The plaintiff has appealed from the order of Judge Jose N.  Leuterio of the Nueva  Ecija court of  first  instance, dismissing his  complaint whereby  he  had asked that defendant be required to vacate  a parcel of land and to pay damages.  The dismissal rested  on  two grounds,  (a) the  case  pertained to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact  of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff had  no right to bring the action.

The record discloses that  on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo,  filed  in the justice  of the peace  court of  San Antonio,  Nueva Ecija,  a  complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters  belonging to Severino P. Marcelo  (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all  the products raised in the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner.  The complaint alleged that  after plaintiff  had  assumed the  administration of Severino  Marcelo's properties,  defendant  delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but  when in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he  would have to  pay a rental of two  pesos  per month,  the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay such additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the premises and to  pay damages and  costs.    

The defendant  questioned  the  court's jurisdiction,  arguing  that the matter involved  tenancy relations falling within  the  authority of  the Agrarian Court; he  also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue.  He lost in the justice of the peace court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his views prevailed.

In this  appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or detainer proceedings,  which fall within  the justice  of the peace court's jurisdiction.  He claims  the  lot to be residential,  and   not  agricultural.  On  this  point, His Honor noted that "the land covered by the title of plain tiff's  principal covers  an area of 59,646  square meters situated in the barrio of San Mariano, San Antonio,  Nueva Ecija.  This land obviously is agricultural, and it is too much to presume that barrio folks would occupy an area of 2,000 square meters more or less of land for a residence. The cultivation  of the land by the defendant and the sharing of the  products  thereof with the  owner  of  the land characterize the  relationship between the  defendant and the plaintiff's principal as one of landlord and tenant."

Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could conclude  that defendant  had  physical possession of the land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop.  This was agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy".  In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-a-month-rental alleged in the complaint may be  disregarded,  because  defendant never  having  agreed to such imposition, it may not be held a part of the compensation payable for holding the land.   The circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on the agricultural lot does not ipso facto  make  it  residential considering specially that the dwelling photograph submitted with brief does not occupy more than 80 square meters of the 2,000 square meters occupied by him.

In this connection,  plaintiff argues as follows:

"The defendant does not  till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full grown. He  does  not  even  do the  actual  gathering of the  fruits. He merely  supervises the  gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the  fruits  to the plaintiff all in consideration of his  stay in the land. He is not, therefore, a tenant  within the  meaning  of that term as used  in Republic Act  No. 1199 for 'A tenant shall mean a  person  who, himself and with the aid available  from within his immediate farm  household, cultivate the land for purposes of production .  .  .'"

Anyone  who has had  fruit trees in his yard, will disagree  with the above description of the relationship.  He knows the caretaker must water the trees,  even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests,  etc.  Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems  that defendant planted  other crops, (i. e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner  his corresponding share.

Now, the  statutes provide that 'All cases involving dispossession of a  tenant by the  landholder * *  * shall be under  the original and exclusive jurisdiction  of such court as may  now or hereafter be  authorized by law to  take cognizance  of tenancy relations and  disputes". Sec.  2, Republic Act 1199); and the court  (Agrarian Relations) "shall  have original and  exclusive jurisdiction to consider, investigate,  decide  and  settle all  questions and matters involving all those  relationships established by law which determine the varying rights  of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land'".   (Sec. 7, Republic  Act 1267 as amended by Republic Act 1409.)

In Tumbagan vs.  Vasquez, Lr-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly held that where a farmhand occupies agricultural land and erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues subject to tenancy laws not to those governing leases.

In fact, the Agricultural  Tenancy Law (Republic Act 1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant an area wherein the latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of  course without thereby changing the nature  of their relationship,  from landowner and tenant to  lessor and lessee.

At any rate,  this action  must fail  upon the  second ground of defendant's  motion to dismiss: the  plaintiff is a  mere  apoderado of  the owner,' Severino  P. Marcelo.^[1] The rule is that every action must  be  prosecuted  in the name of the real party in interest,  (sec. 2, Rule 3).

However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the  legal representative" of  any landlord to bring an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate.  Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1, includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue  any and all  kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land".  This action is not in the  name of plaintiff's principal.

For all the foregoing, the appealed  order is  affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Padilla, Montemayor,  Bautista  Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Arroyo vs. Granda,  18 Phil., 484; Hilario vs. La Congregacion, 27 Phil., 593.