Plaintiffs filed in the Court  of First Instance of Pangasinan an  action seeking to annul the judgment  rendered  in a registration case  (G.L.R.O. Record No. 54794)  which  was jointly heard with another case  concerning recovery of two  of the lots that were the subject of registration (Civil Case No. 8853), on the ground that said judgment was obtained through fraud.   Defendant filed a motion  to dismiss which, as amended, disputed the  sufficiency of the complaint on three  grounds;  (a) that the court had  no jurisdiction of the person  of  defendant;  (b)   that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment;  and (c)  that the complaint states no cause of  action.

After plaintiffs had filed their  objection to said motion and  defendant had replied, the  court  found the motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the alleged fraud  on which the cause of action of plaintiffs is predicated, even if committed, is not extrinsic or  collateral to the issues involved in  the  former  case, but  intrinsic or one which  should have been raised therein because it was part and parcel of the defense  that the plaintiffs had set up to protect  their  interest.   Accordingly,  the  court dismissed the  case without costs.

The  case  was originally taken to the Court of  Appeals but it  was later certified to this  Court under section 17, subsection 6 of Republic Act  No. 296, because it merely involves questions of law.

The  facts which, according  to the complaint,  constitute the alleged  fraud on which plaintiffs base their cause  of action  to annul the judgment  rendered  in  the former case, are: (1)  the concealment by  defendant of the true traces  of  an old sugar mill and of the house of  their predecessors-in-mterest by  indicating some  big stones  with in the  perimeter of lot No. 8 is the ocular inspection conducted by the court, because the truth is that said traces are on the western side of lot 8,  located in another property belonging to defendant;  (2) the  refusal of the trial judge  to  conduct an ocular inspection of the other side of Cabatuan creek to  see  for  himself  the location of the true traces of said sugar mill  and house without any justifiable reason;  and (3) the mysterious  disappearance  of the record of the proceedings concerning the  ocular inspection made by the trial  judge as above adverted  to.

But  it  appears  on the very face of the complaint that those facts,  which allegedly  constitute the fraud on which the action of plaintiffs  is  predicated,  are matters which have transpired in the course of the ocular inspection made by the trial judge in the former case and which said trial judge  had already considered and passed upon in his decision.   It  even appears  that when the ocular  inspection was made, both parties were  present  with their counsel, and  the objection of  plaintiffs to  the indication of the traces or remains  of the old sugar mill and  house determinative of  defendant's  possession has been, duly  noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due consideration by him.  And it likewise appears that these matters have also  been taken up by plaintiffs  in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals  but that said court did  not decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the  findings of  the trial  court.   It  is therefore evident that the  alleged fraud now  advanced  by plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic  or collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they have not only been raised but were the subject of adjudication  by both the former court and the Court of Appeals and as such  it cannot be considered  as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered in the  former  case. 

"There can be no  question as to  the  right of any person  adversely affected by a judgment, to maintain an  action to  enjoin its enforcement, and  to have it declared a nullity, on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the  very matter of obtaining the judgment,  when  such fraud is extrinsic or collateral  to  the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment; and  fraudulent  collusion  between  an administrator and a third person resulting in an order or judgment where by an  interested person is unjustly  deprived of his rights  in, or to the  estate under administration, has  always  been recognized as a  sufficient ground  for the grant of relief from the  order or judgment thus fraudulently procured."  (Anuran vs. Aquino and  Ortiz, 38  Phil., 29) 

"Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must  be extrinsic to the litigations.  Were  not this the rule there would  be no end to  litigation, perjury being of  such  common  occurrence in trials.  In fact,  under the  opposite rule, the losing  party  could attack  the judgment  at  any  time by attributing  imaginary  false hood to his adversary's proofs.  But the settled law is  that judicial determination  however  erroneous  of matters brought  within the court's jurisdiction cannot  be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured  evidence."  (Almeda vs. Cruz,  47  Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1179, 1180.)

It is true, as plaintiffs claim, that when the former case was appealed  to the  Court  of  Appeals  they  discovered that the record of the proceedings  concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial court has "mysteriously" disappeared and for that reason the Court  of Appeals could not  act  properly  on the  issues  raised  concerning said ocular inspection, but why did not plaintiffs take the necessary steps  in  order  that  the  record of  said  ocular inspection may be located or  reconstituted as  required  by law?  It is preposterous to contend that such disappearance is the  result of a conspiracy between the trial judge and  the  defendant.  In any event, it was the concern of plaintiffs to have the matters  investigated in due time, and  this they  failed to do.  But  this circumstance alone cannot certainly be the basis of annulment of a judgment duly rendered and affirmed  by the. appellate court and which  has become final long  ago.

Wherefore, the  order  appealed from  is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.