Plaintiff-appellant  seeks the  reversal  of the  order  of the Court  of First  Instance  of Negros  Occidental dis missing  the case on  the  ground that the  complaint  does not state  a cause of action.

On  February 19, 1953,  plaintiff filed in the court below a  complaint wherein, after stating1  the legal  personalities of the parties, he  averred the following:

"2. That the plaintiff is  the lawful  father of the child, Winston Ortaliz, had in legitimate wedlock with Klena Lucasan;

"3. That  on  or  about  December  18,  1953, at  the  corner  of Washington and  Justicia  Streets, Bacolod  City,  Philippines, the Studebaker  Sedan Car  with  Plate No.  35-1138 of  the  defendant struck  the plaintiff's son, Winston Ortaliz, causing upon him physi- cal injuries  as  a result  of  which he  was taken to the  Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital  as evidenced  by the medical  certificate herewith  attached and marked  as Annex "A"  of this complaint;

"4. That the  said Studobaker Sedan Car with Plate  No.  35-1138 was at  the time of the accident, driven and controlled by  Segundino Estanda,   a  driver  under  the employ of the  defendant,  without due care  and  diligence  and with negligence and  recklessness and violation of traffic rules and regulations;

"5. That an information  was filed in the  Municipal  Court of the City  of Bacolod which  was docketed  as  Criminal Case  No.  2607 against the said Segundino Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical Injuries Through  Reckless Imprudence, a  copy of  said  Information is  hereto  attached marked  as Annex  "B"  and made  an integral part of this complaint;

"6. That the said Segundino Estanda pleaded  guilty to  the crime charged in the Information  and he was finally  sentenced to suffer the penalty  of  five  (5)  days  of  Arresto Menor  and  to pay the costs in a Decision  rendered in said case, copy of which Decision is  hereto   attached marked  as  Annex  "C"  and made  an integral part of this  complaint;

"7, That the said Decision,  Annex  !'C"  has long become final and said Segimtlino  Estanda has already served  the penalty metted to him by  virtue thereof;

"8. That the plaintiff  has suffered damages in  the  form of expenses  paid  for  the hospltalization,  medicines,  physicians'  fees and incidental expense of his  son, Winston  Ortaliz,  in  the  amount of P446.58;   "

"9. That the plaintiff,  by  reason of the  accident met  by his  said son, Winston. Ortaliz, as above-stated, through the  fault, negligence and recklessness   of  Segundino  Estanda  for  whose  acts the defendant  is responsible because he was at the  time  employed  by him (defendant)   as his driver,  has also  suffered, because  of the mental anguish, fright, serious  anxiety, wounded feelings and  moral shook,  moral  damages  in  the amount  of  TWO  thou∧  PESOS (F2,000), Philippine Currency;

"10.  That  the  boy, Winston  Ortaliz, was strong, robust and happy  before  the accident that caused  on him  physical  Injuries which necessitated his hospitalization  and medical  attention, and was not suffering nor had he  ever suffered from  any illness;

"11.  That demands have been  made on the  defendant to pay the  plaintiff the  sum of  P2,446.55 for  actual,  consequential and moral damages, but the defendant  refused and. still refuses to pay the  same,  and that by reason  of the refusal  of the  defendant, the plaintiff was forced  to  secure  the services of an attorney paying the  latter  the  sum of P500.

"Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that a decision be rendered;

1. 
   
2. Sentencing-  the defendant  to pay  the  plaintiff the  sum  of F2,-146.55 for the  actual,  consequential and  moral  damages  plus  an additional  sum of P50O for attorney's fees;
   
   
3. To pay the costs of  this suit, and
   
   
4. Plaintiff  be  granted any  other remedy that is just and equit- able and proper in law."

On March 18, 1953, the defendant-appellee filed a  motion to dismiss wherein, after  admitting the ownership of the Studebaker Sedan  car  with plate  No. 35-1138, he  alleged the following:

" (a)  That  the case  at  bar is  one for  recovery of  damages arising from the  crime  of Slight  Physical Injuries  as borne  out by the allegations of  the complaint itself.

