Petitioners,  in their behalf and  for the benefit of other Jehovah's Witnesses in the province of Zambales, brought this action  to  compel respondent to grant them  a  permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza  of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with  the  kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them.

Respondent,  in his answer stated  that  he had not  refused the  request of petitioners  to hold a religious meeting  at the public plaza as in fact he gave them permission to use the northwestern part  of the plaza  on  July 27, 1952, but they declined  to avail  of it.   He  prayed that the action be  dismissed.

The questions of fact raised in  the pleadings being not controverted,  and petitioners having submitted a motion for judgment on. the pleading?, which was concurred in by  respondent, the  court rendered a  decision dismissing the case  without pronouncement  as to costs.  Plaintiffs appealed  from this decision.

It appears  that petitioners are  members of the Watch Tower  Bible  and Tract Society, commonly known  as Jehovah's  Witnesses, whose  tenets  and  principles  are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "face the pacts", that society  branded the latter as a religious organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth."   Desiring to  hold a meeting in furtherance  of its  objectives,  petitioners asked respondent to give them  permission to  use  the public  plaza  together with the  kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent  allowed  them to hold their  meeting  on the northwestern  part corner of the plaza.  He adopted as a policy not to  allow the  use  of the kiosk for  any  meeting by any religious  denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk  should  only be used "for  legal purposes."  And when their request for reconsideration was  denied, petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus. It is now contended by petitioners that the  action taken by respondent is unconstitutional  being an  abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by  our Constitution.

The  issue  raised  involves  a little digression  on the extent to which  the  right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked.  Fortunately, this issue has already been  passed upon by this Court in Primicias vs. Fugoso,  45 Official  Gazette,  3280,  wherein this Court  said: 

"The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of  grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and  guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries.  But  it  is a  settled principle growing out  of the nature  of well-ordered civil  societies that the exercise of those rights  is not absolute for it may be  so regulated that  it  shall not  be  injurious to the equal  enjoyment of  others having equal rights,  nor injurious to the  rights  of the community or society.  The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign 'police power', which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare  of the people.  This sovereign  police power is  exercised by  the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and  other  constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated  to political subdivisions,  such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their  legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances  for the  purpose."

It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to  peacefully assemble,  though guaranteed  by  our Constitution,  is  not absolute,  for it may be regulated in order  that  it  may not  be "injurious to the equal, enjoyment of others  having  equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society", and this  power may be exercised under the "police power" of the  state, which is the power  to   prescribe  regulations to promote  the health, morals, peace, education,  good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.   It is true that there is  no law nor ordinance  which expressly  confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use  of the public  plaza, together.with its kiosk,  for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised  under his broad powers as  chief  executive in  connection with his specific duty  "to issue orders relating to the police  or to public  safety"  within  the  municipality   (section  2194, paragraph c,  Revised Administrative Code).  And it may even be said  that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used,  directly or indirectly,  by  any  religious  denomination   (paragraph   3, section 23,  Article VI of the Constitution).

The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious  or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case.  It appears  that the  public  plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the  Roman  Catholic  Church.   The  proximity  of  said church to the kiosk has caused some  concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or  the  happening  of untoward  incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit  the  use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place  of meeting  of its members.  This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the  request made by  petitioners. Respondent never denied such  request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning  them the northwestern part of the public plaza.  It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right  to assemble for, as was said, such right  is subject to regulation to  maintain public order  and  public  safety.  This is especially so considering that the tenets of  petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which  respondent must have  considered in denying their request.

