The question involved in this  action is the scope of the power of control lodged in the Davao City mayor by section 9 of its charter (C.A. No. 51) over the departments of the city government. Does it  give  him authority to require the chief of police of the city to relieve Capt.  Petronilo  S. Cariaga as finance and supply officer of the police department, and to assign him to field duty? The Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Amador E. Gomez, presiding, held that it does, and granted a petition for mandamus directing the chief of police to comply with the disputed order.

The chief of police appeals from the above order, claiming that it is beyond the scope of the mayor's authority, because the organization,  government and disposition of police personnel is the sole responsibility of the chief of police, and not that of the mayor as provided for in Section 21 of the city charter, although he (chief of police) may be answerable for his acts  to said mayor; that the supposed power of control of the mayor over the different departments contained in Section 9 of  the charter  does not infringe upon  the specific  powers and duties vested  in  the chief  of police as  provided  in Section 21; and  that no power to transfer officers or employees not appointed by the President is expressly lodged in the  mayor,  unlike the case  in cities of Cebu and  Manila.  It is also  claimed  that the duties and powers of the chief of police are discretionary in character and may not be compelled by mandamus; and that the  mayor has another speedy; adequate and plain remedy  in law, which is that provided for  in Republic Act No.  557.

The provisions  of the Davao city charter which  have reference to the question at issue are as follows:

"SEC. 9.  As chief executive  of  the  city government, the Mayor shall have immediate control over the executive and administrative functions of the different departments, subject to the supervision of the Secretary of the  Interior, and shall be held  accountable for the proper administration of all affairs of the city.

(2)  *  *  *   To see that the officers and employees of  the city properly discharge their respective duties.

SEC. 23.  Each head of department of the city government shall be in control of such department, under the supervision and control of the Mayor and shall  possess such powers as may be prescribed herein or by ordinance."   (Com. Act No. 51).

The lower court found that the city mayor had directed the chief of police to relieve Capt. Cariaga as finance and supply officer and  ordered the latter's transfer to the field, because newspapers reported that  anomalies  have  been committed by certain  officers in  the custody  of  records under  the finance and supply officer. The  court  below found that the above circumstances fully justify the mayor in exercising  his power. Control  and supervision have been  elucidated  in  two cases  as follows:

"In administrative law,  supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to  see that subordinate officers perform their duties.  If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action  or step as prescribed by law to  make them perform these  duties.  Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had  done in the. performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the  former for that of the latter."   (Mondaño vs. Silvosa, 51  Off. Gaz., 2885).

"Supervision is not  a meaningless thing.  It is an active power.  It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic  and brutal, it must be founded upon  knowledge  of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful  study  and investigation."  (Planas vs. Gil, 37 Off.  Gaz., 1228).

If the power of control includes the power to nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in  the performance of his duties and to substitute his own judgment for that of the subordinate, then it  is  evident  that the mayor of the city of Davao has, under the power of control vested in him over the different departments of  the city, the power to order the transfer of the finance and supply officer from his work in the office of the chief of police and his assignment to the field.

It is contended that the duties of the respondent appellant are discretionary in character and may not be controlled by  mandamus. The argument may not be availed of in the case at bar.  The respondent-appellant has not been  compelled to perform a distinct duty.  He  is being compelled to execute an order of the mayor for the transfer of the finance and supply officer to the field.  The duty to comply with this order is expressly provided by Section 21, par.  (d) of C. A. No. 51, which states:

"* *  *  and shall promptly and faithfully execute all orders of the Mayor  * *  *."

Another objection raised against the  petition for mandamus,  is the supposed existence of another speedy, adequate  and  plain remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is that set forth  in Republic Act No. 557.   We can not see how the investigation provided for in said Act by the city council could be appropriate, adequate, or speedy. The investigation provided for in said law refers to charges preferred by the city mayor against members of the police department.  The case  at  bar is  different.  The city mayor,  by virtue of his power of  control,  can order the transfer of the finance and  supply officer to the field, and he did so,  evidently to  avoid further commission  of irregularities in the police department, which  is under  him. No amount of investigation by the city council would remedy the situation.  The transfer of the person supposed to be responsible for the irregularity, or under whom the irregularity  has persisted, is the  most expedient remedy.

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, in toto with cost against appellant.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera,  JJ., concur.