"(b) That defendant  is  being sued  in his  capacity as  the  employer  of  the  perpetrator  of   the  said crime, Segundino  Estanda, and,  as deducible from  the allegations of the complaint,  for defendant's supposed subsidiary civil  liability  arising therefrom under the Revised Penal Code.

"(d)  That  the complaint does  not allege that defendant was nor  is  engaged in  any  business  or industry in  conjunction with which he  has  at any time used  the said  car, much less  on  the occasion of  the alleged  accident,  nor  that defendant bad at any time put out the  said car  for hire.

"(e)  That  the  obligation or liability of defendant, if  any,  for the  damages alleged in  the complaint, being  an obligation arising from a  criminal  offense, is governed  by Article 1161 oC the Civil Code,  which, in turn, makes the penal laws  applicable thereto.

"(f)  That, under  Article 103  of the Revised  Penal Code, it  is essential,  in order  for  an employer to  be liable subsidiarily  for felonies committed  by his  employee,  that the former be engaged in some kind of industry,  and that  the employer had  committed the crime  in  the discharge of Ms  duties  in  connection  with such industry.

"(g) That,  therefore, defendant cannot "be held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his driver  as  alleged  in  plaintiff's complaint.

"PREMISES CONSIDERED,  defendant  respectfully prays  this Hon. Court to dismiss the complaint,  the  same having failed to state a cause of action, with costs."

Thereafter the parties  submitted  their  respective  memoranda on whether the complaint  failed to state a cause of action and the Court, after  taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the parties, dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff now contends that under paragraph 2 of Article 2884 of the  Civil Code and paragraphs  1 and 5 of Article 2180,  a sufficient cause  of  action has been  clearly alleged in the  disputed complaint  and therefore the same  should not have  been  dismissed.   Article  2180  in part provides:

"Art. 2180.  The obligation imposed by artiele 2176 is demandable not only for  one's  own acts  or  omissions, but also  for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

"Employers shall be liable  for  the  damages caused by their employees  and household  helpers  acting: "within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the  former are  not  engaged  in  any business or industry."

and Article  2184 in its  last  paragraph  provides:

"If the  owner  was not in the motor vehicle, the  provisions of Article 2180 are  applicable."

Having in view  the  aforequoted  provisions of  law and those  of  Article  2176  to  the  effect that   "Whoever  by act or omission  causes damage  to  another, there  being fault  or  negligence, is obliged  to pay for  the damage done",  there seems to be  good  reason to support   plaintiff's contention  that  the  complaint  in question   states sufficient  cause of  action.   Defendant-appellee, however, claims that  there is no allegation in the complaint that "the  defendant was engaged in some  kind of  industry and that the employee had  committed the crime  in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry," hence  the defendant cannot  be  held  subsidiarily  liable for the crime committed by  his  driver and therefore the complaint  failed to  state facts sufficient to constitute  a cause of action.  But paragraph  5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for  it clearly provides  that  "Employers shall be  liable for the damages caused  by their employees acting within  the  scope of  their assigned  tasks,  even though the former are not  engaged in  any  business  or industry."

Defendant-appellee also contends that when the  judgment in  Criminal Case No. 2607 of the  Municipal  Court of  Bacolod was rendered  against  the driver Segundino Estanda,  plaintiff  did not  reserve the  civil  action and thus he lost his right thereto and consequently the present action  against the defendant-appellee would  not lie.   This contention,  however, is untenable, for Article 33  of the Civil  Code  clearly provides:

"Art. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil  action for damages, entirely separate  and  distinct  from the criminal  action, may  be brought by  the  injured party.  Such civil  action  shall proceed independently of  the  criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance  of evidence."

Wherefore, the order of dismissal entered by the  lower court is  hereby  revoked and the case remanded  to said court for further proceedings.  Without costs.

Paras,  C.  J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, and Felix, JJ., concur.