This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge to approve and  certify the record on appeal  filed by petitioners for the purpose of  having the decision rendered by said Judge reviewed by the Court of Appeals.

In Land Registration Case  No. 209,  LRC Record No. 715,  jointly heard  with  Cadastral  Case  No.  68,  L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 1455,  pending before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, a decision was rendered  by respondent Judge on March 28, 1958, in favor  of the oppositors.  Copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to applicants' counsel, Attorney Rufino E. Gonzalez.

On March 31, 1958, the first registry notice addressed to Attorney Gonzalez was received by his  son on April 1, 1958, but he actually received the  letter from the  post office on April  8, 1958.   On  May 7, 1958, the  applicants, through' their  counsel, filed  their  notice  of appeal  and appeal bond and prayed  that the same be approve.  Counsel for  the oppositors  filed their opposition contending that the appeal was filed one  day late, which  opposition was  upheld by the  Court.  Thereupon, respondent Judge issued on June 13, 1958, an order disapproving  the record on appeal.   Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, they interposed the present petition for mandamus.

The order  of respondent Judge containing the reasons for  disapproval  of  the record is quoted hereunder for ready reference:

"The  applicants- claimants ask  for  the approval  of the record on appeal filed on May 7,  1958.  The appeal  bond was deposited with the office of the clerk  of  Court on May 8,  1958.  It appears, however, that a copy of the decision was sent to this counsel for the applicants- claimants on March 31,  1958,  and  that the first notice of said registered letter was sent  to Atty. Rufino Gonzalez for the applicants on April 1, 1958. While it is true  that in the registry return receipt, Atty. Rufino  Gonzalez  appears  to  have received the decision sent by registered letter on April 15, 1958, yet, the said date is  not the determining factor  in  deciding, whether or not,  the  record on appeal was filed   on time.   Under sec. 8, Rule  27, Rules of  Court, it  is provided, therefore, that in case the addressee fails to  claim  his mail  from the  post office within five  (5) days from the first notice of  the postmaster, the service shall  take effect  at the expiration of  such time.  This being the the case, counsel  for the applicants-claimants is supposed to  have received the decision on April 5, 1958.  He only filed his record on appeal on May 7, 1958, and deposited the appeal bond on  May 8, 1958,  It  is clear, therefore, that the record on appeal was filed out  of time, and that  when the same was filed,  the decision has already become final.

WHEREFORE, this Court refuses to act on, and denied the approval of the record on appeal.

SO ORDERED. Done at Lingayen, Pangasinan, this 13th day of June, 1958.

(Sgd.)   Eloy B. Bello

Judge

It would appear, according to respondent Judge, that copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to counsel for the applicants on March 31, 1958, and the first notice thereof was sent to their  counsel on April 1, 1958, but that actually applicants' counsel withdrew the letter from the post office on April 15, 1958.  And  considering that under Section  8, Rule 27, of the  Rules of Court, in case the addressee of the mail fails to claim the mail from the post office within 5 days from the first notice sent to him, the service is deemed to take effect at the  expiration of such time,  respondent Judge concluded  that counsel  is deemed to have received copy of the decision on April 5, 1958.  And since he submitted the record on appeal only on May 8, 1958, in his opinion the same was filed out of time.

The foregoing is disputed by  the applicants. They contend that  the same is  contrary to the true  facts as shown by the affidavits attached to their motion for reconsideration which clearly indicate that the record on appeal was filed within the reglementary period. We have gone over the record  and we find this  claim to be well taken. Thus, it appears that the first notice sent by the post office to counsel for applicants advising him of the registered mail sent  by the Clerk of Court, was actually received on  April 1, 1958,  by counsel's daughter,  Aurora, who was only 11 years old, who in turn delivered same to her brother Manuel, also a minor, for which reason the notice never reached him. It  likewise appears  that when on April 8, 1958, counsel's  other  son, Lito,  who  was  his helper in the office, went to the  post office for an errand, the postmaster delivered to him the registered mail  in question and on the same date Lito gave it to his father. But when counsel for  applicants filed the record on appeal on May 7, 1958, the same was disapproved on the ground that it was filed out of time.

We disagree with  this finding.   Section 8, Rule 27, provides .that "service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt  by  the addressee;  but if  he fails  to claim his mail  from  the post office within 5  days from the  date of first notice of the postmaster, the service shall take effect at the expiration of such time."  Note that the rule speaks of "from the date  of  first notice of the postmaster," which presupposes that  the addressee has actually received the mail on said date, and when he fails to do so because of some justifiable excuse, the presumption of the  law cannot apply, for to interpret this  rule rigidly or to the letter may work injustice  rather than promote justice.  Such is the situation that obtains here.  The first notice did not reach actually the counsel for the applicants because it was  given to his minor children, but when he got  the mail eight days thereafter,  he saw to it that the record on appeal be filed within  the reglementary period. In the circumstances, equity demands that the relief prayed for be granted in keeping with the principle that the rules should be liberally construed to promote the  interest of justice.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Judge  is ordered to give due course to the appeal interposed  by applicants.   No costs.

Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor,  Labrador,  Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Paras C. J. concurs  in  the  result.