On January 17, 1956, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants before the Court of First Instance  of  Manila praying that the court order the  partition  between the parties in accordance  with law of a building designated as 760 Sisa St., Sampaloc, Manila, built on six  parcels of land  situated in said city; that the sale made  by the Sheriff of Manila of the properties mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant Vivencio  D. Antonio in Civil Case No. 18142 be declared illegal; that  the amended writ of possession issued by the sheriff to place defendant Antonio in possession of the property sold be also declared  illegal; and that the sheriff be enjoined from carrying out said writ and from disturbing  plaintiffs' possession  of the aforesaid building designated as 760 Sisa St. On  January  17,  1956, the court granted ex parte the writ of preliminary  injunction prayed for in the complaint thereby enjoining the Sheriff of Manila and defendant Vivencio D. Antonio from molesting and disturbing plaintiffs'  possession of the building designated  as 760 Sisa St.  On January 20, 1956, defendants filed a  motion praying that the writ thus granted be dissolved  on two grounds:  (1) the court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, and  (2) the  allegations  of the complaint are insufficient to justify the issuance of the writ.  Notwithstanding the opposition interposed thereto by plaintiffs, the court on January 24, 1956  issued an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction.

On January 27, 1956, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion praying for  the reconsideration  of  the  order dissolving the injunction, which was granted, the court setting aside the order  and reinstating the writ  as originally issued. On February 7, 1056, defendants again filed a  motion for reconsideration  of the  last order reinstating the injunction, which was vigorously  opposed by plaintiffs, and after both parties had submitted memoranda in support of their contentions, the court on February  18, 1956 not only dissolved the writ of injunction previously  issued but dismissed  the  case for lack of  merit. The court ruled that the  questions  raised having already  been threshed out in Civil Case No.  18142  of the same court, it has no  jurisdiction to nullify the orders issued  in that case.

Plaintiffs appealed in due time and the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the questions involved are  purely of law.

Plaintiffs executed in favor  of defendant Vivencio D. Antonio a real  estate mortgage covering five  parcels of land and a building designated  as 760 Sisa St. Sampaloc, Manila, to secure the  payment of certain indebtedness. Plaintiffs having failed to pay the indebtedness as agreed upon, Antonio  filed  an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage  before the Court of  First Instance  of  Manila which was docketed  as Civil Case No. 18142.  After trial, the court ordered the foreclosure of the mortgage, and the decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued  and the  sheriff  sold the properties mortgaged at public  auction  in accordance with law.  The properties were sold to Antonio as the highest bidder and the sheriff executed  in his favor a deed  of sale on September  1, 1955.  On September 19, 1955,  Antonio filed a motion for a writ of possession, which was granted, and accordingly, the sheriff issued the  corresponding writ  but, through  inadvertence, he failed  to include  therein  the residential house designated as  760 Sisa St. Taking advantage of this omission, the Lacuna spouses, defendants therein,  plaintiffs in  the present case, wrote a  letter to the sheriff registering  their  opposition to the placing of Antonio in possession of the building,  alleging that the  same was not included in the writ, and having been informed of the omission, Antonio also wrote a letter to the sheriff requesting that  the error be  rectified, to which request the sheriff  acceded by issuing on November 15, 1955  an amended writ of possession.  Thereupon, the Lacuna spouses filed a motion to  suspend  the  amended writ contending  that the same has been  issued  by the sheriff in an  illegal  manner, to  which  Antonio  filed an opposition.  After both parties  had been heard, the court denied the motion.   And when their motion for reconsideration was denied, the Lacuna spouses initiated the present case labelling it as an action for partition though in substance its  purpose  is  to  thwart the  amended writ of possession  issued  in Civil Case No.  18142.

There  is no merit  in the  claim that  the  instant case is merely one of partition  of the residential building designated as 760 Sisa St., which is erected on the six parcels of land mortgaged  by  the plaintiffs  in  favor  of defendant Vivencio D. Antonio and which was the subject of foreclosure in  Civil Case No.  18142 because in substance its purpose is to  declare  null and  void  not only the amended writ of possession issued  by the sheriff on November 15, 1955 but also the certificate of sale issued in favor of defendant Antonio  as a result  of the  auction sale carried out by the sheriff in said case.  This can be clearly seen by a cursory examination  of the allegations of  the  complaint wherein it is prayed  that the  steps taken by the sheriff in said case relative to the execution of the judgment and to the placing of creditor  Antonio in possession of the property sold be nullified  on the ground that the amendment  made by the sheriff of the writ of possession by including the  residential  building designated  as 760  Sisa  St., which was inadvertently omitted was made without authority of law. Evidently, this cannot be done  for  it is well-settled in law and in jurisprudence that a  court of first instance  has no power nor jurisdiction to annul judgments or decrees of  a coordinate court because that  function  devolves upon the proper appellate court.

Thus,  "it is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of a,court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.  * * *  The various branches  of the Court of First Instance of  Manila are in  a  sense coordinate courts and  to  allow them  to interfere with  each others'  judgments  or  decrees by injunctions would obviously lead to  confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice"  (Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil., 182).  It has also been  held that "The rule which prohibits a Judge from interfering with the  actuations  of the Judge of another branch of the same court  is not infringed  when the  Judge  who modifies or annuls the order issued by the other Judge acts in the  same  case  and belongs to the same court. (Eleazar vs.  Zandueta,  48 Phil., 197.)  But the rule is infringed where  the Judge  of a branch of the court issues a writ of preliminary injunction in a  case to enjoin the sheriff from carrying out an order  of execution issued in  another  case  by the Judge  of another  branch of the same  court."   (Philippine  National Bank vs.  Javellana, 92  Phil., 525; 49 Off. Gaz., [1]  124; Italics supplied.)

Appellants cannot pretend that the residential building designated as 760 Sisa St., has been improperly included by the sheriff in the amended writ of possession he has issued in connection with  the  execution of the  judgment because the  same is actually  covered by the  mortgage and was included in the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 18142.  It has only been inadvertently omitted from the original  writ  and  the sheriff later  on  rectified the error  by amending  the writ.  It being a mere  clerical error, the same can be rectified without authority  of the court.

In any event, it appears that this matter has been brought to the attention of the court by appellant themselves when they objected to the amendment of the writ, but that their objection  has  been overruled.  We find, therefore no error when the  court a  quo dismissed the present case for lack of merit.

Wherefore, the order appealed from  is  affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.