In Civil Case No.   R-612 entitled  Arsenio  Acufia, et al.  vs.  Go Guioc Sian,  et  al., filed  in the  Court of  First Instance  of Maasin,  Leyte,  the  court rendered  decision the  dispositive  part  of which reads: 

"Por  las consideraciones  expuestas, se  dicta  sentencia declarando a la demandada Esperanza Tan  dueiia  del solar en cuestion, tal como se halla descrito al comienzo de  esta decisi6n, y a los demandantes  duefids  proindhdso,  en la  proporcion  corresporidiente, de la casa existente  el referido solar,  concediendose  un plazo de tres  meses a los demandantes  para quitar del solar y  trasladar la casa a otro sitio.   Expirado este plazo, la demandante,  eomo dueiia del solar tendra derecho  a hacer suya la  casa previa indemnizacion de su valor actual, o a obligar a los demandantes a pagar el precio del terreno, y en  caso  de  que  no llegaran las partes  a un acuerdo en cuanto  al valor de la  casa  o  del terreno, se nombraran comisionados de  avalue.  Pero  los  demandantes  no  podran  ser obligados a comprar al  terreno  si su valor es  considerablemente mayor que  el de  la casa, y  en tal caso, deberan pagaran una renta razonable  que  ser  afijada  por  el  juzgado  si  las partes no llegaran a un acuerdo,  del terreno, el caso de'que  la demandada Esperanza  Tan no quisiera hacer suya  la casa  previa la correspondiente  indemnizacion."

The  above decision became final  and executory  and on October 16,1953, defendants, who were declared owners of the  land  in  question, filed a motion praying that the owners of the house erected thereon be ordered to remove the same as decreed in the decision  without any indemnity on their part.  This motion was denied in an  order entered on April 20, 1954, the court enjoining the parties to comply strictly with the dispositive part of the decision.   Defendants moved to reconsider this  order at the same time giving notice of their intention to appeal should the same be denied.   This motion the court  denied in an order  entered on  September  10,  1954 the. court stating that the notice  of appeal given by  defendants was defective.  Nevertheless, defendants submitted  the record on appeal, appeal bond and notice of  appeal as  required by law, and when  the court refused to  approve the appeal as thus perfected, defendants interposed the  present petition for certiorari contending that the lower court  acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with  grave abuse of discretion.

It does not appear  clear  from the record  the reasons why the lower court refused to give course to the appeal inspite  of the fact that apparently the record on appeal, appeal  bond and  notice of  appeal were filed within the reglementary period, but it can be gleaned from the  order of the  trial court of September 10, 1954 that it refused to approve the  record  on appeal  because  the order  from which  defendants, now  petitioners,  desire to  appeal is merely  interlocutory in nature and not appealable. Moreover, the court  added: "It is  not within  the province of this  Court to direct the removal of the house in question because it will  be tantamount to modifying the decision which  is already  final."

While the order of April 20, 1954,  from which defendants desire to appeal, is final in  character  because  "it finally disposes of  the pending action so that nothing  more can be  done with  it in the trial court" (Mejia vs. Alimorong, 4 Phil.,  57?; Insular Government vs. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil., 487; People vs. Makaraig,  54  Phil.,  904), and in  this  respect the trial court  is in error,  however, we are of the  opinion that the appeal would have no useful purpose for it clearly appears that what is  intended by defendants  in  their motion  of October  16, 1953 is to  secure  an order for the removal of  the house belonging to  plaintiffs without any indemnity  on their part contrary  to  the precise terms of the dispositive part of  the decision rendered on October 3, 1952 In said dispositive part it is expressly  decreed that defendants can only  appropriate  the house  after paying  the  corresponding indemnity to  the plaintiffs or to compel plaintiffs to  pay the value of the  land if defendants should so elect,  except when such value is much greater than that of the house, in which case plaintiffs could be required to pay a reasonable rent for the occupation of the land.   The decision also decrees that if the parties  could not reach an understanding as to the value of the land  or the house,  commissioners of appraisal may  be appointed for that purpose.  Evidently, the motion of petitioners above adverted to tends  to subvert the nature of this  decision for which reason the trial  court refused  to give  course to  the  appeal.  We hold that the lower  court did not  err in this respect.

Wherefore, the  petition is denied, without pronouncement as to, costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.  L.,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.