Plaintiff Roldan is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing his complaint on the ground that the action brought against the members of the Philippine Veterans Board, which was a mere agency of the government, was in effect a suit  against the state and  that it was done without its consent.

The facts in this case are not controverted.  Roldan was a first grade Civil Service eligible.  On March 26,  1953, he was appointed clerk in the Philippine Veterans  Board with compensation at the rate of  P2,160 a year, and he entered  upon  the performance of  his  duties.  Defendant Antonio F.  Garcia,  acting Administrative  Officer of the Philippine Veterans Board of which he was a member and signing for the Chairman, in a letter dated March  10, 1954 addressed to Roldan, among other  things, said:

"In this connection, attention may  be  invited to  the provision of section 2 of Act 2589 and the Cabinet Resolution dated December 23, 1946, reiterating its former policy against the reinstatement in the service of officers  and  employees of the Government  who  have retired under  existing retirement Acts and also to the provision of Sec.  6 of Republic Act 728, which states that '.no person shall  be appointed or reinstated in the service when he is already fifty seven years of  age, etc.'

"In view of the foregoing, and as  you were already fifty-seven (57) years of age on March  11, 1953, you are hereby advised that your services in the Board  will terminate  effective  at  the  close of business on March 25, 1954."

So, Roldan was separated from the service on March 25, 1954 and in his place  Juan Domingo was appointed. Roldan initiated Quo Warranto  proceedings against  Domingo  in Civil Case No. 25603 of the CFI  of  Manila.  The  trial court  in said case decided in favor of Roldan, declaring his  ouster to have been  illegal.   The  dispositive part  of the  decision reads thus:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; judgment is rendered declaring Juan Domingo not entitled to said office, and declaring plaintiff,  Felipe M. Roldan, as the person legally entitled and with authority to exercise the same; and the  Court orders that plaintiff be  restored  to said position.  Costs against  defendant."

Said decision became final and  was executed resulting in the  reinstatement of Roldan to  his former position  on September 24, 1955.

For the period of about  18 months that he was out of the service due to his separation therefrom on March 25, 1954, Roldan filed the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board and its five members to recover his back wages during said period plus moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 including  P600.00  for  attorneys  fees.  The trial court, through Judge Luis B.  Reyes,  dismissed the complaint on the ground that Republic Act No. 65 creating the Philippine Veterans Board made said Board a  mere agency of the Government to carry out the purposes of said Act No. 65; that  the salaries  of  the employees of said Board, like that  of the plaintiff, were appropriated every  year by law and that the salary corresponding to the position of Roldan for the period from March 26,  1954, when separated from the service, until September 24,1955, when he was reinstated, had already  been paid to Juan N. Domingo, the defendant over  whom he  won  in the Quo Warranto Proceeding;  and that neither  the  Philippine Veterans Board nor its members can provide for the payment of Roldan's back wages, having no power to do so under the law, Congress being the only body that can  make the appropriation.  In support of its ruling the trial  court cited  the  case of Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) vs.  Paredes, 79 Phil., 819.

After a careful study of the case we agree with the trial court that the ruling laid down in the case of Metropolitan Transportation  Service  (Metran) vs.  Paredes,  supra, is directly applicable.  In that case the Metran was created by an  Executive  Order shortly  after liberation in. order to provide transportation service for the government and its employees.  It would appear that as a result of a collision  resulting in damages^ action was brought against it to recover  damages.  This  Court  held that the Metran was a  mere office or  agency  of  the government, unincorporated and possessing no juridical personality under the law, incapable of suing  or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit against the government, which suit may  not prosper  without  the government's consent.  In the  case of  Metran, the latter was a mere agency of the government operating under the Bureau of Public Works.   In the present case, the Philippine Veterans Board was created  and functioned under the Department of  National Defense.  It is also a  mere  agency of  the government.  It is  not a body  corporate  and  politic in deed  and  in law, incapable  of suing or being  sued.

Appellant contends that the  Philippine Veterans Board is a juridical entity within the meaning of Article 44 of the Civil Code,  which reads  as follows:

"Art. 44. The following  are juridical persons:

(1)  The state and its political subdivisions;

(2)  Other corporation, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;  their personality begins  as soon as they have been constituted according to  law;

(3)   Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants  a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of  each shareholder, partner or member."

Counsel   for  the  appellant merely  quotes  the above-reproduced article without giving reasons why the Philippine  Veterans  Board  is  included in its provisions.  A juridical person is a "being of legal  existence, susceptible of rights and obligations,  or of being subject  of juridical relations" (2  Sanchez Roman,  p.  119, quoted  in Padilla's Civil  Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 94, 1956 Ed.).

It is clear that the Philippine Veterans  Board which was created under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 65  under the Department of  National Defense  to  carry  into  effect  the purpose of said act  and to take charge of effectuating the duties assigned  to it by law,  which Board  is composed of a chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on  Appointment from among veterans of the  Philippine Army and of  recognized  or  deserving  guerrilla organizations, which members are entitled to per diems of P15 each for every  meeting  actually attended,  may not be  considered a juridical person within the meaning of the law, capable of being sued, especially for the recovery of back salaries, which salaries are appropriated only by Congress.  So, a suit like the present one against the Board is in reality an action against the government itself.

In  the  case of Syquia  vs.  Almeda Lopez, et al.,  (84 Phil., 312; 47 Off. Gaz., 665), we held that a suit against an  officer  of a  government  by a  private citizen  which would result in a  charge against or financial  liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the government itself, and it cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of said government. In the present case, a  judgment in  favor  of Roldan for the  payment of his back  salaries  for the  period  of 18 months when he was out of the service cannot be a charge against  the Philippine Veterans   Board  or  against  its members for the reason that the board member acting as chairman in effecting the separation of Roldan from the service, assuming the same to be illegal, acted officially and in the name of the government.  Naturally, any judgment in favor of Roldan would mean a charge to or a liability against the  Philippine  Government.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,  with costs against  appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.