Jose, Jesus, Pablo and Maria all surnamed de la Cruz are the children of the late Silvestre  de la  Cruz, the first two begotten by his first  spouse  Librada Albines and the last two begotten by  his second spouse Fernanda Manzanilla.  On 1 August 1912 Silvestre de la  Cruz died intestate in Bugasong, Antique.  Proceedings for the  administration  and settlement of his estate was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Antique (Sp. proc. No. 995), which  was  terminated by  an agreement  entered into by the heirs on 30 December 1922 that partitioned the properties  of the state among them (Exhibit C).  The project of partition signed by them was submitted  to, and approved by,  the  probate  court.  Among the properties adjudicated  to  the  widow   (second  spouse)  Fernanda  Manzanilla was a parcel of sugar cane land  situated at barrio La Rioja, Patnongon,  Antique,  containing an area  of 27,980 sq. m. more or  less (Exhibit C-3) described  in paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs'  complaint.   On 26 March 1940 Fernanda Manzanilla sold the  aforesaid  parcel of land to Telesforo de la Cruz (Exhibit 3).  On 15 October 1945 Fernanda Manzanilla died  (Exhibit D).  On 27 December 1951 Telesforo  de la Cruz sold the  same parcel of land by way of pacto de retro  to Felix Busayong (Exhibit 2) and on 30  March 1954 he  repurchased  it.

On 1 October  1955 the four children of  Silvestre  de la Cruz,  the last joined  by her husband Jose B.  Barcelo, brought  an  action  against Telesforo de la  Cruz in the Court of First Instance of Antique to recover  possession and ownership of the parcel of land sold to him by  their step-mother  and mother on the ground  that the vendor being  a mere usufructuary thereof, the  vendee's  right thereto terminated upon the vendor's death on 15 October 1945.  They also prayed  that the defendant be  ordered to pay them the same  of P2,350, the amount they would have realized from  the sale of the share in the  produce of the land  from 1946 to the date of the filing of the complaint, P5,700 as moral and  exemplary damages, and P600 as attorney's fee; and to return to  them the excess of the principal  and interest of the consideration m the contract  (Exhibit 3), as provided for in  the Usury  Law. They further prayed for other just and equitable relief.

The defendant  moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground  that their cause of action is  barred by the statute of limitations.  After the denial by the Court of his motion to  dismiss,  the defendant answered the  complaint pleading that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him because he  acquired the  parcel of  land in question  by way  of  absolute sale and for a valuable consideration on 26  March 1940, from Fernanda Manzanilla, the plaintiffs' step-mother and mother, she being the owner thereof;  that since then  he has  been in  actual,  open, public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession under a claim of ownership;  and that for that reason he has acquired  title thereto by prescription.  Claiming  that as a result of the plaintiffs' frivolous claim he has suffered moral damages, the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay him P10,000 as moral damages,  P500 as attorney's fee, and the costs of the suit.   The plaintiffs controverted his  counterclaim.

After  trial,  the Court rendered judgment holding that Fernanda Manzanilla,  as owner of the parcel of  land in question, having  conveyed  it unto the  defendant  by way of absolute sale on 26  March 1940, and the latter having been in possession thereof since then as owner, the defendant has  acquired title thereto  by prescription; dismissing the plaintiff's complaint; and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant  the sum  of P124.09 as actual and moral damages  and the costs of the suit.  The plaintiffs  have appealed to this Court on purely questions of law.

The trial court found that the appellee

*   *  *  purchased  the property  from Fernanda  Manzanilla on March 26, 1940  (Exhibit  3). Since that time  up  to the filing of the complaint on  October 1, 1955, the plaintiff possessed  the  land through his tenants, received the produce thereof» paid  the  taxes of  the property, and assessed  it in his name.  On December 27, 1951, the property was sold a retro to Felix  Busayong by the defendant and the land remained  in the possession of Felix Busayong until it was redeemed by the defendant on March 30, 1954 (Exhibit 2).  From the  time the  property  was  redeemed,  the  defendant repossessed the land up to the present time.  *  *  *.

*  *  *   There is abundant evidence that since the property was sold by the late  Fernanda Manzanilla to the defendant the latter has possessed the land in the concept of an owner.  * *  *.

and  held that

*   *  *  Section 41  of the Code of  Civil Procedure  which was then the law in force at the time the sale was made makes no distinction as  to the  manner the possession has commenced.  In other words, a person who possessed a land  for  ten years  continuously,  publicly and in the concept of an owner acquired the land  by prescription even though he has no title  to the  same.  This Section 41 of Act No.  190 states partly as follows:

"*  *   *  In whatever way the  possession may have commenced or continued."

Plaintiffs' claim that the defendant has only acquired whatever right the  late Fernanda Manzanilla has on the land is  belied by the deed of sale that the  late  Fernanda Manzanilla has  executed fa favor of the defendant.  Beading attentively the deed of sale, Exhibit 3,  it appears that Fernanda Manzanilla maintained to be the owner  of the property that she has sold.  The deed recites in part:

*****  to that parcel  of  land  of my absolute  ownership which  it was acquired by us during the life of my deceased husband  *  *

and

* *  * that the  defendant has possessed the  property in litigation for a period  sufficient to acquire it by prescription, whatever right the plaintiffs might have over the  property has long prescribed at the time the action was instituted.

The appellee's possession of the parcel of land having been actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous under a claim of title exclusive  of any other right  and adverse to  all claimants,  since  26  March 1940,  he  has  acquired  title thereto.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to  costs.

Paras,  C.  J. Bengzon,  Montemayor,  Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.