Petitioners were plaintiffs in a civil case  filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas, Batangas, for the recovery of the sum of P650.00 allegedly owed to them by the defendant spouses Miguel Mendoza and Feliciana Davalos, plus the sum of P200.00 as attorney's fee and P100.00 as expenses of litigation.  The trial of the case was set for June 17, 1958.  On that same day,  the inferior court after hearing plaintiff's evidence, both oral and documentary, over the objection of the defendants and in the absence of the  latter's counsel who had  previously sent a telegraphic request for postponement sentenced  the defendant spouses to pay plaintiffs the  amounts  claimed in the complaint.  Also on that same day, defendants moved for the reconsideration of the judgment.  Their motion having been denied, defendants, on July 9, 1958 the very same day they received notice of the denial took steps to perfect an appeal to the Court of First Instance of the province by filing with the justice of the peace court  their notice of appeal, an appeal bond and an  official receipt issued by the municipal treasurer evidencing  the deposit of the  appellate court docket  fee  in the sum of P12.00. Giving course to the appeal, the justice of the peace transmitted the record of the case to the Court of First Instance where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 643.

On July 25, 1958, plaintiffs filed in the Court of  First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within the prescribed reglementary period owing to the failure of the defendants to pay within the 15-day period fixed  by the Rules the full amount of the docketing fee which, in accordance with Rule 130, section  5,  should be P16.00  instead  of P12.00.  No objection to the motion having been filed, the court below on August 12 of that year ordered the dismissal of the appeal.  But the following day, counsel for defendants while appearing before the lower court in connection with another case learned of the shortage in the docketing fee and immediately deposited the balance with the municipal treasurer.   Subsequently, he filed a motion for the reconsideration  of the order  dismissing defendants' appeal.

Plaintiffs objected to the  motion for reconsideration but the court below, considering" that the additional amount of P4.00 was deposited upon defendants' counsel learning that the appellate court docket fee was short by that amount and following the rule that technicality should  be  given scant consideration when  substantial rights  are not prejudiced, set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the appeal.

Alleging that the lower court acted without jurisdiction in reinstating the defendants' appeal, plaintiffs elevated the case to this Court through an original petition.  The prayer calls  in effect for the issuance  of  a writ of mandamus, but the facts stated in the petition indicate that the appropriate remedy, assuming the action to be well founded, is the writ of certiorari.  The instant petition will, therefore, be considered as an application for the latter remedy. The rule is settled that, in case of appeals from inferior courts to the Courts of First Instance, the amount of the appellate  court's  docket fee should be deposited in full within the period of fifteen days.  If half  only of the amount is  deposited  and the other  half is tendered after the expiration of such period,  no appeal is deemed perfected.  (Lazaro vs.  Endencia et ah, 57 Phil. 562.)   However,  where appellant in  good faith deposited  less  than the correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he  was  required to pay by the clerk  of the justice of the peace court, and he was willing to pay what was lacking, his appeal must not be dismissed, and he must be  allowed to  complete  the amount  by him  deposited. (Marasigan vs.  Palacio, et  al., 87 Phil.; 839; Segovia vs. Barrios, et  al., 75  Phil. 764.)

In the present  case, it  would  appear that defendants, upon advice by the justice of the peace, deposited the apellate court's docket fee of P12.00 with the  municipal treasurer.  The official accepted the amount without objection.  The justice of the peace during the perfection of the appeal by  the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond  and the official receipt evidencing the deposit of the docketing fee did not require defendants  to pay an additional amount  of P4.00  to complete the  docketing fee, but transmitted the Record of the case to the Court of First Instance.  And the clerk of that appellate court, in. entering the  appeal upon the docket of his office, likewise, did not require defendants to pay an additional  amount to cover the shortage in the docketing fee already deposited. It can fairly be assumed that the omission by these public officers led defendants to  believe that they had paid the correct fee.  It is significant to note that the shortage, upon  discovery, was immediately paid.  Obviously,  defendants were from  the beginning ready and willing to pay the correct amount of the docketing fee and if they paid the sum of P12.00 they did so in good faith and apparently because the justice of the peace advised, and the municipal treasurer  required, them to pay that amount only.  Under the circumstances, it would be unjust to dismiss their appeal.   As was  said in the case of Marasigan vs. Palacio et al., supra, citing the case of Segovia vs. Barrios et al., supra, "Every  citizen has the right to assume and  trust that the public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in  accordance with law.  To penalize such citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice."

It is argued, however, that defendants' counsel received on July 30,  1958 a copy of plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal which explained that the docketing  fee should be P16.00  and not P12.00 but that  notwithstanding, he filed no opposition to  the  motion nor offered to pay the balance, and relied instead upon "the respondent  judge's leniency on such  matters  as personally experienced previously" by him in another case.  These facts, according to plaintiffs, show defendants' bad faith and "malicious intention to delay the case."  Counsel for defendants, however, has, in the answer filed to  the petition, explained that he was not aware that a motion to dismiss the appeal had been filed  by plaintiffs, because  his  employee,  who received the copy of the motion, inadvertently misplaced it in the filing cabinet and neglected to inform him about it.  In support of the explanation is  a  sworn  statement executed by said employee and attached as an annex  to the answer.  Taking into account all the circumstances  of the case we are not persuaded to say that  there has been sufficient showing  of  intent, on the part  of defendants, to unduly delay the case. 

We note further that the alleged error  or irregularity committed by the lower court  in issuing the order complained of has not been brought to its attention through a motion for reconsideration, a requisite which is necessary in petitions for certiorari.  And considering, moreover, that defendants  during the hearing of the case before the justice  of the peace court were not assisted by their counsel, and that the reinstatement of their  appeal did  not deprive plaintiffs of any substantial  right, we think that the interest of justice  would  be better  served if defendants were given an opportunity to be heard and allowed to prove their defense.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, C.  J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.