This is a petition for certiorari filed by Sun Un  Giok, owner of  a theater in La Carlota, Negros Occidental, seeking to annul the order of Judge Jose Teodoro, Sr., of the Court of  First Instance of said province,  dated  January 26, 1956,  denying petitioner's motion to lift  order of default and to vacate judgment rendered in  Civil Case No. 3428 of said court.   The facts of the case may be summarized as  follows:

On  July  1, 1955,  an amended complaint was filed by Hermogenes Matusa  with the  Court of  First  Instance of  Negros  Occidental against Sun Un Giok, as  owner and manager of the Idelco  Theater  located  in said municipality of  La Carlota, alleging among other  things,  that he  had been employed  in said theater as  gate-keeper from November 1,  1848, up to December 1, 1954;  that he  had rendered services  for 8 hours  on ordinary days and for   12  hours  on Saturdays, Sundays and  holidays throughout  the duration  of said  employment  without being given the corresponding overtime compensation in accordance with the 8 Hour Labor Law; that he was  paid a salary below the amount fixed by the Minimum Wage Law;  that  defendant, in order to  defraud  the  plaintiff of  his just wages  and .to circumvent  the  provisions of the law,   kept daily time records and payrolls which he knew to be  contrary to  facts; that the ldelco Theater had more than 6 individuals in its  employ,  and prayed  that after due  hearing, judgment be rendered ordering 'defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,897.82  as the total balance of his salary underpaid, with  interest at 6 per cent  per  annum on  said  amount  until the  whole  sum is paid, plus the additional  sum  of 10 per cent  of  the total  amount for attorney's fees; for moral damages  in the sum of P10,000; for nominal  damages in accordance with  Articles  2221 and 2222  of the  New Civil Code; exemplary  or  correctional damages  in accordance with Articles 2229 and 2230 of the same Code; and  for such other relief as may be deemed  just  and equitable under the circumstances.

The corresponding summons was  served  on defendant on September 8,  1955,  and on the following day, counsel for Sun Un Giok filed  a  motion to dismiss  the  complaint and  amended  complaint on  the ground that  the cause of action was already barred by the  statute of limitations because plaintiff  was asking for the recovery of underpaid salaries  from November 1, 1946, to December  1,  1954, when  under  Section  16  of the  Minimum  Wage  Law, an  action  must  be commenced  within  three years after the cause of action accrued; and  that  the Court had  no jurisdiction over  the subject matter.   It was  contended that defendant, as managing partner of said moviehouse, employed  regularly only  four  employees  and  hired  occasionally  one  more, and, therefore, granting that plaintiff actually received a  salary below  the amount  provided for by  the Minimum  Wage Law, said law can not be invoked in the case at bar because retail or  service establishments that regularly employ less than five employees are exempted from the operation  of the Minimum Wage Law.  This pleading  (motion  to dismiss)  contains  the following notice  addressed  to the  Clerk of Court:

"The Clerk of Court
Court  of First Instance
Bacolod  City, Philippines
Greetings:

Please submit  the foregoing Motion  to Dismiss Complaint  and Amended Complaint for the proper consideration of the.  Honorable Court and as soon as thereafter as counsel can be heard.

(Sgd.)   ALFONSO  CRISOSTOMO

"I hereby certify that I have sent a copy of the foregoing motion   to  Attorney  Pio  Tan,  Counsel for the plaintiff  this 9th day of September,  1955,  by  registered  mail  as evidenced by  Registry Receipt No. 703 hereto attached, at Sibalom, Antique.

(Sgd.)  ALFONSO CIUSOSTOMO"

The records  further  show  that said motion was set for hearing on  Saturday, September  24,  1955,  before Branch II of the Court of First Instance of  Nogros Occidental (Annex  "D") although plaintiff Hermogenes Matusa  avers  that he was  not notified  of said  hearing. Counsel for plaintiff did  not  appear,  but  as  defendant, who was properly represented, was not  able  to  present proof of service on  the adverse party, the  Court deferred action on the motion to dismiss and issued  an order dated September 24, 1955, postponing consideration on the same "until  proof can be shown that  attorney  for  the plaintiff has received a copy of said motion to dismiss"   Hermogenes Matusa received a copy of this order of postponement, but before counsel for defendant could present the required proof  of  service, counsel  for plaintiff filed  a motion to  declare  the  defendant  in default which was  granted by  order  of the Court of October 15,  1955,  and consequently, the  Court received  plaintiff's  evidence and  judgment was  rendered thereon.