It is true that the  foregoing conclusion  is  predicated on  facts which do not appear  in  the pleadings  nor are supported by any evidence  because  none was presented for the reason that  the  case was submitted on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,  but those facts like the situation of the "kiosko" and the occurrence of religious controversies which  disturbed the peace and order  in the municipality of  Sta.  Cruz  are  matters  which may be deemed to come  within the judicial  knowledge of the court as in fact they were so considered by the trial judge in his decision.  This is  what he said on this point: "The presiding judge, through information, personal  experience and through the papers,  has known of unfortunate  events which caused the disturbance of peace and order in the community.   If the  petitioners  should be allowed to use the 'kiosko' which is within  the hearing distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious  ceremonies performed  in  the church."  (Italics supplied.)  This action  of the judge may be justified under section 5, Rule 123, of the  Rules of Court, which  is elaborated by this Court in the following wise: 

There are facts,  indeed  of which  courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer  to a variety of subjects legislative, political, historical,  geographical,  commercial scientific, and  artificial in addition, to a wide  range of matters, arising in the ordinary course  of  nature  or the general current of  human  events.  The matter of  judicial  notice is ever expanding and will  surely  keep pace with  the  advance!  of the  sciences and the arts.  But,  a matter to  be  judicially cognizable  must  be  well-established  or authoritatively  settled, or  of common or general  knowledge.  Obviously, courts  should take notice  of whatever is or should  be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant  than the rest of mankind.'  (The Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs.  Segundo Agustin, 65 Phil., 144.)  (Italics supplied.)

The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza, cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the road in the  northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence  is untenable, for it  appears that that portion  is part of the plaza and has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people.  In fact, during the past celebrations of the traditional town  fiesta  of the  municipality, said portion has been utilized  by the authorities  as a place for staging dramas, zarzuelas, and  cinematograph shows.  Verily, the pretense  of petitioners  cannot be attributed  to  the unsuitability of that  portion  as a  meeting place  but  rather  to their obstinate  desire to use the kiosk knowing it to  be contrary to the policy  of the municipality.^[1]

The decision  appealed  from  is affirmed,  with  costs

against petitioners.

Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,   Jugo, Labrador,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.
   
 

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 ^[1] These  facts are not disputed by appellant in the memoranda they have submitted after oral argument.
 
 

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DISSENTING:

CONCEPCION, J.,

With  due respect to the  majority opinion, I  am  constrained to dissent for the following reasons:  

1. It is admitted in respondent's answer that (as stated in paragraph  VIII of the petition)  counsel for the petitioners had, on August 25, 1952, written to respondent a letter reading in part as follows: 

"May I therefore, request your kind  office to grant  a permit to Messrs. Fernando Ignacio and Simeon de la Cruz to use the public plaza with the 'kiosko' therein located for the  purpose of holding a public lecture to be held on such date and time as shall be chosen by them and subject  of course to your  final approval."

and  that (as  alleged  in  paragraph IX  of  the petition) "respondent mayor has not by any manner answered and responded" to  the  aforementioned letter.  In other words, respondent  herein  has not  granted any permit for the holding, anywhere  or  under any condition,  of  the public lecture referred to in said letter, although  it is impliedly conceded that  petitioners are entitled to  hold such public lecture.

2. The majority  decision,  and that of  the  lower court, invoke the police power of the State as authority for the policy  of respondent herein  of not permitting the  use  of the town  plaza proper,  including  the  stand  or  kiosko therein,  by petitioners herein.  I do not  believe that this view is supported  by the pleadings,  which, in the case  at bar,  are controlling, the  case having been submitted for decision on the pleadings.    

In an effort  to justify his failure to act  on  the above quoted  letter of the petitioners, respondent  (who, seemingly,  is a  lawyer or has studied  law,  for he signed his pleadings and  appeared,  in  the  lower court, in  his own behalf) alleged, in his answer, by  way of special defense, that he had

"put up an  off-limit to use the 'kiosko' for any religious meeting, conference, or rites by any religious denominations, as it is his belief, in  good  faith, that said 'kiosko', although  a  public  edifice is intended for use  by the general public, only on  legal purposes and objectives other than religious one."  (Record on Appeal,  pp. 12- 13.)

This allegation indicates that respondent's policy was prompted, not by  considerations of  public order, but  by his belief  that no  public  property may be used  for religious  purposes, even if there  were  no danger of  breach of peace.  In other words, what he  had in mind was the provision of  Article VI, section 23, paragraph 3,  of the Constitution;  reading:

"No public money or property shall  ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian  institution, or  system of religion, or for the/use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister,  or  other religious  teacher or dignitary as  such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or  dignitary  is assigned to the armed  forces  or to  any penal institution,  orphanage,  or leprosarium."

