This is a petition for review of a decision of respondent Commissioner dated April 20, 1955, granting the dependents of one Domingo  Garin  the  sum of P2,994.25 as death benefits,  plus burial expenses not exceeding  P200,  minus any amount already paid.

Petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.  Domingo  Garin  was employed by petitioner as a laborer  in its  Central since 1927, first as a bagasse-packer, and later as a  stoker, with a daily compensation  of P4.36.  While in the  performance  of his duties he contracted  pulmonary tuberculosis and on December 5,  1951, he applied  for retirement for reasons of ill-health.  On  December 6, 1951,  petitioner's physician issued a  certification attesting to the weak physical condition of Garin  and recommended approval of his request. Whereupon he  was retired and  granted retirement pay in the sum of P525, which  was later raised to P725.

On June  10, 1952,  Garin filed a notice of sickness and claim for  compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Division of the Bureau of Labor, and while the same was pending investigation, Garin died on January 11, 1953. Thereafter, on June  30, 1954, respondent Commissioner rendered a decision awarding Garin the  amount of P2,502 as disability benefits and a weekly compensation of P18.00.

On  January 11, 1955,  petitioner informed respondent Commissioner that it is willing to pay  the correct amount of compensation on condition that such  compensation be limited to the period  from October 20,  1951  to  January 11, 1953, the last date corresponding to Garin death.

On  April  16,  1955, Felicidad Ocampo Vda. de Garin executed  a notice of death and claim for death  benefits and sent the same to  respondent Commissioner,  and on April 28,1955, the latter rendered another decision awarding the dependents of  Garin the amount of P1,134.00 as disability compensation from  October 20, 1951 to January 11, 1958, another amount of P2,994.25 as death  benefits, plus burial expenses amounting to P200,  less any  amount already paid.

On May 4, 1955, petitioner wrote respondent Commissioner conceding the amount of P1,134  to Garin's dependents as disability benefits provided the  amount  of P725 paid to Garin be deducted therefrom.   However,  it contested that portion of the decision  awarding  death compensation on three grounds: (1) that the notice of death and claim for  compensation were filed out  of time;  (2) that Garin  died more than  2 years  from the date of sickness;  and (3) that  the increase from P18 when Garin was alive to  P20.65 after he had died was not correct.

On June 27, 1955, respondent Commissioner rendered an order  on petitioner's motion stating that the delay in giving the notice  of death and in filing the claim for death benefits did not prejudice  the petitioner,  and as a result, he ignored the latter's  request  for hearing.

Hence the present petition for review by way  of certiorari.

It is now contended that respondent Commissioner acted with great abuse of discretion in awarding death benefits and burial expenses to  Garin's dependents for  the following reasons:  (1) that the notice of death and claim  for death benefits were filed out of time;  (Z) that the claim for death benefits and  burial expenses should have been dismissed for the reason that Garin died  more than two years from the date of sickness; and (3) that respondent Commissioner does not have before him  sufficient proof to justify his award of death benefits.   Petitioner likewise contends that respondent Commissioner acted arbitrarily when he denied petitioner's request for a hearing.

Petitioner's contention that  the  notice  of death and claim for death benefits  were filed out of time is not well founded.  Although Section  24  of our  Workmen's C6mpensation Act, as amended, provides that the notice and claim for compensation must be made within two months after injury or sickness or in case of death not later than three months  after death, however,  the same section provides that in case medical, surgical, and hospital services and  supplies have been  furnished voluntarily by the employer, such notice shall  not be necessary, and that if the employer has voluntarily made compensation payments, the claim for compensation  is  not also necessary. Petitioner admits that it had freely  furnished the late Garin. with such  medical  services and  supplies  he  needed during his illness and  that  upon his retirement  it had voluntarily paid him a retirement compensation in the amount of P934, which clearly indicate that the present claim comes within the exception to  the rule which requires timely filing of the notice  and claim for compensation.

