This  is  an appeal by certiorari  from a  resolution of the  Court of Industrial Relations  dismissing a petition filed in that court by the Betting Usher's Union  (PLUM) to have the Jai Alai Corporation of the Philippines pay its  betting ushers  the minimum wage fixed  in  Republic Act  No. 602.

As a background to the case,  it should be stated that previous to the  filing  of that petition, the  acting  chief of the WAS (Wage Administration  Service, Department of Labor) had been  investigating the Jai Alai Corporation with  a view  to  determining its liability to pay  minimum wage to its  betting ushers,  but  upon complaint  of the corporation,  the  Court  of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 24155 of that court enjoined the investigation on  the ground that the  said betting  ushers, who plied their trade under  a concession, were not employees of the corporation and, therefore, not entitled to  the legal minimum wage.  In granting the injunction to  stop the investigation,  the Court of First  Instance at the  same time  denied  the claim  of  the Jai  Alai  Betting Ushers' Association which,  having been made co-defendant in the action, had set  up  a  counterclaim for P243,360 as  total minimum wages  already due its 65  members.

From the judgment rendered in the said civil  case, the acting chief of the WAS appealed to the Supreme Court, but the  Betting  Ushers' Association did not.  What it did was  to file a petition in the Court  of Industrial Relations to have that court order the Jai Alai Corporation to pay the claim for minimum wages which had already been denied by the Court of First Instance.   For reasons which do not appear, the petition is in  the  name of Betting Ushers'  Union (PLUM).  But  there appears  to be no  question  that  this  union and  the  Jai  Alai  Betting Ushers' Association are one and the same thing.

Answering the petition, the corporation set up the defense of  (1)  lack  of  jurisdiction,   (2)  lack of cause of action and (3) pendency of another case  between the same parties in the  Court of First Instance  of Manila.  And then after the expiration of the association's period for appeal in that ease, the corporation amended its answer by  converting  the third defense  (pendency  of  another suit)  into one of  res judicata on  the theory that the judgment in  the  Court of  First  Instance  had  already become final with respect to the association or  union and at the same time prayed that the preliminary issues  raised in its three  affirmative  defenses,  which also  constituted grounds  for  a motion to dismiss, be ruled  upon  and resolved  pursuant to section 5  of Rule 8.

The general manager of the corporation  having  subsequently received a letter signed by  64 out of the 65 members of  the  union,  authorizing  him to  ask for the  dismissal  of the case before the Industrial Court for lack of merit, the corporation filed a  "supplemental motion to dismiss"  pursuant  to said letter as well  as on the grounds  of res judicata and lack of cause of action.   And the union itself, by resolution of its members and  acting through its board of directors, filed a motion for dismissal "with prejudice  and without pronouncement as to costs."

Informed of the motion to dismiss, Attys.  Rafael  and Ilustre, who had theretofore been handling the case for the union, filed an opposition thereto, alleging that they had no knowledge of the letter sent by the 64 members of the union to the management of the  corporation  or of its  authenticity and  praying that resolution on the  motion to dismiss be deferred until the union should have duly  authorized  dismissal  either  through  counsel  "or directly  by  proper notice of  their  lack of interest to prosecute."   Despite  this opposition,  however, the Judge in charge of the  case  handed  down  an order on  March 30, 1955, which reads:

Acting on the motion for dismissal filed by the petitioner union, through  its Board  of Directors acting  under  authority  of  its members this case is, as it is hereby,  dismissed with prejudice."

On April 5, 1955 Attys.  Rafael and Ilustre filed a  motion for reconsideration, supporting it  8 days later with written  argument in  which, among  other  things, it is alleged that  40  members of the union had not authorized the dismissal of  the  case and that if they signed  the letter to the general manager of the corporation,  it was because  the  same was  "imposed"  (sic)  upon them and on  condition  that  they would  be fully compensated  for their  claim,  as shown  by a  resolution  of  the said  40 members, dated  April  2, 1955 attached to the  written argument.

