This is an original  petition for certiorari  with preliminary  injunction to secure the annulment of the order of the Court of Industrial  Relations dated  October  12, 1957,  in   Case  No.  129-V(7),  the  dispositive  part  of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Chief of the Examining Division of this Court, or any of his assistants, is hereby directed to examine the payrolls, daily  time  records, and other pertinent documents  of respondent company in order  to determine  whether any or all of the 51 claimants rendered  service up to 5:00  o'clock p.m.  and  were  not compensated for the extra  hours of work beyond their supposed working hours, from the year 1951  up to  the present  or up to the date they  became  monthly salaried employees  and  if so, to compute the amount due them and  submit a report  for further disposition  of  the  Court.  For  the  purpose  of  simplifying  the computation of the basic  rate per hour,  the  suggested formula should be  to divide the  weekly pay (rate per day times 6 days) by 40  hours."

Following is a summary of the background of the case: On March 15, 1948, the National  Textile Workers Union filed  with the Court of  Industrial  Relations a labor case, which was docketed as No. 129-V, involving among others controversy over minimum wage, vacation and sick leave, salary increases,  social security,  backpay, housing project, and payment of overtime.  This was decided on November 5,  1948,  but the case was not terminated in view of  the various incidents that  ensued after the rendition of  the award.  One of  them  was the  filing by the petitioning Union in August,  1956, of  a petition  on behalf  of 51 other members headed by  respondent  Bonifacio R. de Luna, claiming  compensation for work rendered from 4:00  to  5:00  p.m.  on Mondays  through Fridays,  and from 2:00 to 5:00  p.m. on Saturdays, or a total  of eight hours per week, counted from the year 1951. This petition being the seventh incident in the  case, was docketed as No. 129-V (7), involving as it did the same parties.  In it  these 51 members alleged that,  having been assigned and/or detailed to office work in the administrative offices of the company  as  clerks,  typists,  stenographers, bookkeepers,  accountants, etc., on a  daily  wage  basis, the implied contract  of  their  employment was that  their working  hours are the same as those  observed  by the monthly-paid employees, i.e., from  8:00 to 12:00 in the morning  and from 1:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon  from Mondays through Fridays, and from  8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on Saturdays; that as a matter of fact, the company had been paying them compensation for these additional hours of service, but that in  1951,  payment  for such additional  work  was stopped  by  the company,  at the recommendation of its  auditor, although  they  were required to  continue working up to 5:00  o'clock  in the afternoons  as usual.

On September  1st, 1956, the  National  Development Company  moved  to  dismiss  the  petition  alleging that the Court  of Industrial Relations had already lost  its jurisdiction over the case by  virtue  of the passage of the Minimum Wage  Law  (R.  A.  602) and of the Industrial Peace Act  (R. A.  875); but  the motion was denied on  January  29th,  1957.  On  February 7,  1957, the company filed its answer  reiterating  its allegations in the motion to  dismiss, and averred  that  the case was  a proper subject of collective bargaining pursuant to Republic Act No. 875.  On  October 12th of  the  same year,  the order  subject of these proceedings was  issued by  the  Court  of Industrial  Relations maintaining  its jurisdiction and holding that the petition in  question was merely an  incident  of  the main  case and that  the  51 petitioning  members were  entitled to  their  claim.  It therefore directed its Examining Division to make the necessary  computations  of the  amount due  each and every one  of them.  Reconsideration  of the order was sought, but was denied on November 21,  1957,  by the court en bane; hence this present petition.

Petitioner National Development Company now contends that the Court of Industrial Relations  had  no  power to  make the  award to  the  51  members  of the  Union because,  under the Industrial  Peace Act and by  virtue of the decisions of this  Tribunal  in the  cases of Reyes vs. Tan, et al., 99  Phil., 880; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 14, p. 6187, and PAFLU vs. Tan, et aJ., 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 13, p.  5836, the power of the Court of Industrial Relations is circumscribed only  within  the following cases:

"(1) When the labor dispute  affects  an industry which is indispensable to the national interest  and is so certified  by the President to the industrial court  (section  10, Republic Act 875);
"(2) When the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law  (Republic Act  602);
"(3) When it involves hours  of employment under the  Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth  Act 444); and
"(4) When it involves an unfair labor practice  (section 5[a], Republic Act 875).

"In all other cases, even if they grow out of a labor dispute, the industrial court  does not have  jurisdiction, the policy  of the law being to advance the settlement of disputes between the employers and the employees through collective bargaining, recognizing 'that the real industrial  peace cannot be  achieved by compulsion of law' (section  1[c], in relation to  section 20, Republic Act 875)."

It  further  maintains that the petition in question, which involves  a controversy foreign to those litigated  in the main  case,  cannot be said  to  be an incident thereof, as said  principal  case had  already been  decided as  far back as November 5, 1948, and therefore no longer pending at the time of the passage of the Industrial  Peace Act whereby the  Court of Industrial  Relations is empowered to continue processing cases then pending,  under  Commonwealth Act 103,  as amended; and  that neither could said court have jurisdiction under the  latter  Act, because the issue  involved is a demand concerning terms  or conditions  of  employment which, under  R. A. 875,  is a proper subject of collective  bargaining as  a means  of promoting sound,  stable industrial  peace.