Indeed, had his policy been motivated by a concern for the preservation of harmony and  good will among the people, respondent would  have applied his off-limit policy not merely to religious meetings, but, also, to any activity which might  lead  to a public, disturbance.

There is another clear proof that the protection of peace and order had  nothing to  do  with  said policy  of respondent herein.  In paragraph XII of the petition it is asserted:

"That petitioners desire to hold peaceful meetings, in the town of Sta. Cruz,  in the  province of  Zambales."

Replying thereto, respondent said, in paragraph  (6) of his answer:

"That the respondent has no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the statements contained in  paragraphs XI and XII  of the petition"

Had respondent  refrained from acting upon petitioners request for permit,  or adopted his aforementioned off-limit policy, for fear that  petitioners may  provoke  a public disorder, said respondent would have so  alleged  in his answer, instead of stating therein that he had "no knowledge sufficient to form  a belief" in connection with the peaceful nature of petitioners' proposed  meetings.  If he had no such  knowledge sufficient to form a belief, then he could not have entertained' the aforesaid fear of breach of the peace.

3. The above quoted special defense in respondent's answer advances the proposition that religious  assemblies or gatherings may not be held in public property, which is obviously false. Public  squares,  roads, highways  and buildings are  devoted to public use, and, as such, are open to all, without distinction.  Incidentally to such use, religious acts may be performed in said  public property.  It is the appropriation thereof mainly for religious purposes that  the. Constitution does  not  sanction.  Thus, for injstance,   public  lands  may  not  be  donated  for  the construction thereon of churches, convents or seminaries. However, public streets, boulevards and thoroughfares are used, almost daily, for religious processions in the Philippines.  Masses and. other religious services are often held at  the  Luneta, the  Quirino Grandstand and the Rizal Memorial Stadium, in the  City  of Manila, as  well as in other public property,  such as  penal  institutions,  leprosaria and army camps.   So long as  the use of  public property for religious purposes is incidental and temporary, and such as to be reasonably compatible with  the use td which other  members  of  th«  community  are similarly entitled, or  may be authorized to make, the injunction in section  23(3)  of Article  VI of the  Constitution is not infringed (see Aglipay  vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201; People vs. Fernandez,  CA-G. R. No.  1128-R).
    
   
4. A mere general possibility which, at any rate, may be  remote that, if petitioners were  allowed to use the grandstand  in the,town  square of Sta.  Cruz, Zambales, they  may say or do something tending to disturb  public order, is insufficient to  warrant  denial of  the  license prayed  for.   Otherwise, we would, in effect, nullify the Bill of Eights, for all rights are susceptible of abuse and, hence, the possibility of such abuse, is always present in the exercise  of any right.   In this connection, it  is important to note  that  petitioner's aforementioned  request is covered by the constitutional mandates on due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly  and freedom of religion.  Obviously,  a right of such  magnitude as to  be guaranteed by no less than four (4)  provisions  of the fundamental  law and these of the most transcendental and vital to  the democratic system underlying the structure of our Republic cannot be curtailed on the basis of an abstract and speculative possibility of a threat to peace or breach of peace, which may or may not result,  if and when, in the exercise of their religious profession,  petitioners  should transcend the proper  bounds, for  which, at any rate,  they could, and would, be  punished under existing laws. 
    
   
5. In an effort to bolster up the position therein taken, the decision  appealed from says that the permit  sought by petitioners, If granted "may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies performed" in the Catholic Church, which  is said to  be "within  hearing distance'* from  the  aforementioned kiosko and  would amount  to giving petitioners a "license to disturb anytime the religious practices or ceremonies of that rival denomination".  The weakness of  this view is patent.

To  begin with, respondent could and, perhaps, should limit  the  time  at  which  petitioners  could give their lectures on  religion.  Secondly, a  license  to hold  such lectures is not a grant of authority to disturb the religious services held in said Catholic Church.  Thirdly,  it  is a matter  of common knowledged that  Catholic  Churches are not open throughout  the day.  Masses,  if any, are held in the morning.  There may be  weddings, baptisms and other religious services before  noon and often times in the late afternoon, but,  generally, such churches are closed in the evening.  Masses, and other  religious activities  are not  held daily  in some churches, particularly in chapels.  Hence, petitioners could be authorized to give their lectures at such times as would  avoid any possible interference  with the normal activities  of  said  Catholic Church.

