This is a petition for  a writ of  certiorari to annul an order  of the  Court  of  First  Instance of  Quezon City directing

* *  *  the National  Bureau  of  Investigation  and tho  Department of Foreign Affairs  for them to take  proper steps in order that the  accused, Emilio Suntay  y Aguinaldo, who is alleged to be in the  United  States,  may be  brought back  to the:  Philippines,  so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law, (Exhibit D) and  of prohibition  to enjoin the Secretary for  Foreign Affairs from  cancelling  the petitioner's passport without previous hearing.

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubia, father of Alicia Nubia,  a minor  of  16  years,  filed a  verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of  the City Attorney of Quezon  City,  as follows:

On  or  about  June  21,  1954, the  accused took  Alicia  Nubia from  St. Paul's College  in  Quezon  City  with  lewd  design and took her to somewhere near  the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and  was then  able to  have carnal  knowledge  of  her.  Alicia Nubia is  a minor of 16 years.

On  15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney  recommended to the  City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On  23  December 1954 attorney for the complainant ad- dressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City where- in he took  exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction  be filed  against the herein petitioner.

On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by  the Department of Foreign Affairs (No.  5981  [A39184]).  On  20  January  1955 the  petitioner left the Philippines for San  Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school.  On  31 January 1955  the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the  petitioner with  seduction which was filed in the Court of First  Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted (crim. case No.  Q-1E96,  Exhibit B).  On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed  a motion praying the Court  to issue an  order "directing such  government  agencies  as may  be concerned,  particularly  the National Bureau  of Investigation  and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of  having the accussed brought back to the Philippines  so that he may  be dealt with in accordance with law."  (Exhibit C.)   On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D).  On 7  March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the  passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to  return to the Philippines to answer the  criminal  charges  against him.  "The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the  State Department that  Emilio  Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is  considere

The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper  steps  in order that the"  petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he  may be dealt with  in accordance  with law," may  be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the  said order is illegal because "while  a Court  may review  the  action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a pass- port and grant  relief when the Secretary's discretion  is abused, the  court  cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary  and itself order a passport to be cancelled."  The petitioner further contends  that while  the Secretary for Foreign Affairs  has discretion in the  cancellation  of passports,  "such  discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or  stay  abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection  of the Constitution  and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without  due process of law. The  petitioner's  contention  cannot be  sustained.  The petitioner is charged with seduction.  And the order of the respondent Court  directing  the Department of  Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order  that the accused *  * * may be brought back to the  Philippines, so that he may be dealt with  in  accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess  of its jurisdiction.

When by law  jurisdiction is conferred on a  court  or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other  means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by  such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of  such jurisdiction is  not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process  or  mode  of  proceeding  may be  adopted  which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules.   (Section 6, Rule 124.)

Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary  must take  to compel the petitioner to  return to the Philippines to  answer the criminal charge preferred against him.

Section  25,  Executive Order  No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off.  Gaz.  1400, prescribing rules  and  regulations for the grant  and issuance of passports,  provides  that

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs as well as any diplomatic  or consular officer  duly  authorized  by  him,   is authorized,  m  his dixcretion, to refuse to issue a passport, to  restrict a passport for use  only in certain  countries, to restrict it  against  use in  certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a paxaport  alread/ij  issued,  and  to withdraw a passport for the purpose of  restricting  its validity  or use in certain countries.  (Italics supplied.)

True, the  discretion granted, to  the  Secretary for Foreign Affairs  to  withdraw or  cancel a  passport  already issued may not be exercised at whim.   But here  the  petitioner was hailed to Court  to  answer a  criminal  charge tor seduction and although at  first  an Assistant City Attorney recommended  the dismissal of  the complaint previously subscribed  and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been  taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study.  And as the Solicitor  General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in  such  a convenient  time, can  reasonably be interpreted to mean  as a deliberate at- tempt on Ms part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law  should join together  to bring him back  to  justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent  Secretary was  convinced that a miscarriage  of justice would result by his  inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound  discretion, he cannot  be enjoined from carrying it out.

Counsel  for  the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a. "quasi-judicial hearing" by  the  respondent Secretary before withdrawing or  cancelling the passport issued to him.  Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason (or the withdrawal or cancellation  of the passport  were not  clear but  doubtful.  But where the holder of a  passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the  country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for  Foreign Affairs,  in the exercise of Ms discretion  to  revoke a passport already issued, cannot  be held to  have acted  whimsically  or  capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such  passport.  Due process does not necessarily mean or  require a hearing.  When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the  passport holder,  hearing may be dispensed with by such  officer as  a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport;  lack  of such hearing  does  not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and  the  exercise  of the discretion vested  in  him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such  hearing.   If  hearing should always  be  held  in order to comply with  the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte  would be  violative  of  the  said  clause.

In the cases of Bauer vs.  Acheson, 106 F. Supp.  445; Nathan, vs. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951; and Schachtman vs. Dulles No. 12406, 23 June 1955, all decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the  district of  Columbia, cited by the petitioner, the revocation of a passport already issued or refusal  to issue  a passport applied for, was  on the vague reason that the continued possession or the  issuance thereof would be contrary to the best interest of the  United  States.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Reyes,  J. B. L.,  Endeneia and Felix JJ.,  concur.