In three amended complaints filed in the above-entitled cases in the Municipal  Court of Manila,  Generoso  Amosco accuses  Paz Villavicencio,  Consuelo  B.  Garcia, and  alias Doe alias Miss Santiago, of slander for uttering insulting words and expressions against him.   The slanderous words are alleged to  have been uttered  on January 23, 1954, and separate informations against the accused had previously been filed by the  Fiscal on  February 18, 1954.  But  on Jill}' 21, 1954, the three accused filed a joint motion to quash the informations on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense,  and that the municipal court has no jurisdiction to try the cases.  The court sustained this  motion on August 11, 1954; so on  August 20, 1954, the amended complaints were "filed by the offended  party" against the three accused.

On September  27,  1954, counsel for  the  accused  again filed a motion to  quash the amended complaints on the ground  that  the  offense charged  therein  has been extinguished  03' prescription, and that the facts alleged  do not constitute an offense.  On  October  18, 1954, the Municipal Court  dismissed the three cases,  but  recommended that the Fiscal appeal  the order to the higher  court so that a clear and  definite report  on the. matter at  issue can  be had.  The clerk of  court entered  the order  of dismissal in the clerk's daily report of  October 18, 1-954. Almost  eleven  months elapsed  without any action on the part of  the  Fiscal  Being taken, but on September 14, 1955, he filed  his notice of  appeal  against  the order  of October  18,  1954.   The papers  were forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1955. On September 19,  1955,  counsel for the accused filed  a motion in the  Municipal  Court to dismiss the  appeal  of the prosecution, but  the court  denied the  motion in its order of September 28,  

Once  the case was docketed in the  Court of First Instance  by virtue of  the appeal, the accused sought the return  of the  papers to the Municipal Court  in order that his motion for reconsideration of the  order allowing the appeal  may be passed upon by that court,  He also  asked that the appeal be elevated directly to the Supreme Court. The  Court of First  Instance  denied the motion of the accused that the case be certified to the Supreme  Court, holding that the  Judiciary Act of  1948  (Republic Act No. 296) confers upon the Courts of First Instance the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over  all cases "arising from municipal and  justice of  the  peace  courts.  However, it held, that the  order of the  Municipal  Court  dismissing the  informations in the  three  cases may not be reviewed by "it  for the reason that the appeal was not perfected "before six o'clock postmeridian  of the day after  the rendition  and entry of the judgment by  the municipal court."   (Section  46,  Republic. Act No.  409).  Against this order  the  Fiscal  prosecuted this appeal.

The  issue raised on this appeal  is whether or not  the period for filing an appeal from a judgment of the municipal court  of  the  City  of Manila  should  begin to  run from the entry  of  the judgment in the said  court, or from the receipt of notice of  the judgment by the party desiring  to  appeal.   The issue  involves  the  interpretation of section 46 of Republic Act No. 409,  which  is as follows:

"Sec. 46. Procedure  on appeal from,  municipal court  to  Court of First Instance. An appeal shall  lie to the  Court  of First Instance next to be held within the  city,  in all cases where  fine or imprisonment,   or  both," is  imposed  by the municipal  court. The party desiring' to appeal shall before  six  o'clock postmeridian of the day after  the  rendition and  entry of the judgment by the  municipal court,  file with  the clerk of the  court a written statement that  he appeals  to the  Court of First  Instance.  The filing of such statement shall perfect the  appeals. *  *  *.

The above provision is  a  reproduction  of  section  2445 of the  Revised  Administrative Code  of  1916, and  therefore it  should be interpreted  in  the same manner as the latter.

Some members  of  the Court  sustain the view that a judgment or order of the municipal court may be appealed by the Fiscal within the period provided, to be computed from the  actual receipt of the notice of the judgment or order.  The reason for  this  view is that  this has  been the practice and procedure followed in  all courts and in all proceedings, and lack of notice may be deemed a denial of due process.  Others  are of the opinion, following the ruling of  the judge below,  that the entry of the judgment or order in the records of the municipal court as indicated in section 46 of Republic  Act No. 409  (Revised Charter of the City of Manila), is equivalent to notice by  personal service of a copy  of the order or judgment.  As the law expressly  provides that appeals from judgment or orders of the municipal court are to be taken on  the day following  the entry  of  judgment,  the  prosecuting officers are presumed to know this provision, and if they are  interested in any order or judgment, they should take the trouble of consulting the record

We have decided not to resolve the issue and base our ruling on the case on a more  plausible ground.  All members  of the Court are agreed  that  the  Fiscal  has  been guilty of  laches in prosecuting this appeal.  In  view of the express provision of the law to the effect that appeals from orders and judgments  can be appealed only on the day  following their rendition and entry, it was the  duty of the Fiscal to find out, within a reasonable time, whether a  judgment  or order! has been  entered in the  case, so that an appeal there from may be perfected.  The Fiscal was  entirely  wanting  in  that  diligence  expected  of a public official  interested in the faithful discharge of,  his duties, and  his  failure to  exercise the required  diligence and  care  in respect to the case is  inexcusable.   Without determining the issue  presented by  the  Government in this appeal, we  hold that  the cases should be  dismissed because  of laches on the part of the  prosecuting  officer. The  order  of   dismissal   appealed  from  is,  therefore, affirmed, with costs de oftcio.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, and  Reyes,  J.  B. L., JJ., concur.