On November 13, 1957, Celso Bautista,  et al., filed an action for ejectment against  Felicidad  Castueras, et al., before the Municipal Court of Manila wherein after trial, judgment  was  rendered in  favor of  plaintiffs against defendants  as follows:  Felicidad  Castueras was ordered to  remove  the building and other structures she  had built on the land in question and to pay the sum of P48.00 as rental in arrears, the sum of P24.00 a month until she vacates the property, and the sum of P50.00 as attorney's fees, and the  costs of  action; Isidro Mangahas, to remove the building and other structures he had built on the  land and to pay the sum of P56.00 as rental in arrears, the sum  of P38.00 a month until he vacates the  property, the  sum of P50.00 as attorney's  fees, and the costs of action; Ignacio Martinez, to remove the building and other structures he had built on the land, to pay the sum of P52.00 as rental in arrears, the sum of P26.00 a month until he vacates the property, the sum of P50.00 as  attorney's  fees and the costs of action; and  Aurelio Siao,  to remove the building and  other structures he had  built on the land, to pay the sum of P60.00 as rental in arrears, the sum of P30.00 a month until he vacates the property, the sum of P50.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of action. Defendants  in due time appealed to the court of first instance who,  besides putting up the required appeal bond, deposited with the clerk of court the amount of P216.00 representing the aggregate amount of the rentals in arrears covered by the judgment and began depositing  with the same clerk the amount  of monthly rentals that may become due as ordered by the municipal court.

On January 20, 1958, plaintiffs  filed  a motion for  immediate execution alleging that defendants  have not filed a supersedeas  bond as  required by the rules, which motion was opposed by defendants.   The court  denied the motion. Again, on  February 18,  1958,  plaintiffs reiterated their motion for immediate  execution alleging  that the amount of P216.00 defendants had deposited with the  clerk of court cannot take the  place of  supersedeas bond because it does not cover the attorney's fees adjudged by the municipal court in the amount of P200.00, which  motion again was opposed  by defendants.  This time the court granted the  motion and ordered the immediate  execution of the judgment.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied and, accordingly,  the court issued the corresponding writ of execution,  and  upon petition of plaintiffs, gave the  latter authority  to  collect the  amount  deposited by defendants with  the clerk of court  to cover the rentals in arrears which were adjudicated in the judgment.  Alleging that the  trial court, Hon. Froilan Bayona presiding, has  acted in excess of its jurisdiction or  with grave abuse of discretion  in issuing  the order of immediate execution as well as in authorizing plaintiffs  to collect the deposit made with the clerk of court, defendants interposed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Section  8,  Rule 72, of the Rules  of Court provides in part:

"If judgment is rendered against the defendant,  execution  shall issue  immediately, unless an  appeal has  been  perfected  and the defendant to stay  execution files a sufficient bond approved by the  justice of  the peace or municipal court and  executed to the plaintiff to  enter the  action in the Court of  First Instance, and to pay the rents,  damages, and costs down to the time  of the final judgment in the  action,  and  unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he pays to the plaintiff or to  the  Court of.  First Instance the  amount of  rent due from time to time under the  contract,  if any,  as found  by the judgment of  the  justice of the  peace or municipal court to exist, or, in the absence of  a contract, he  pays to the plaintiff  or into the court, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, the reasonable value of  the  use  and  occupation of the premises for the preceding month at the rate determined by the judgment,"

It would appear that if judgment is  rendered against defendant,  execution  may  issue immediately,  unless an appeal has been perfected and defendant  to stay execution files a supersedeas  bond "to pay the rents,  damages,  and costs down to the time of the final judgment of the action, and unless, during the pendency  of  the  appeal, he pays the amount of rent  due from time to time."  And it has been  held that a  supersedeas bond is unnecessary when defendant has deposited in court the  amount of all back rentals adjudged in the final judgment rendered by the justice of the peace or municipal court  (Mitschiener vs. Barrios 76 Phil., 55; Sogueco vs. Natividad, 80 Phil., 829). Here defendants did not  file any supersedeas  bond but instead deposited with the clerk of court the amount of all the back  rentals adjudged to plaintiffs by  the municipal court.  The question that now arises  is:  For what items does a supersedeas bond stand for under Section 8, Rule