6. Said decision further states  that the  stand in the public square  is  within  the hearing distance  of said Catholic Church.  The majority decision adds that "the proximity of said church to the kiosko  has caused  some concern on the part of the authorities".  There is, however, no  allegation in the pleadings,  or proof, to this effect. Such is merely the impression that the  Judge a  quo tended to convey in his decision, without anything in  the record to bear it, but predicated, in the language of said  decision, upon his avowed knowledge acquired   "through information, personal experience and through the papers" of "unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of  peace and order in community".  Regardless of the propriety of considering such knowledge and information of  the trial Judge as a factor in deciding the case,  it  seems evident that the events alluded to did not take place in Sta.  Cruz, Zambales, and did not refer to incidents t provoked, either by petitioners  herein, or  by Jehovah's  Witnesses, the sect to which they  belong.  Otherwise, said events would have surely been  pleaded specifically in respondent's  answer. The same, in fact, indicates that there had been no such "events" in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, as may be deduced from respondent's above quoted allegation to the effect that  he has "no  knowledge  sufficient to form  a beliefh on  the peaceful character of the meetings sought  to  be  held  by petitioners herein.
   
7.  
8.   I cannot  but take exception to the  statement, in the majority opinion, that "the  situation of the  kiosko and the  occurrence of religious controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the municipality  of  Sta. Cruz,  are matters which may be deemed to come within the judicial knowledge of  the court,  as in fact they were so considered by the trial Judge in his decision".   The lower court did not mention and, I  think, it did not have  in mind any particular breach of  peace in the municipality of Sta. Cruz. It did  not say so in the  decision  appealed  from. In  fact,  respondent's brief has not specified,  or  even hinted,  any such  incident  "in the  municipality  of Sta. Cruz."

Moreover, such  incident,  if  any, is not one of which courts may take judicial  cognizance of.   Rule 123, section 5 of the  Rules of Court specifies what  matters  are subject to  judicial notice.   It  provides:

"The existence and territorial extent of states, their forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of  nations,  the admiralty and maritime courts  of  the world and their seals,  the political  constitution and history of,  the  Philippines,  the  official acts of the legislative, executive, and  judicial departments  of  the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, the  geographical divisions and political history of the world, and all smaller matters which are  of public knowledge, or are capable of  unquestionable demonstration, or sought to  be  known to judges because of their judicial functions, shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction  of proof; but  the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in  this section  stated, when  it shall find it necessary  for its  own information,  and may  resort for  its  aid to appropriate books  or  documents of reference."

Nothing  contained in  this section  has any bearing  on the events  above  referred to,  except possibly  the clause relative to "all similar matters which are of public knowledge".  I  believe,  however, that  there is  no  public  or common knowledge of any  religious controversy that has brought about a  disturbance of  the peace  and  order in Sta. Cruz,  Zambales.  What  is  more,  the allegations in respondent's answer, as well as the tenor of his brief, palpably  show, to  my mind, that there  has never been  any such breach of peace in  said municipality.   Hence,  in- dependently of the technical aspect  of the question,  would it not be too  hazardous for this Court to take judicial notice of something,  the  existence of which is,  to say the least, so debatable, that it may not be an objective reality?

8. Even, however, if the  grandstand in the public square of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, were within the hearing distance of the Catholic Church, the decision appealed from must, to my mind, be reversed.   Practically, all plazas  in the Philippines have a church  nearby.  Besides, thousands of churches and chapels  may be  found  in  the  populated portions  of our  municipalities,  barrios,  sitios or other smaller communities.   Affirmance of the decision appealed from would imply, therefore, that religious sects or denominations,  other  than  those to  which said churches or chapels belong, could be barred from engaging in religious activities within the hearing distance thereof.  Considering  that  modern  technology, particularly the  use of amplifiers, has extended, and is still extending, considerably the range of the hearing distance, it is clear that, in order to be beyond that range, said religious sects or denominations would have to hold their services or gatherings far away  from  the town or the  populated localities where people  are less likely  to  be. In other  words, the  late commers would have to preach in the desert  or, at least, in deserted  places.
      
