The properties involved herein were the alleged conjugal properties of the late  spouses  Simon Toledo  and Andrea Nocon.  The husband predeceased the wife and after the latter's  death on July  19, 1955, testamentary proceedings were instituted on August 5, 1955, in the  Court of First Instance of Cavito  (Special Proceedings No. 5743), wherein  petitioner Cirila Nocon was appointed  administratrix thereof.  The wills of Andrea Nocon and  the order probating the same  appear  on record as Annexes A,  A-1 and B.

While said testamentary proceedings were  pending,  as they are still pending, or specifically  in September,  1955, respondent heirs  of Celedonia, Jacinta, Silvina,  Nicolas and Juan, surnamed Toledo, claiming to be the heirs  of the  deceased husband Simon Toledo, filed an action against herein petitioner Cirila Nocon  as  executrix of the estate of Andrea Nocon, deceased wife of the late Simon Toledo, and the spouses Melquiades  Grepo and  Encarnacion Villanueva,' (Civil Case  No.  5755 of the Court of  First Instance  of  Cavite Annex C)  seeking  partition of the  alleged conjugal assets of the late spouses Simon Toledo  and Andrea Nocon and  praying that defendants be  ordered  to make an  inventory and  accounting of  all the if fruits of the  properties beginning with  the  year  1950  and to deliver to the plaintiffs not only the  shares  corresponding  to them  from all the  lands described in the Hi  last will of Andrea Nocon (Annex A), but also the corresponding  fruits,  with  interests  from  date  they  were  gathered, and to reimburse the plaintiffs for their  actual expenses (of litigation and attorney's fees) equivalent  to 1/3 of the share corresponding to them, plus moral, nominal, moderate and  exemplary damages in an amount not less* than P5,000.00, plus  any other  lawful, just and equitable relief to which they may be  entitled in the premises. The defendant spouses were sued in said  case  No. 5755 because  the  late  Andrea  Nocon, without  the  knowledge and consent  of plaintiff heirs of the aforementioned Toledos, sold on November 28, 1954, to said spouses  lot No. 2285 mentioned in  the will  (Annex A).

Defendant Cirila  Nocon and  her co-defendant  spouses answered that  complaint, setting  the affirmative defenses that plaintiffs' complaint  states  no cause  of action and that they had another remedy, and a counterclaim in the sum of  P3,000.00.  In  that  answer,  dated  October 21, 1955, defendants  denied that the disputed properties were conjugal, emphasizing  that  they were the  exclusive or separate properties  of  the deceased wife Andrea  Nocon, and further  alleging that plaintiff heirs of Simon  Toledo had "absolutely no  right  nor any  interest  of  any kind in the  properties listed in Annex  A of the  complaint."

On June 30,  1956, defendant Cirila Nocon, as the duly appointed and qualified executrix of the testate' estate of the late Andrea  Nocon,  filed a motion to dismiss  (Annex D), alleging  in substance (1) that the  properties inventoried in  said testate proceedings as constituting the  estate of the late Andrea Nocon are the very  same properties which the herein nameless plaintiffs desire to partition  in said' case 5755; and (2) that under  Act  No. 31.76 amending Section 685  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure  and  Section 2, Rule 75,  of  the Rules  of  Court,  the conjugal partnership should be liquidated either in  an ordinary partition action  or in  the corresponding administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate  of either spouse, and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.  Upon objection  of the plaintiffs on the ground (1) that the answer of the defend- ants put in  issue  the  question of title of  the properties mentioned in the will (Annex A) ; and (2)  that when the question of title to property  is raised the same should be  determined  in an  ordinary  action  and  not  in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate (Ongsiako, et al. vs. Tan, et al.,  97 Phil., 330; Santiago vs.  CFI of Rizal, 55 Phil. 62; and Devesa vs. Arties, 13 Phil. 273,  and other  case), the Court, by order of July  14, 1956, overruled the motion to dismiss for not being well founded.  The motion for  reconsideration  of  this  order  (Annex  E)  was  also denied.

Because of these two orders and claiming that the trial Judge  acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave  abuse of discretion  in  not dismissing the partition suit filed by respondents Toledo in Civil Case No. 5755; that his order denying petitioner's  motion to dismiss is contrary to settled rulings of this Court; that  respondent Judge  had no  jurisdiction to entertain  the partition suit while the said testamentary proceedings for the settlement of  the wife's  estate are pending;  that  there  can be  no partition  in a separate action such  as in  Civil Case No. 5755 because what can be partitioned only is the remmiente liquido, and this net remainder can only be determined in the testamentary proceedings; that partition and liquidation of the supposed conjugal partnership are required  by law to be effected in the testamentary  proceedings; and that the trial  Court acted in a manner which is  not  in accord with the  applicable decisions of  this Court, when it did  not dismiss the separate action for  partition, and further claiming that  she  has no adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner executrix prays  that the orders  of  respondent. Judge denying petitioner's motion to  dismiss in Civil Case No. 5755  of the Cavite Court of First Instance be ^et  aside  with costs against respondent  heirs  of' said  Toledos.