This point needs to be  clarified because in the decision herein involved defendants were ordered  to pay  not only the back rentals but also  attorney's fees in  the aggregate amount of P200.00.  Apparently, considering the wording of Section 8, the purpose  of  a supersedeas bond is to answer for the payment of (a) rents, (b)  damages and (c) costs, down to the time of the final judgment of the action.  There is  no difficulty with  regard to the first item, for  the same refers to the back rentals that may be found due from defendants.  There can also be no doubt with regard to the third item because the costs can easily be ascertained.  Where difficulty  may arise is with regard to the nature and meaning of the second item which refers to  damages.

Apparently, the words rents and damages are used interchangeably in Section 8 of Rule 72 for in ejectment cases no other  damages can be  adjudicated except the loss of rents or their equivalent.  The loss may refer to the rents when the latter are fixed in the  contract,  and the rent takes the form of damages when the  same is  not fixed and  has to be determined by  the court  considering the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises.

Thus, this Court has declared that the only damages recoverable for illegal detainer are the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises (Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng, 2 Phil., 622).  In another case, this Court held that in an action for forcible entry and detainer the damages  consist in  a reasonable compensation  for the wrongful use and occupation of the premises, the legal measure of damages being the fair rental  value  of  the property (Sparrevohn vs. Fisher, 2 Phil., 676).  And still in another case, this Court held that ordinarily the amount allowed as damages may be presumed to be the reasonable value of the use-of the land as fixed by the court (De Castro vs. Justice of the  Peace, 33  Phil., 595; See also Igama and Reyes vs. Soria and Nepomuceno, 42 Phil.,  11; Santos vs. Santiago and Angeles, 38  Phil., 575).

Former Chief Justice Moran, on the other hand, makes the following comment as to the nature of damages that may be  recovered in an  action for forcible  entry and detainer.  Thus he comments: "But what is the character of these 'damages'?  Since the  only  issue in actions  for forcible  entry and detainer is physical possession, the damages which plaintiff is entitled to are such as he may have sustained as a mere  possessor.  Material possession involves only the enjoyment of the thing possessed, its use and the collection of its fruits, and these are the only benefits which the possessor is deprived of in losing  his possession.  In other words, plaintiff is  entitled  only to those damages which are caused by his loss of the  use and occupation of the property, and not to such damages as are caused to the land or building during the unlawful possession, which he may recover only if he were  the owner of the property, and he cannot be declared as such in an action  for forcible entry  and detainer Damages to property may be recovered  only by the owner  in an ordinary action"  (3 Moran, Comments on  the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., p. 301;  underlining supplied.

Tested by the  rulings and precedents  above referred to, it may be safely stated that the damages that may be recovered in an action for ejectment within the meaning of Section 8, Rule  72,  refer to the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled which generally is measured by the fair rental value of the property.  It cannot refer to other kind of damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the property.  Consequently,  the attorney's fees in question cannot be considered as damages more so when  we  consider that when  the present Rules of Court were approved on  July 1, 1940  attorney's fees could not yet be recovered as damages but only as costs (Section 6, Rule 131; Jesswani vs. Dialdas, et al., G. R. No. L-4651,  May 12, 1952;  Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26  Phil., 566).  The right to collect attorney's fees as damages was recognized only when the  new  Civil Code was approved on August 30, 1950 (Art.  2208).

Since attorney's fees cannot be considered as damages within the meaning of the rule and defendants had already deposited the back rentals as a substitute for the supersedeas bond, the trial court erred in ordering the immediate execution of  the judgment.

Wherefore, petition is granted.   The pertinent orders of respondent court are hereby  set aside,  with  costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.