Opposing the motion for reconsideration,  the corporation alleged that,  contrary  to the assertion  of Attys.  Rafael and Ilustre, the dismissal was consented to and duly authorized by the members of the  union; that the  dismissal was without any condition; that  the said attorneys were  without authority to ask for  a reconsideration of the dismissal as, the  day following the said  dismissal, they were by letter  informed  by the union through  its board  of directors  that their  services  were  being  dispensed with; and that  as  the dismissal partook  of  the nature of a  judgment  by  consent, it became  final upon promulgation and, therefore, no longer  subject to reconsideration or appeal.  In pleadings subsequently filed, with supporting affidavits from the members of the union,  the corporation  also informed  the  court that subsequent to the resolution of April 2, 1955, purportedly signed by 40 members  of the union  and presented by the complaining attorneys as basis for their motion  for  reconsideration, 28 of the signers thereof made statement under oath to the effect that it  was  their real  desire to have the  case dismissed for the  reason that  they  were not  really employees  of the corporation  and that if they  signed the said resolution  it  was because they had  been made to believe  that  its purpose was only  to  secure  refund of one-half of the cost of their original  uniforms.  The corporation further informed the court  that 28 more  of the members of the union  also  signed sworn statements  reiterating  their desire to have the ease dismissed with prejudice and to abide by the decision of the Court  of First Instance, so that the total, number of those who had expressed  their desire in favor of dismissal was 56, or more than four-fifths of the total union membership.

After considering the arguments adduced by  both sides, the Industrial  Court, sitting en  banc,  handed  down its resolution, dated June 18,  1955,  denying  the  attorneys' motion  for reconsideration.

From that resolution the aforementioned attorneys have appealed to this Court by certiorari,  contending that the dismissal of the case was erroneous because (1)  it in effect authorized a waiver of the legal right of the betting  ushers to a minimum wage, (2) it denied due process by not allowing a trial on the merits, and (8) it foreclosed the question of jurisdiction.

The basic question to determine is whether the dismissal of  the case was proper.

The record shows that the dismissal  was decreed upon motion  filed  by the petitioning union itself, through its board of directors, acting in deference to the  wishes of all the members of, the union except one as expressed in their resolution.  Attys. Rafael and Ilustre tried to show by means of a resolution purportedly signed by 40 members of the union that  the said 40 signers had  not.  authorized the dismissal of the case, alleging that the resolution for dismissal had been "imposed" upon them and that they were made to believe that they would be fully paid their claim for minimum wages.   But it appears from the sworn statements of more than three-fourths of the 40 signers of the resolution presented by the attorneys that their signatures were affixed  thereto under a misapprehension in that  they had  been made to believe that the object of the  said resolution was only  to secure reimbursement for one-half  of the  cost  of  their original  uniforms,  whereas  their  real desire was to have  the case dismissed because it lacked merit since  they were not  employees of the corporation. It appearing then that the  dismissal was  sought by the union  itself   acting through the  instrumentality of its governing body and also in accordance with the  wishes of an overwhelming majority of  the members of the union, we do not think the lower court abused its  discretion  or violated  any  legal rule in  dismissing  the case.  Surely, the  will  of  one or  several members  of  an association cannot be allowed to  prevail over  the  will  of the great majority. And it may well  be questioned whether Attys. Rafael and   Ilustre  could still  be  deemed authorized  to ask for a reconsideration of the dismissal after they had been notified by the union that their services had already been dispensed with.  It is  true that, as already held  in several cases, once the case  is in court with  the requisite jurisdicfcional number  of employees involved, jurisdiction over it is not lost upon the  withdrawal of some of those employees from the  union.   But such  is not  the situation in the instant  case, it not appearing that any of  the dissenting members has withdrawn  from the union.  And as already stated, it was the union itself that asked for the dismissal of the case."

The objection on lack of due process on the ground that the movants  for reconsideration were not heard is without basis, for  we gather  from the  allegations in  the answer  of the corporation,  which  is not  denied by the movants, that although a  hearing was held Attys. Rafael and  Ilustre did not appear thereat. Petitioner  also  contends  that the  subject  matter  involved in  the case dismissed  below wag  a labor dispute falling under the  exclusive jurisdiction of the  Industrial Court, but it is now idle to  argue that point, the case having been dismissed on  motion of the petitioning union itself.

It may  here be stated that  the appeal  taken by the acting chief of the WAS from the  judgment of the  Court of First  Instance  was dismissed  by  that court  and the petition  for  mandamus  to elevate the appeal  here was denied by us in our decision  of October  31,  1956.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Felix, JJ., concur.