of the appeal, notwithstanding which appellant does not raise in this case any question against the appeal  of the sub-lessees from  the decision of the Director  of  Lands  to  the Secretary of Agriculture and  Natural  Resources for  being interposed beyond  the 60-day period provided by section 2 of Lands Administrative  Order No. 6,  if the period lapsed between the  filing of the action in  court on  August  4 and  September 8, 1952, and the date  of receipt by said sub-lessees, of notice of the order of the Court dismissing their action, (which does not appear of record), is considered interrupted.

In  justification of his attitude  in  taking cognizance of the sub-lessees' appeal, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural  Resources  refers to his Department's  policy  of considering the running of  the  prescriptive period  for purposes of appeal from decisions of the Director of Lands, as suspended  by the institution of a civil action in Court. It is  interesting  to note at  this juncture that the order of the lower  Court  dismissing  Civil  Cases Nos.  1826 and 1865 was predicated on the ground that the sub-lessees failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them and, therefore, held that said actions could not be entertained by the courts, citing the  case of Miguel vs. Reyes,  93  Phil.,  542.  But  in  subsequent  rulings  in other cases involving lots in said Tambobong Estate, this Court qualified its stand by confining the application of the principle of exhaustion of  administrative remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of  a judicial  action to controversies arising out of the disposition of disposable public lands and not to cases  involving private  lands acquired, by the Government by purchase  (See Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil., 128; Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil., 168).'

At any rate, and looking at the question at issue in this case independently of  the aforecited  authorities,  it may be asked:   After  the civil  cases filed  by  the sub-lessees were thrown out of court, could they still invoke administrative relief by appealing to  the  Secretory  of Agriculture  and  Natural  Resources 1  Said  Administrative official answers in the affirmative, maintaining  that  the period of 60 days  provided for  by section  2 of the Lands Administrative  Order  No.  6   aforequoted  has   not  yet prescribed,  it being the adopted policy of their office to consider the filing of civil actions in court as suspending the running of said period.  It must be remembered that Lands  Administrative  Order No.  6 is  in  the nature of procedural rules  promulgated  by the  Secretary  of Agriculture  and  Natural  Resources pursuant  to  the power bestowed on said administrative agency to promulgate rules and  regulations necessary for the proper  discharge and management of the functions imposed by Jaw upon said office.  The necessity for vesting  Administrative Authorities  with  power to make rules and regulations because of the impracticability of the lawmakers to  provide general regulations for various and varying details  of management, has  been recognized by  the  courts  and  upheld against various particular objections  (42 Am. Jur, 329).   Recognizing the existence of such  rule-making  authority, what is the weight of an  interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own  rules  or regulations?  Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight  by the Court construing such rule or  regulation,  and  such  interpretation will be followed unless it appears  to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431).   It has also been  said that:

An administrative body  has power to interpret its  own rules which have the force and effect of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of the  rule (Foley vs. Benedict, 122 Tex 193, 55 SW [2d] 805, 86  ALK  477).

Rules, regulations, and general  orders enacted by administrative authorities  pursuant to  the  powers delegated  to them have  the force  and effect of law (Columbia Broadcasting  System vs. United States, 87,  L Ed [Adv 1086]).

The contemporaneous construction of  a  statute  (and similarly of rules  and regulations) by the executive officers of the goverment whose duty it is to execute it is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily  control  the  construction  of  the  statute  by the courts (United  States vs. Philbrick,  120  U.S. 52, 30 L  Ed. 559).

Courts are reluctant to disregard a settled practice of an executive department whore they are not satisfied that it is contrary to law, and are satisfied that it is in accordance with justice and good faith (Grant vs.  Raymond, S L Ed. ,370).

From the foregoing it may be seen, that under the law and the  jurisprudence  on the  matter appellees had two courses  to follow,  and inasmuch  as  their  resort to the courts railed for  non-exhaustion  of administrative remedies, could they be deprived of taking the  other  course left to them, i.  e., the remedy of appeal to the Secretary  of Agriculture and  Natural  Resources,  especially  when  in accordance with the interpretation given  by said administrative  agency and  its  acknowledged policy,  that relief could still be availed of by the aggrieved parties?   Taking into consideration all the  factors  involved in the  controversy, We are of the opinion and thus hold that the dismissal  of  the actions  in courts does not constitute  an impediment to the filing of the appeal before the Secretary of Agriculture  and Natural Resources. The only  requisite in such a case would be that the period within which said remedy may be invoked has  not yet  prescribed.  In this  connection, We can also  say that the interpretation given by the Department of Agriculture and  Natural Resources to  the  provisions of section 2 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 appears to be reasonable for it merely reflects the intent of the law in placing the disposition of lands within the  Tambobong  Estate in the hands of the officials of  the  Land  Department  (Executive Order No. 376; Commonwealth  Act No.  539; Lands Administrative Order  No.  R-3).   The  underlying idea seems to be that those officials are considered in a better position to decide controversies regarding the disposition of said Estate.

Wherefore, the decision  appealed  from and  the order denying the motion for  reconsideration thereof are hereby affirmed, with  cost against appellant.  It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A.,  Bautista Angelo,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B, L.,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J., concurs in the  result.