This an appeal  from  the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal  (Pasay City Branch)  dated December 20,  1956, denying" petitioner-appellant's petition for execution of the order  of  the Wage  Administration Service (WAS) dated July 12,  1955 in WAS Case  No. C-3271 "awarding  in favor of  petitioner-appellant and against respondent-appellee the  sum  of P11,618.96 representing unpaid overtime compensation  due the former."

The facts  in this case are not disputed.  Petitioner Leonardo V. Figueroa  was a bus  inspector of the Saulog Transportation,  Inc.  for several  years.  He  allegedly worked  from  6:00 a.m.  to  6:00  p.m. each day of duty with a break  of 15 minutes for  lunch time.  After  his separation from the service, he filed with  the WAS a claim  for unpaid overtime compensation.   The WAS  notified  respondent-appellee Saulog Transportation, Inc. of the  claim and requested  it to appear during the hearing. Despite the notification, however, respondent-appellee never appeared, and Figueroa was allowed to present his  evidence after which the WAS issued its so-called "decision" sought to be enforced, at the  same time requesting  respondent-appellee to pay  petitioner the sum of P11,816.96 within five (5) days.

On October  22, 1956, that is, more than one year  from the  date of the rendition of the so-called decision of the WAS,  Figueroa filed with the trial court  his petition for the  issuance  of a writ of execution of the decision of the WAS.   Respondent-appellee opposed the  petition on the ground that the trial court was not authorized to execute or enforce decisions of the  WAS, that said  decision of the WAS sought to be enforced was illegal, issued without authority of law, unenforceable not only by the WAS but also by the Court of First Instance; and that said decision of the WAS was not res judicata, because that body was not a competent court.

On December 20, 1956 the trial court issued the order appealed from, denying  the petition  for execution  on the ground  that  it "has  no  power  to  execute the decision sought to be executed.

The case of Venancio  Potente vs. Saulog Transit, Inc.,* G.  R. No.  L-12300, promulgated on  April 24, 1959,  is quite  similar to  the present case.   Plaintiff  Potente in. that case was also a bus inspector of the same respondent transportation  company.   Potente filed  a claim with the WAS  for the  collection  of overtime compensation.  The Acting Chief of the Wage Protection Division recommended approval of the  claim,  and the  same  was approved by the  Acting Chief of the WAS.   Over a year later, Potente filed with the Court, of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for  execution  alleging that the  decision of the WAS on his claim had become final  and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom  by the company, and praying that a  writ of execution be issued in his favor to  satisfy his claim of P8,359.75,  the  amount  approved by  the WAS. Without either notice to  the company, or  hearing, the trial court issued  an order granting the petition and ordering the  issuance  of the  writ  of  execution.  On appeal to us, we  reversed  the appealed order  of the trial court.  Thru  Mr.  Justice  Concepcion, we said:

"The issue before us is  whether a 'decision' of the WAS, finding that Potente  is entitled to recover P8,359.75, from his former employer, by way of unpaid overtime compensation, may be ordered executed by a. court of justice, without an ordinary action for the recovery of said  sum of  money, and  without  a decision  of such court sentencing the employer to pay the  aforementioned  amount: It is obvious to us that the  answer must be negative.

*      *        *       *       *       *

"In other words,  the WAS  may cause the employer to satisfy the unpaid wages through mediation,  arbitration, or  court action,. and by no other means.  It has an authority to render a 'decision' in the sense in which this term is  used in legal parlance on the claim for wages,  except insofar as  it has to  determine whether, in its  opinion, the Claim  is meritorious,  as  a condition precedent to the institution, before  'any competent court,'  of an  ordinary 'action' for the recovery  of  the  sum of money it considers due to the claimant.  But, then no writ  of execution shall issue, except when  the  judgment rendered by said court after  due notice and hearing, as demanded by  the tenets of due process and provided in the Rules of Court-shall have become final and executory."

On  the basis  of the aforementioned  decision  of this Court in Potente  vs.  Saulog Transit,  Inc.,  supra,  there is no alternative but to affirm  the order  of dismissal of the trial court.

Our attention is being  called to the case  of  Brillantes vs. Castro, 99 Phil., 497; 56 Off.  Gaz., (29)  4621, in support of appellant's theory that  a decision of the  WAS,  if not appealed, becomes final, conclusive and executory.   There is, however, a great difference  between  the case  of Brillantes and the present  case.  In that case of Brillantes, the parties therein formally

"entered into  an  Arbitration  Agreement  whereby they  agreed

"1. That  they  submit their  case   to  the  Wage   Administration Service for investigation;  and "2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever  decision this Office may render on the case and that they  recognize said decision to  be final and conclusive"; that in accordance  with the  said  agreement, the  parties, assisted by their respective  counsel, adduced evidence before the Wage Administration Service;"

In the present case, there was never such an agreement, and as already stated, respondent-appellee  never appeared before the WAS  or  attended any of its hearings.

In view of the foregoing,  the order  appealed from is affirmed,  with costs against petitioner-appellant.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angela, Concepcion,, Endencia, and Barrera,  JJ.,
concur.

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^* Supra, p. 525.