Upon receipt of  a copy of said  decision, counsel for defendant filed a motion to  lift order of default and  to vacate judgment dated  November 28, 1955, advancing the argument that defendant  should  not have been declared  in default because there was a motion to dismiss pending  consideration  of the  Court  which  suspended  the  time  within which to file an answer; that the  Court had not resolved  this  motion because it  required  defendant  to  produce proof  that  the adverse  party had received  said  pleading, and said  requirement was  not complied  with at  once because the return card  evidencing receipt  of  said  pleading was not yet forwarded to him  by the post office  of Sibalom,  Antique;  that  upon  receipt of  said  card he immediately wanted to file the  same but  found out that he wag already declared  in default; that  the  ruling in the case  of Manakel vs. Revilla  which pronounced that where no notice of hearing is served upon the plaintiff the pleading becomes  a  mere scrap of paper which the Clerk of Court should not have received for filing, should not be' made  applicable  to  the instant ease, because  plaintiff was notified of the hearing of said motion and was likewise furnished with copy of the order of the Court postponing consideration on the motion to dismiss and was aware of the existence  of said  hearing.  Defendant,  therefore,  prayed that the order of  default be lifted; that the judgment of November 14, 1955, vacated;  that  a date be set for the hearing  of  the motion to dismiss  and for such  other relief that may be deemed proper  in the premises.
 
By order of January 26,  1956,  the Court denied this motion  and ordered that the  writ  of execution of judgment,  prayed for by plaintiff, be  issued.  A motion for the reconsideration of  said order dated February  6, 1956, having  been denied by order  of  the Court of February 14, 1956, defendant Sun Un Giok filed the present petition for certiorari  with preliminary injunction praying that respondent  Judge, Hon. Jose  Teodoro, Sr.,  be  restrained from taking any further steps  concerning the instant ease; that the Provincial  Sheriff of Negros Occidental or any of his deputies  be orderde to refrain from  enforcing the writ of execution  already issued by the respondent  Judge and from taking  possession  of the apparatus and equipment of the Idelco Theater for the purpose  of selling the same at public auction; and  that after hearing, the order of  the respondent Judge denying  the motion to lift the order  cf  default  and  to vacate  judgment be declared null and void.
 
By resolution of  February  22,  1956,  this Court  gave due course  to the petition and issued  the  writ of preliminary  injunction prayed  for by petitioner  upon approval of the required  bond of P2,000.   Within the reglamentary period,  Hermogenes Matusa  filed  an  answer admitting that he had received a copy of the "Motion to Dismiss  Complaint  and  Amended  Complaint" filed  by counsel for  petitioner, but contending that said defective pleading was  merely a scrap  of  paper because it failed to comply with the essential  requisites  provided  for  by sections  4 and 5 of Rule 26 of the Rules of  Court, for said pleading  contained  no notice of  hearing  and should not be considered a motion at all; that the Clerk of Court should not have accepted and included the same  in the calendar of the Court; that this error on the  part of the Clerk  did not produce a remedial effect  to the prejudice of the adverse party; that the defective pleading remained to be  a  useless scrap of paper  attached to  the  records, the  requirement that notice  of hearing  be  served  on the adverse party  still being  uncomplied with; that the Court  had nothing  to resolve because what was  before it  was not  a  motion at  all;  that said party  was aware of the order of the Court postponing action  on the supposed  motion  to dismiss but he was  also  aware  that said order  could  never   be  complied with  as no notice of such hearing was ever sent to himself or  his counsel; and  that respondent has the right  to rely on the Rules of Court instead of being bound to wait indefinitely for proof  of a non-existent notice to  be produced; hence after 30 days  had  elapsed, he filed a motion  to  declare therein plaintiff in default.

From  the foregoing facts, it is clear that the question in the case at  bar revolves  on  whether the  notice  incorporated in  said (pleading is sufficient under sections 4 and  5 of Rule 26  of the Rules of Court, and granting that it is defective, whether the Clerk  of  Court in  including the  same for hearing on September 24, 1955, and the Court in taking cognizance of the same to the extent of ordering the postponement of the hearing thereof until certain requirements were complied  with, did in effect cure whatever omission counsel for  defendant  might have committed  in  connection  with   defendant's   motion  to dismiss.
 