Considering the foregoing  narration of facts and without going into the merits of the main, issue of these proceedings, it seems evident that  petitioneir's  present recourse of certiorari does not  lie.

Rule 67 of the Rules  of  Court provides:

"Section  1. Petition for cerliorari. When any tribunal,  board, or officer exercising  judicial functions,  has  acted without  or  in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave  abuse of discretion and* there is no appeal, nor any plain,  speedy and adequate remedy in the  ordinary course of laiv,  a person  aggrieved  thereby may file  a verified  petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that  judgment be rendered  annulling  or modifying the proceedings of such  tribunal, board,  or  officer,  as the  law requires,  with costs."

So that where  an  appeal  is in  itself  a sufficient and adequate remedy  that  would promptly relieve  the petitioner  from the  injurious  effects of the order  or  judgment complained of,  the existence of that appeal would bar  the institution of the  remedy of certiorari.  In the case at  bar, if  executrix Cirila Nocon, defendant in said Civil Case No.  5755, was not agreeable  to the  order  of the Court  refusing to  dismiss the complaint filed against her  and the spouses  Grepo, she should  have submitted herself for trial and  let the  lower Court render decision in the  case  and then  appeal therefrom if she  were not satisfied with the outcome of the same.   In that case the lower  Court  had  jurisdiction to  pass upon  and decide the  motion  to  dismiss  submitted  by  petitioner  herself, and where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision  or  order  on all other questions arising in the case is but an  exercise of  that jurisdiction (Herrera vs. Barretto et al., 25 Phil. 245, 251), and errors which the court may commit in  the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely  errors of judgment.  Consequently, it is  necessary to distinguish errors of  jurisdiction from errors of  judgment.   The first may be reviewed in a  certiorari proceed- ing  (Henderson vs. Tan,  87 Phil.,  466)  the  second,  by appeal  (So  Chu  et al., vs.  Nepomuceno,. 29  Phil.  208; De  los  Santos vs.  Mapa, 46  Phil. 791; Santos vs. Court of First Instance, 49 Phil. 398;  Ello vs. Judge  of  First Instance of  Antique,- 49 Phil.  152;  Gonzales vs. Salas, 49 Phil. 1; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78 Phil., 785, 44 Off. Gaz. (12)  4915, 78 Phil.  785; Castro vs. Pefla,  45 Oft. Gaz., (Supp. to No. 9)  114, 80 Phil. 488; Herreros vs. Toledo, 45  Off. Gaz.  (Supp.  to No.  9),  411, 88 Phil. 260.

"Unless  the abuse of  discretion is  grave, certiorari will not lie to correct  an order denying a motion to  dismiss.  The reason for the rule is obvious.  If  every error  committed by the trial court  were to be  the  subject  of review by certiorari, trials  would be  interminable.  The contention that an order  denying  a  motion to  dismiss is  merely interlocutory and hence not  appealable  is without' merit since Section 2 of Rule 41, Rules of Court, does not prohibit an  appeal  but  merely postpones  it until after  final  judgment is rendered, in  the,  case,"   (Arvisu  vs. Vergara, 90 Phil., 621).

"The petition for certiorari  with preliminary  injunction filed in G.  E.  No. L-7882, Julia  Fortus vs.  the  Hon.  Juan Enriquez, etc., et al., is dismissed.  The remedy is appeal  after the decision on  the  merits."  Resolution  of June  25, 1954.)

We  have already held  that neither certiorari  nor pro- hibition  lies  against  an order  of the  court granting  or denying a motion to  quash an information (and the same thing can be said of a motion to dismiss a civil complaint). If the courts  had jurisdiction to take  cognizance of  the case to   decide the  motion  to  quash  or  dismiss,  appeal in due time is the obvious and only remedy for  the parties affected therein (Arches to  Beldia et al., G. R., No. L-2414, promulgated on May  27, 1949).

Wherefore, the  petition filed herein  is  dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.   It is so ordered.

Paras,  C. J., Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L.,  and Endencia,  JJ., concur.