There  is no  dispute 1) that although  officially and on paper the 51 members of the Union were employed by the  National Development  Company  as workers  or laborers  on  the  daily wage basis and as  such should work eight hours a day or 48  hours a week, they were, however, designated or assigned to perform, as in fact they did perform, regular office work  in the administrative  offices of the company  as typists,  stenographers, bookkeepers and accountants; "2) that  the  regular office hours observed  by the monthly-paid  regular  employees of the company is from  8:00  to 12:00 in the morning and  from  1:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon from Mondays through  Fridays, or seven hours a  day, and from  8:00 a.m. to 1:00. p.m., or  5 hours, on  Saturdays, or a  total of 40  hours a  week; 3)  that these  51  members were required  to work eight hours  every day  from  Monday to Saturday, or 48 hours a week,  that is  to  say, from 8:00 to  12:00  in  the  mornings and from  1:00  to  5:00 in the afternoons from  Mondres through  Fridays, and from 8:00  a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and from  2:00 to 5:00 p.m. on Saturdays; and 4) that for these  eight extra hours a  week  they were paid  from the beginning  of their designation or  assignment as office employees until the end  of  1950 when the  company stopped  paying them for said  extra  hours  of  work  upon the recommendation of its auditor.

Under  the circumstances and in view of the aforestated conduct of the herein petitioner,  the  lower court was fully justified in upholding the right of the 51 respondents herein to claim compensation for said extra hours.  In fact, petitioner  does  not  openly assail such right, for the only issue it raised in its petition is "whether  or not respondent Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction  over the case."

The record shows that the  main  case,  No.  129-V, was  filed, litigated and decided in  1948 under Commonwealth Act 103, as amended.  Unlike in ordinary courts that once the decision acquires finality the case is said to be terminated,  the Court of Industrial Relations is granted ample powers, during the effectiveness of the award, to  alter, modify  in whole  or  in  part,  or even set  aside the award or decision,  or  reopen the  case. Thus Section 17 of Commonwealth Act  103 provides:

"SEC. 17. Limit of  Effectiveness of  Award. An award,  order or decision of the Court shall be valid  and effective during  the time therein specified.  In the absence of  such  specification, any party or both parties to a controversy may terminate the  effectiveness of an  award,  order or  decision after three  years  have elapsed from the date  of said award, order  or  decision  by  giving notice to that effect to the Court: Provided, However, That anytime during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the Court may, on application of  an interested party, and  after due hearing, alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside  any such award,  order or decision, or reopen any question involved  therein"

When Republic  Act  875 was  enacted in June,  1953, curtailing some of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations granted by Commonwealth Act 103, it did not deprive said court from taking cognizance  of  cases wrested from  its jurisdiction by Republic Act  875;  on the  contrary, it empowered  said  court to process  them in accordance  with  C. A. 103,  as  amended.  Thus  the transitory provision of the Industrial Peace Act found in Section 27 thereof, authorized the court in the following language:

"SEC. 27. Transitory Provision. All cases  pending before   the Court of Industrial Relations at the time of passage of  this  Act shall be processed by the Court according to Commonwealth  Act Numbered One hundred three, as  amended by Commonwealth Acts Numbered Two hundred fifty-four, Three hundred fifty-five  and Five hundred fifty-nine but the  judges of the Court shall  call both parties to the dispute and make every attempt to help them reach a just and  speedy  solution  by mutual  agreement."

True  that  the main case, No. 129-V,  had already been decided five  years  prior to  the passage  of  R.  A. 875; but  it is equally true  that at the effectivity of said  Act the  case was  still open,  unsettled and pending  in view of the various incidental questions relative to the processing of the award,  and under the transitory provision above transcribed,  the  Court of Industrial  Relations was duly empowered to  continue processing the  case under C. A. 103,  as  amended.  And when the petition in  question came up in August, 1956, which was the seventh incident in the  case and for  which  reason it was  docketed as No.  129-V(7), the whole  case was  still  open  and unsettled.  In fact, only on May 25, 1957, or June 1,  1957, was the award in the main case deemed terminated  when herein petitioner, by virtue of Section 17 of C. A. 103, asked that the effectiveness of the award  be terminated (Annexes  6 and 7,  respondent  Court).  The Court of Industrial  Relations  in calling  Case  No. 129-V(7) for hearing presumably to  "make every attempt to help  them (the parties) reach a just and speedy solution by mutual agreement,"  did nothing but comply  with the transitory provision .above referred to.  Evidently the parties  were at loggerheads and have failed to reach an  agreement that the court  had to  hear the case and receive  evidence which served as the basis for issuing the order of October 12, 1957.   The lower court, in so doing, acted within its jurisdiction not only under C. A. 103, as amended, but under R. A. 875 as  well.

Petition denied, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion, Barrera,  and  Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.