Counsel for respondent in advancing its defense relied on these sections of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court: 

Sec. 4. Notice. Notice of motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties  concerned, at least three  days  before the hearing' thereof,  together with a copy of the  motion and of  any affidavits . and other papers accompanying it.  The  court, however, for good cause  may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispense of  on its own.
 
Sec. 5. Contents of notice. The notice shall be directed to  the parties  concerned,  and  shall state the time and  place  for  the hearing  of the motion.

From  the  aforequoted  sections,   it  is  required that notice of a motion directed to the parties concerned, must be served by the movant stating therein the time and place for the hearing of the  said  motion.  Counsel for defendant in addressing  the  notice to the Clerk of Court requesting  that  said motion be  submitted for  the "consideration of the Honorable Court and an soon as thereafter as counsel can be heard", and at the  same time certifying that  he had  sent a copy  of the motion to  counsel for therein plaintiff, such notice seems to substantially comply with  the requirement  of  section 5  of Rule  26,  for  in virtue  of  said  notice,  the hearing  was actually  set  by Clerk  of Court for  September  24,  1955,  of which,  We can presume, counsel for respondent Hermogenes Matusa was notified.  Respondents banked on the ruling laid down in the  case of  Manakil vs. Revilla, 42  Phil.  81,  but the pronouncement  therein is based  on the provision  of section 6  of the same Rule 26, which reads  as follows:

Sec. 6. Proof of service, to be riled with motion. No motion shall be acted upon by  the Court,  without proof of service of the notice thereof.

It was in  virtue  of this requisite  of  proof of  service that the trial court,  in its order of  September 24, 1955, deferred action on the motion  to dismiss, postponing the same indefinitely until counsel for  defendant  could produce the necessary evidence  that adverse party was  furnished  with  copy  of  said motion,  despite  the  fact  that defendant's attorney certified that a copy of said pleading was sent by registered mail  to adverse  party and even attached to  it  the registry  receipt  thereof.  The  case of Manakil  vs.  Revilla, supra enunciated that notice  of motions is necessary,  and without proof of service thereof, a motion is nothing but a useless piece of  paper which the' clerk should not  receive  for filing,  but the facts  of the case at  bar are quite  different.

But let us grant, for  the sake  of  argument, that' the notice in question, as quoted above is defective, for failure to  specify  the  exact  date when that motion  should  be heard.   Even  so,  We  believe  that the  Court  in  taking cognizance  of  the motion on the  date  set  for  hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such pleading  may have had, specially if it  is taken into account  that upon receipt  of the  motion to dismiss, plaintiff was properly notified  of  the  existence  of said  pleading.   Counsel for plaintiff  should not  have relied on  mere  technicalities which in the interest of justice may be relaxed  for it was said that:

"A litigation  is not  a game of  technicalities  in  which  one, more deeply  schooled  and skilled  in  the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and  destroys the other".  Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil.  815.)

"As  the motion was  heard after  this notice,  and  strictly  in compliance with the Rules of Court, it cannot be  said that the hearing was  held without due  process of law.  What  the  law prohibits  in not the absence  of previous notice, by the  absolute absence thereof and  lack  of opportunity to  be  heard".   (Borja  vs. Tan, 93  Phil.,  167;  Duran Embate vs. Penolio, 93  Phil.,  782,  49 Off.  Gaz. [9]  8850).

Parties litigants shall  not be  deprived of their  day  in court as it  was done  in the  case at bar.

Wherefore, the Court hereby grants the petition for cetiorari prayed for by  petitioner  and the questioned order of default and decision rendered by the respondent Court in the absence  of the defendant in Civil Case No. 3423 of the  Court  of First Instance of  Negros Occidental,  are hereby set aside and  left without force and effect.  The respondent Court is further ordered to hear and pass upon the motion to dismiss filed by defendant and to proceed with said case  until  it is finally. disposed  of in that instance. The writ  of preliminary injunction issued herein, is made permanent,  with  costs   against  respondent  Hermogenes Matusa.  It is  so ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B, L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.