   
9. The majority decision,  likewise, states:

"It  appears that petitioners are members of the  Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known  as Jehovah's Witnesses, whose  tenets  and principles are deregatory to  those professed by the Catholic organization.  In its publication 'Face the Facts', that society branded the latter as  a  religious organization  which  is a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and  claiming the  right to rule the earth"

The publication alluded  to has not been introduced in evidence.  It has not been incorporated in the pleadings. I do not think it belongs to the class which is subject to judicial notice.  Said statement in  the majority  opinion is based only upon a quotation in respondent's brief.

Assuming said publication to be a fact, it is my  firm conviction that the writ prayed  for must be  granted. It is not unreasonable  to assume,  as I do,  that all sects, churches, denominations, sectarian institutions and systems of religion that refuse to recognize the supreme authority of the Holy See, consider the same, or its policies, more or less as a "monstrosity".  They may  not officially use this word to characterize their opinion about the Roman Catholic Church, but, their disagreement with the latter must  be fundamental or  serious  enough for  them  to consider the position of  the Catholic Church comparable to that of a monster.  Otherwise, said religious organizations would nave joined hands with Catholic church or would not have seceded therefrom.  In any event, everyday  experience shows that, in the political field,  minority parties generally  regard and publicly proclaim  that the administration of the Government by the party in power is so clumsy,, corrupt and inimical to the  interest  of the people as to be tantamount to, if not worst than, a monstrosity.  If such criticism sufficed to warrant denial to the critic of a license to  speak within the  hearing  of the "monster",  then minority parties could  be enjoined from holding public meetings within hearing distance of public buildings, for the same are occupied, used by, or under the care of men chosen  by,  and generally belonging to, the majority party.

In short,  carried to its logical conclusion, the proposition  that one may be prevented from speaking within the hearing distance of another, if the former considers the views  or policies  of the latter  as a monstrosity,  would lead  to consequences which are inconsistent with the  fundamental principles  upon  which  our  Constitution  and Republic are based.

10. The case of Fugoso vs. Primicias  (45 Off.  Gaz., 3280), cited in the majority opinion, is authority in favor of petitioners herein, for it applied the  clear and present danger rule, and no such clear and present danger exists in the case at bar.  It is true that said  rule has not been consistently adhered to by this Court, and that the same has,  in effect, shown its preference for  the dangerous tendency rule.   However, in every case in which the latter was applied, there had been  a tangible specific act of the party adversely affected  thereby,  which incited or tended to incite in a substantial manner a breach of the peace.  Thus, in People vs.  Evangelista (51 Phil., 254), People vs. Nabong  (57 Phil., 455), and People  vs. Feleo (58 Phil., 573), the defendants  were  found to  have advocated the overthrow of the government by the use of force.  The defendant in  People  vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599), had expressed himself publicly in favor of beheading our then Governor-General Wood.  In the case of Espuelas vs. People  of  the  Philippines  (90  Phil.,  524,   December 17, 1951), this Court held that the acts of Espuelas tended to  stir  up  the   people   against  lawful   authorities. In  Evangelista  vs. Earnshaw  (57 Phil., 255), we upheld the refusal of the Mayor  of Manila to grant permit to the communist party to hold further political meetings in said city, after the members of said party had in public meetings  incited  the people to rise in arms against the  government,  for  which  reason several criminal  cases  for sedition were   filed  against  the leaders of  said  party, who,  subsequently, were  convicted of the crimes charged against them.

In  the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioners themselves, or  their immediate  associates, had  ever  performed any illegal  or even improper act in  preaching the tenets of their faith. Respondent's answer indicates that, prior to the date set forth  in petitioners request for license, or July 27, 1952,  said petitioners had been allowed to  hold a religious meeting,  though not in the grandstand in  question,  and seemingly,  had held said meeting.   Yet, nothing appears to have been said or done in the course thereof, which  could be,  or  is being, assailed on legal or moral grounds.  Hence, the position taken by respondent mayor  is to my mind absolutely  untenable.

Paras, C.  J., Reyes, A., and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.