The respondent in the  above-entitled administrative case is charged  with  having appeared  as lawyer in  several  civil,  land registration and  criminal cases in the Court  of First Instance of Capiz,  and  having conducted trials  therein, examining and 'cross-examining witnesses, moving for postponement of hearings and filing a notice and a record on appeal, after he was suspended from the practice of law by Judge Luis N.  de Leon of the Court  of First Instance of  Capiz.  The respondent  does not deny that he appeared in the cases and on the  occasions mentioned in the complaint filed  against  him  before  Us,  but he alleges that  the order suspending him from the  practice of law is a part of a  vindictive scheme or design of the complainant   to  persecute him  systematically;  that  the order  suspending him  from  the said practice of  law  was issued without due process  of  law and  without giving him  his day in  court.

Upon the filing of the respondent's answer, complainant moved for a judgment on the pleadings, as the respondent  had  not  denied the  material  allegations  of the complaint.  We did  not,  however,  resolve  this  motion, but remanded the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation and report.  The Solicitor-General in turn endorsed the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Gapiz for investigation and report.  The Provincial  Fiscal  found  that  as the acts of the respondent herein are related  to his  acts  in relation to  another  case for  contempt  (People vs. Boanerjes Venturanza, G. R. No. L-7974), wherein respondent was ordered to pay  a fine of P500, the  case is now moot or  academic and, therefore,  recommended  its dismissal. The Solicitor-General concurs in this recommendation.

When the case was submitted to this  Court, respondent filed a reply  to the report of the  Solicitor-General,  reiterating his claim that the order declaring his suspension from the  practice of law is null and void, because it was issued without  giving respondent opportunity to appear and defend himself.

The record discloses that on December 19, 1953, complainant Judge of First Instance  of Capiz, entered an order requiring respondent to appear in court on December 21, 1953,  at 9:00  a.m., to show cause why  he should not be  dealth with severely and  suspended  from the  practice of law for having sent the following telegram to the judge: 

"COLLECT JUDGE DE LEON
CALIBO 

REQUEST SET ASIDE YOUR ORDERS CONFISCATED BOND AND MY ARREST BEING VINDICTIVE ABUSE USE POWERS UNJUST MALICIOUS AS YOU ARE OFFENDED PARTY  OTHERWISE  WILL CHARGE  YOU CRIMINALLY CIVILLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY ...

ATTY. TORRES"

Respondent did not appear  in court on December 21, 1953, as  ordered.  He  merely submitted  a medical certificate to the effect that he was  sick.   On December 25,  1956, he filed a motion  praying that instead of appearing personally  in  court  he should  be allowed  to file a written answer, because of pressure of work and because he was leaving for Manila for  some important matters.   Complainant took steps  to  have the respondent arrested,  but the latter could not be located.  The reason is thsft he had come to Manila.  In his  motion of December 25,  1953, however he says: 

"* * * it is respectfully prayed that  the promulgation of the decision  in the  contempt proceedings mentioned in  said order be postponed to January,  1954, at 9:30 a.m. and  if this  is  not possible  he hereby  waives to be present in the reading of  said decision  and if the decision is  against him he  hereby gives notice of his intention to  appeal  *  * *."
    (p. 14 of the Record.)

As the complainant must have believed that respondent purposely' refused to appear, he entered the  order  dated December 29, 1953,  ordering respondent  "suspended from the practice of law  in  any court  of the  Islands from the date of the  notification  of this  judgment,  until  further action on the premises  by the Honorable  Supreme Court." It  is this  order, duly transmitted to  Us,  that  is now before Us  for final  decision.

There is  no question that defendant  has  violated  the order of suspension; his  appearances in court have not been denied by him in  his answer or in his reply memorandum.  The only defense  put, up  by him  is that he has had no sufficient opportunity to defend himself.   We find that  this defense is  without merit.   His conduct upon receiving  the order  of December  19,  1953 shows that 'he did  not like to appear  before  the  complaining judge.   He refused  to  appear, alleging  illness, and  when the judge  attempted to have him arrested, he escaped arrest and came to Manila.  These  acts of the respondent do not evince a desire to defend himself against the charges of contempt filed by the complaining judge against him. He also had waived his right to be present and contest the order in the court below.  In view of his failure to appear and the waiver of this  right, the complaining judge had no other recourse but to decide the charges against him ex-parte, in accordance with the last sentence of Section 29, Rule 127, cited by respondent himself in his reply memorandum.

It is, therefore, apparent that notwithstanding the fact that respondent  had been suspended from the practice of law  and was advised of this  order of December 29, 1953, he openly defied the prohibition by  appearing as a lawyer  in  court, defending cases, examining  and  cross-examining witnesses, filing pleadings and  papers  in relation to the cases he was defending.   These things he had committed from January  25, 1954  to June,  1954,  the date of the filing of the petition by the  complainant in this Court.  For all we know, notwithstanding ,the  order, he  has been  continuously appearing for  clients  in the courts of justice and openly defying the order suspending him from the practice of law.

We  desire to  call attention to the  fact that  courts' orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers  of the  courts.  Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be  extended  to the judicial branch  of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government  is to be a government of laws and not of men.   Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.  Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which  they belong, as well as  to  the State which has instituted the judicial system.

In order to impress upon  the members of  the  bar the duty  of respect towards  judicial authorities, we  have decided, after a careful deliberation,  that  the acts of the respondent, which were  committed  in open defiance  of judicial authority, should not be allowed to go unpunished' In  consonance with  this  desire,  we hereby  suspend  respondent Jose y.  Torres  from the practice of law for a period of three months from the date he is notified of this decision.   Copies  of  this  decision shall be furnished the courts where  respondent has  pending cases,  for faithful compliance therewith.

Paras, C. J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,  A, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J, B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.