In a nutshell the most  important question  presented to us on this appeal is, Does a parole granted a person convicted of homicide, on condition that he pays one-fifth of his monthly salary to  the heirs  of  the  deceased, which condition he complies with, bar or suspend the right of the said heirs to an action to enforce the subsidiary  liability against the employer  of  the  convict?

In a judgment rendered by the Court of  First Instance of Baguio in Criminal Case No. 766 affirmed by the Court of Appeals in C. A.-G. R.  No.  10361-R, Alejandro  Bentres was convicted of homicide committed on the person of Dagtayan Dalasdas and ordered to pay an indemnity of  P4,000 to the heirs of the deceased.  Execution having been issued against Bentres for the  amount  of  said  indemnity,  the sheriff made a  return containing the following statements: "'the accused has no property, either real or personal which may be levied upon" and that  "Notice of Garnishment was served upon  said mining  company (Itogon Mining Company, where  the accused  is now employed  as policeman) on January 28, 1954  over the salary of the  accused, but inspite of the lapse of time, said mining company did not answer  our notice  of  garnishment."   So plaintiffs,  heirs of the deceased Dalasdas,  presented this action against the Itogon Mining  Company, Inc, employer of Bentres at the time and on the occasion of the homicide, upon the latter's subsidiary liability in view of the finding in the judgment of the  Court of Appeals  that Bentres  "undoubtedly acted in the  performance of a  duty or in the lawful exercise of a  right of office"  (because he as policeman  shot the deceased  when trying to stop and arrest  the latter whom he caught stealing  ores from the mines  of Itogon Mining Company, Inc.) The above  facts appear in the Stipulation of Facts.   It also  appears therefrom that Alejandro Bentres was released  on parole under Act No.  4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, on the condition, among others, "that he shall give  one-fifth of his earnings during the period  of his parole to the payment of the indemnity to which  he  had been  sentenced."   The  Court  of  First Instance  held,

"* * *„  it will be seen  that plaintiffs have fully complied  with all of the  requisites of the law and their claim should be satisfied. But  defendant has  set up  the defense of  the  conditions on  the parole and claims that  the effect is a suspension of the sentence, including' the portion of civil indemnity,  and thence no  subsidiary liability.  The  Court is  of the  opinion  that  this defense  is  not tenable.  By final judgment, the  accused policeman  incurred an obligation  of P4,000  in favor of plaintiffs, which  was immediately demandable."

"* * *.,  The Parole Board  was  aware of the law.  It  knew that it could  not touch this phase of the civil indemnity neither  reduce it nor change the absolute terms of its payment.  The Parole Board was  likewise aware,  conclusively so, that the salary  of the accused policeman was exempt from garnishment and impose this condition merely as  part of the process of  rehabilitation to inculcate  in the accused  policeman a sense  of responsibility of his obligations.  To hold  otherwise would result, in the final analysis, in the anomalous situation of having a novation made of a contract the payment of the civil indemnity without  the consent of the creditor. A situation that our laws do not permit.   From these premises, and holding that  the civil indemnity of P4,006 is still entirely and immediately due from the accused policeman, there can be no other  conclusion than that  in view of his  admitted  insolvency, defendant is  subsidarily  liable."   (pp. 51-52,  Record on  Appeal).

It is  argued  on this appeal that as Bentres, the convict' under parole, has made payments in accordance with the condition oi the parole, the right of the heirs  of the deceased to enforce  payment of the  indemnity against the Itogon  Mining  Company,  Inc., the party  subsidiarily responsible,  does not accrue or is suspended.  We find no merit in this contention.  In addition to the reasons given in the decision appealed from, we may add that the Parole Act contains no provision modifying the  liability of the party subsidiarily liable for the crime committed  by the paroled convict, or suspending such  liability upon the grant of parole.  We might venture to anticipate that  a modification of such liability  or the conditions for  the enforcement  thereof, without  opportunity  on the  part  of the offended party or his heirs to be heard, would be deprivation of property without  due process  of  law.   The proceedings  leading  to  the  grant of  parole   are  entirely administrative and  ex-parte.   Only the State and. the convict are parties thereto.  They refer only to the service of the sentence.  Neither the provisions of the law, nor the proceedings thereunder, nor the purpose and  intent thereof purport to affect in any wise the rights of the offended party.  How can the rights of others be affected thereby.

It is also  argued  that  the return  of the sheriff  is not conclusive evidence of the insolvency of Bentres, the convict.  It is at least prima fade, and if it is  claimed that he had other properties which  could be levied upon, that fact should  have  been alleged  in  defense to the action. No such allegation exists in the answer.  The stipulation of  facts  contains  no  such fact  either.  The argument must, therefore, be  overruled.

It  is  lastly contended  that  Bentres has  so  far paid P314.36, this evidently in compliance  with  the  condition of the parole.  Our  ruling above that the  Parole Act does not, and proceedings thereunder cannot, affect the right of the offended party to the  subsidiary liability concludes this argument.  If payments have been  received  by the offended party or his  heirs,  such payments may be  deducted from the amount of the judgment on the subsidiary liability; but they may not in any manner suspend or bar the action for  enforcement of  said liability.

The judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angela,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.