Moreover,  Section  27 of the same  Act provides that "failure to or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding herein provided if  it is shown that the employer, his agent  or  representative  had knowledge of the accident or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure."  Here it cannot be pretended that the late  filing of the notice  and claim for  death benefits has caused prejudice  to petitioner for  it knew right along the sickness  with which  Garin was afflicted so much so that it helped him in his  medical treatment and hospitalization.  In fact he  was under treatment of petitioner's physician up to October 26,  1952, and it is this same sickness that brought him to his grave on January 11, 1953.  The reason behind the requirement that prompt notice be given of the sickness or death by the employee or his dependents to the employer is  in order that the  latter may take the necessary steps to protect his interest, which purpose may not be attained if notice is unreasonably delayed, but when the employer knows right  from the beginning the  sickness of the employee and the cause of his death, the reason for the requirement ceases to exist.   Such is the situation herein obtained.

The contention that  the  claim for death benefits  and burial expenses  should be dismissed  for  the reason that Garin died more than two years from his sickness, is not also well founded.  The law invoked by petitioner is Section 8 of the Act which we quote in part:

"Sec. 8. Death benefits. If the disease contracted or  injury received by the employee as provided in section two hereon  cause his death  within two  years from the date of such injury or sickness; the employer shall pay the compensation  to the persons entitled thereto, and in case there shall be none, he  shall pay to the person representing the deceased employee the burial expenses not to exceed two hundred pesos, and shall  also pay  to or for the  following persons, in the order or priority and during the periods hereinafter set forth. * *  "

It is petitioner's  theory that the  two-year period mentioned in the law should be reckoned with from the date the injury is caused or the illness is  contracted resulting in death in order that the  employee may be entitled to compensation, or that the wording  of the law should be interpreted literally in order that the  illness or death may be compensable.   To this we cannot agree for that would render  the law  nugatory and  ineffective.  A reasonable interpretation would be that the two-year period be counted from the date the disease or illness becomes compensable, or from the date  the employee's sickness  renders him physically disabled  to do the work,  which  interpretation is in  keeping with the general rule in,compensation cases that the injuries or diseases that are compensable are only those which produce disability and  thereby  affect the earning power of the employee. In other words, as long as the employee is able to work and receives his pay even if he is suffering from illness, he  is not entitled to compensation.

"Sec. 240. Nature of injuries and elements of damage compensated. In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated  for are those which produce disability and thereby affect earning power. *  * *"   (Larson's Workmen's Compensation  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp. 9-10).

In  the instant  case,  it appears, Garin contracted pulmonary tuberculosis much prior September 28, 1950, when his treatment by petitioner's physician began, although the same did not prevent him from working until December 5, 1951, when he applied for retirement because of the aggravation  of  his illness.  He therefore became incapacitated for  work  only beginning December 5,  1951,  and only from that time  on his ailment became  compensable within the meaning of the law, and so the counting of the two-year period should  start from that time.   The period of two years cannot be counted from September 28, 1950 when Garin was  placed  under treatment by petitioner's physician, as petitioner  would  like us to apply, because even if Garin were then treated he was not yet completely incapacitated for  labor until  December 5, 1951, when he applied for  retirement.   Petitioner's  contention that the claim for compensation  should have  been dismissed  is therefore without merit.

Petitioner finally  contends that respondent erred in making the award for death benefits even if he had not before him sufficient proof to justify  such award.   This contention is also untenable.   It appears that petitioner became aware of the death of Garin  on January 11, 1955.  Pursuant to  Section  45 of the  Act,  it has  10  days within which to controvert dependents' right to compensation, but it failed to  do so, and instead  it merely informed the Commissioner that Garin died way back on January  11, 1953, and that there was need of a re-computation of the amount of the award in order to adjust it to the date of death of Garin.   Such failure constitutes a renunciation on its part of its right to dispute the award.  And since they  have failed  to controvert dependents' right to  compensation seasonably, it cannot now be heard to complain that it was deprived of its right to a hearing.

Wherefore, petition  is denied.   The decision  appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.