Appeal by the prosecution from an order of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque, in Criminal Case No. 1630 thereof,  setting  aside its judgment of  conviction based  on the defendant's plea of guilty,  and granting a new trial.

It appears that when  Criminal Case No. 1630 for slander by  deed was  called  for  trial  in  the court  below, appellee appeared without  counsel because he could not afford to pay the services  of  a lawyer.  Thereupon, the trial court  appointed for him a  public defender.  Upon the latter's  advice, appellee entered a plea of guilty; and on the basis of such plea, the trial court rendered judgment  finding  him  guilty  of  the  crime charged  and sentencing him accordingly. A week later, appellee moved to set  aside the judgment of conviction, to withdraw his plea of guilt and substitute it with one  of not guilty, and for a trial on the merits, which motion the Court granted. Not  agreeable with the withdrawal of appellee's plea and  the new trial,  the fiscal  appealed.

We agree  with appellee that the order in question is not appealable.

Under section 1 of  Rule  118,  Rules  of  Court, only final judgments or orders  may  be appealed from; that is, such judgments or  orders that completely dispose of the cause so that no further questions affecting the merits remain for adjudication (II Moran,  Rules  of Court [1952 ed.], p. 880).  The order appealed from allows the withdrawal  of the defendant's  plea of guilt,  sets aside the judgment of conviction, and orders a new trial.  Far from disposing the cause on the merits,  this order reopens the case and grants  a  new  hearing.   Like an  order over ruling a motion to quash the information, it leaves further proceedings to be done in the  trial court, and is  therefore interlocutory and unappealable (cf. People vs. Virola and Alia, 97  Phil.,  759;  People vs. Manuel, L-6794-95, August y,  1954).

The Solicitor  General claims  that the evidence  sought to be presented by the accused at  the new trial which is the testimony of a witness who  avers that the accused slapped the complainant  because the latter  abused him in public (Original  Records,  p. 58) is  only cumulative to the plea  of guilty and would not change the result of the case.  Assuming such claim to be correct, the state would  suffer no  substantial damage or prejudice  by the new hearing, because  it would  also result in the defendant's conviction.  If,  on the  other hand,  the  evidence intended to  be presented by the accused is of such materiality as to prove his innocence,  then  the interests of justice demand that he  be allowed to  change his plea of guilt and prove his innocence  by such evidence.  In any  case, it is discretionary  with the trial court to allow a change of plea after judgment  (section 5, Rule 114), and  the appellate court will not interfere with such  discretion  in the absence of  abuse.

Wherefore,  the order appealed from is  affirmed, with costs de oficio.   So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.