Estanislao  Serrano is  appealing the  decision  of the Court  of  First Instance  of Jlocos Sur,  Judge Jose G. Bautista presiding, declaring null  and  void the supposed donation, propter nuptias on which his complaint was based and dismissing the  later  upon  motion of the  defendant. The motion for  dismissal was filed before  the hearing but the  trial court deferred  action upon it until after submission  of  evidence by the  parties.  Said parties entered into a stipulation of facts after which they declined to  submit any other evidence  except  Exhibit "A", the supposed deed of  donation propter nuptias, the  translation of  which, for purposes of reference, is reproduced  below:

"That, I Melchor  Solomon,  single, Filipino, of legal age, native of the  municipality  of  Sinait, province of Ilocos Sur  and  residing at  present  in Sinait,  having decided  to get  married with  the consent  of my parents,  brothers  or sisters and relatives,  have announced  and manifested  my  determination and  desire  to Mr. Estanislao  Serrano  to  whose  family the flower I  intend to win belongs, namely Miss  Alexandria Feliciano single, born in Hawaii but is actually residing in Cabugao,  Ilocos Sur.

This ardent desire favored  by good  luck and accepted by the noble lady the one concerned,  is to be realized  and complied  with under agreement or  stipulation which affirms, promotes and vivifies the union.  This  agreement donating all my exclusive properties in order that we shall have a basic capital for our conjugal life and in order that there will be ready maintenance and support of our offsprings has come out voluntarily  and expontaneously from me, I the very one concerned.

These which I am  donating my exclusive  properties  because I have  honestly  acquired the  same  with  the sweat of my brows and I donate them gladly, to wit * * *;

The referred to properties  are donated in accordance with the existing laws of the  Philippines and our children out of the wedlock will be the ones to inherit same with equal shares.  But if God will not blew our union with any child one half of  all my properties including the properties acquired during: our conjugal union  will be given the (to) my brothers   or sisters or their heirs if I, the husband will die before my wife and if my beloved wife will die before me, one half of all my properties and those acquired by us will be given to those who have reared my wife in. token of my love to  her* * *  *  (Italics supplied)

Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went  to  Hawaii to seek his  fortune and  who  until  now resides  there, had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from the age of 12 until she  readied womanhood.  On June  21,  1948,  defendant Melchor Solomon married Alejandria.  On the same day of the marriage but before the  marriage  ceremony  he executed the alleged Deed of Donation, Exhibit  "A" above reproduced.  Less than nine months, after the marriage, or  rather on  March 2,  1949,  Alejandria  died  without issue.  Several   months thereafter  Estanislao  Serrano commenced the present action to  enforce and  implement the  terms of the alleged donation particularly that portion thereof to the effect that if  Alejandria died  before her  husband Melchor and left no  children, then one half of Melchor's properties  and those acquired  by him and his wife would  be given to  those persons who had  raised and  taken care  of her namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Acting upon  the motion  for  dismissal  the trial court found that the donation could not be regarded as  a donation propter nuptias for the reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it  was not made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important, that the donation was not made to one  or both of  the (marriage) contracting parties, but to a third person.

After a careful study of the case,  we fully agree with the trial court  Article 1327 of the Old Civil Code reads:

"Art 1327. Donations by reasons of marriage are those bestowed before its celebration in consideration  of the  same, upon  one or both  of the spouses."

This article was reproduced in the new Civil Code under Article 126.  Whether  we  apply  Article 1327 for  the reason that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in 1948  before the promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950  or whether we apply Article 126 of the New Civil Code the result would be the same.

Was the donation made  in consideration of the marriage between Melchor and Alexandria or was it made in consideration  of  the death of either of them  in the absence of any children? True, the Deed of Donation was executed on  the  occasion when  they  married.  But, the marriage in itself was not the only consideration or condition under Which terms  of the donation would be carried out  The marriage would have to be childless and one of the spouses would have to  die before the other before the  donation would operate.   So,  strictly speaking, the  donation  may not be   regarded as one  made  in  consideration  of  the marriage.

But assuming for the  moment  that  it  was  made  in consideration  of the marriage, still, we have the fact that the donation was being made not in favor of Alejandria, the wife, but rather in favor of those  who acted  as her parents  and  raised  her from  girlhood  to  womanhood  in the absence of her father.  That does not  place it  within the provisions  of Article 1327  and  Article  126  of  the Old  Civil  Code and the  New  Civil Code, respectively. Manresa, in his commentary on  Article 1327  of the Civil Code, says the following:

"Donations excluded are  those  (1) made in favor of the  spouses after the celebration of marriage; (2) executed in favor of the future spouses but not in  consideration of the marriage; and (3) granted to persons other than the spouses even  though they may be founded on the marriage (6 M. 232)."

Having come to the conclusion that the Deed of Dona tion does not fulfill the requirements of a donation propter nuptias and that it might be considered a donation inter vivos,  can it be considered valid and effective?   Hardly, because it was never accepted by the donee either in the same instrument of donation or in a separate document as required by law.

Again, may the donation be regarded a donation mortis causa,  and given effect?  The  answer has to  be in the negative for the reason that this Tribunal has  heretofore consistently held that a donation to take effect after the death of the donor,  is  equivalent to  a disposition  or bequest of property by last will, and it should be executed in accordance with the requisites and  strict  provisions governing the execution of wills x; and Exhibit "A" does not fulfill said  requirements.  Moreover, in  the present case, the donor is still alive and naturally,  even if the donation were otherwise valid, still, the time and occasion have not arrived for considering its  operation and implementation.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla, Bautista Angelo,  Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera,  JJ., concur.