In Special Proceedings No. 163  of the  Court of First Instance of La Union,  appellee Severo Viloria was,  on October 27, 1948,  appointed guardian  of the person  and estate of  the  minor  Roy Reginald Lelina,  beneficiary of arrears  in pay, insurance, and other benefits from the U. S. Veterans Administration due to the death of his late father Constancio  Lelina,  supposedly  a  member  of  the  U. S. Armed Forces  during the war.  On  March 31, 1950, the court authorized the guardian to withdraw from the estate of his ward the sum of not to exceed P30 a month for the boy's support and other expenditures.

On March 20, 1952, the  U. S. Veterans Administration filed a motion in  the guardianship proceedings,  alleging receipt of certain letters  from its central office in Washington, D.  C., to the  effect that the minor's deceased father had no guerrilla or other service in the armed forces of the United States, and that consequently, Ms heir was not entitled to the payment of gratuitous National  Service life Insurance, and prayed that the guardian  be ordered to stop further payment of monthly allowances to  the minor. The court found the motion well-founded and granted the same.  A few years later,  on February ]5, 1955, the Administrator of Veterans  Affairs again filed a motion in the same guardianship proceedings  for a refund  to the U. S. Veterans Administration of the sum of $2,879.68, the balance of gratuitous insurance benefits allegedly wrongfully paid to  the minor  Roy Reginald Lelina, which was still on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, San Fernando, La Union Branch.   Upon opposition of the guardian, who submitted  evidence  of the  service record of the minor's deceased father duly recognized by both the Philippine and U.  S. Armies,  the motion for  refund  was denied.  Then on Am il  27,  1955,  the guardian  moved to  be allowed to withdraw  P4,000  from  the  minor's  estate  to meet  the minors needs.  This motion  was  opposed by the Administrator  of Veterans  Affairs,  arguing  that  the  minor's right  to   National   Service.  Life  Insurance  benefits  is governed  exclusively by  the U. S.  Code  Annotated,  which provides  (Tit.  38,   section  808)   that  decisions  of  the Administrator

"shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact and no other official of  the  United States, except a, judge or judges  of the United  State?, courts,  shall  have  jurisdiction  to review  any such decisions;"

In the same motion, the  Administrator prayed for the  set- ting aside of the  court's order denying  the  refund  of  the money in the  hands  of the minor's guardian,  on the ground of  "lack  of jurisdiction".

Acting on the pending motions  of the guardian and the Administrator,  the  lower court  held:

"If the legal  provisions alleged in the petition of the Veterans Administration  is correct, and  should  be taken into account,  this Court may  not have  the right to order  the return of the amount of $2,879.68 at present  credited  as funds of the minor, and deposited in the name of said minor with the Philippine National Bank.  Precisely, the  issue  now  pending  in this  guardianship proceeding  is  whether or not, the father  of  the minor the deceased  Constancio  Lelina,  has a valid military service to  justify the  payment to  him   or to his heirs  of the National Life  Service  Insurance benefits. The minor Reginald  Lelina through  his guardian  and his  counsel claims  that his father had  rendered services  as shown by  certain  papers  submitted  in  this case to support that claim.  As a matter  of fact,  the said minor was granted and  paid those benefits as  shown  by the statements of accounts submitted and duly approved by  this  Court up to and  including  March 31,  1954, in the  Order of  Judge Primitivo L. Gonzales dated  April 22, 1954.  On the other hand the          attorneys of the Veterans Administration now  claim that such payment was an error  because  the deceased Constancio Lelina had no recognized  military  services  or  was he a member of the Commonwealth  Army in  the service of the Armed Forces of the United             States Government.  This is, therefore,  a  matter   that should be determined in an  appropriate action filed with the competent court.

This being  the case, until this  issue is finally  determined  by the competent court in an appropriate action, the balance of the  amount now deposited in the name of the minor throug his guardian could not be disposed by this  Court one way or another.  In this proceeding, the matter at issue cannot  be  finally  determined.  Hence, this Court believes and  so holds,  that in the meantime, the  status  quo should be maintained with respect  to the  funds now existing and deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch in the name, of the herein minor."  (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 47-49)

and denied both  the guardian's motion to withdraw from the minor's deposits, and the Administrator's position for refund.  The Administrator of  Veterans  Affairs sought reconsideration  of the above  order,  which was denied; wherefore, it appealed to this Court.

We are  of the opinion that the appeal should be  rejected. The provisions of the IT.  S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the  decisions of  U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive  when made  on claims  properly submitted to him for resolution;  but they are  not applicable  to the present case, where the  Administrator  is not acting as a judge  but  as a  litigant.   There  is a great difference between actions against the Administrator  (which  must be filed strictly in  accordance  with  the conditions that are imposed by  the  Veterans'  Act,  including  the  exclusive review by United States  courts),  and those actions  where the  Veterans' Administrator  seeks  a  remedy  from our courts and submits to  their jurisdiction by filing actions therein.   Our attention has  not been called  to any law or treaty that would make the findings  of the  Veterans  Administrator, in actions  where  he is a party, conclusive on our courts.   That, in effect, would  deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the  Veterans' Administrator.

In an analogous case,  We  have ruled:

"By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and  put in  issue the legality  of  his  vesting order.  He can  not therefore now dispute this  power."  (Brownell vs.  Bautista,  50 Off.  Gaz.,  4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered were paid to the appellee guardian, for  the ward's benefit, the latter became their  lawful  possessor  and he  tan not  be deprived thereof  on the  sole  allegation of  the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid.  The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was  really committed; and the Philippine  courts' determination of the  question is as binding upon the  Veterans'  Administrator  as  upon  any  other litigant.

Concerning  the claim itself, We  agree with  the  court below that it  was not properly filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter  are solely concerned with the ward's care and custody and the proper administration or management of his properties.  Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such,  should be litigated in a separate proceeding.

The order of the court below,  dated 22 June 1955, is hereby  affirmed, with  costs  against the  appellant.  So ordered.

Paras, C. .J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,   Conception and Felix, JJ., concur.