Petitioners in the above-entitled  case were  the  defendants  in a  criminal  complaint  filed  by a sergeant of the Constabulary in case No. 218 of the Justice, of the Peace Court of  Tunga,  Leyte (Annex  "D").  The complaint charges the  defendants in  that case, petitioners  herein, with  the crime  of robbery  in band  with double homicide, frustrated homicide and  less  serious  physical injuries, committed in  said  municipality  of Tunga, Leyte.   The complaint is  dated April 25, 1958.   On June 18, 1958, the provincial fiscal of Leyte petitioned the Secretary of Justice for authority to file said case in the  branch of the Court of First Instance at Tacloban, instead of before the branch of the Court  at Carigara, 6th Branch, praying for the non-application of the  provisions of Justice Administrative Order No. 175,  dated December 13,  1954,  which assign the town of Tunga to the district presided over  by the judge stationed  at  Carigara, Leyte.  The  reason  alleged for transferring the trial of the case is that  the  accused have many relatives and followers in the towns of Jaro and Tunga, and  may harass the  prosecution witnesses while going back and  forth to Carigara (Annex "H").  On July 3, the Secretary of Justice approved the petition of the fiscal, so  the information  was filed before the Tacloban Branch of the  court.  It so happened,  however,  that on July 2, counsel  for the accused moved the Court of First Instance to have the case transferred to Carigara for trial on the merits.   In the meanwhile, said counsel had  secured a telegraphic order from the Secretary of Justice, which reads as follows:

"PETITION ATTORNEYS  VILLAMOR GRANADOS SUPERABLE TRANSFER CRIMINAL CASES SEVEN FOUR EIGHT SEVEN AND SEVEN FIVE ZERO EIGHT TO CARIGARA WHERE THEY BELONG GRANTED STOP PREVIOUS AUTHORITY TO TACLOBAN  COURT REVOKED PLEASE INSTRUCT CLERK COURT SEND RECORDS CARIGARA IMMEDIATELY" (ANNEX "K").

In accordance with this order, Executive Judge Segundo C. Moscoso ordered the case to be forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Carigara for trial.  Thereupon, the fiscal and the private prosecutors moved to reconsider the order for the transfer  of the case to Carigara, alleging the same reason that had been given by the fiscal  in asking for permission  to file the  case in Tacloban. Opposition to this motion was registered by counsel for the defense. The court thereupon  set  the motion and  the opposition thereto  for hearing,   and  on September   27,   1958,  it reconsidered its order transferring  the case to the 6th Branch at Carigara for trial.  The judge  ruled  that Administrative Order No. 175 of the  Department of Justice, dated December 13, 1954, while not illegal,  was intended merely to distribute equally the burden of work among the different  branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte and to facilitate the speedy administration of justice; that said administrative order cannot confer exclusive jurisdiction, because the matter of jurisdiction is beyond the said department's prerogative and is fixed by law.   The court further held that the different branches of the  Court  of First Instance of Leyte had equal or concurrent jurisdiction over all  cases filed therein, and the judge assigned  to a branch before whom a case has been presented may refuse to.follow the above-mentioned administrative order or may transfer  a case on appropriate motion or motu propio to a proper branch.   It moreover reasoned that no administrative  regulation  can vest  jurisdiction  upon the courts, for jurisdiction  is conferred by law and that once the court has taken jurisdiction of a case, it may not be removed therefrom by  mere departmental order.

Against this  order,  the defendants in the case, petitioners herein, have prosecuted this action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, alleging that as the municipality of provided, however, that whenever the interest of the administration of justice so requires,  any judge of the six  (6)  branches of the Court of First Instance  of the  province of Leyte, Tacloban and Ormoc cities may try any case coming from any municipality, with the previous approval of  this Department.

The above  arrangement is  without  prejudice to  the  assignment from time to time or any of the Judges presiding the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Branches to hold court  in  Tacloban  City  as  the occasion demands."

The above order has evidently been promulgated in pursuance of  Section 57 of Republic Act No. 296, superseding Tunga, where the crimes with  which they are charged, is nearer  to  Carigara than Tacloban,  the court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to  transfer the case to Carigara,  in accordance with the departmental order and the specific mandate of   the Secretary of Justice. Administrative  Order No. 175 of the  Department  of Justice reads as  follows:

"In view of the creation, under Republic Act 296, as amended, of additional branches of the Court of First Instance of the province of Leyte, Tacloban and Ormoc  cities, Thirteenth Judicial District, and considering the transportation facilities, means of communicating. the distance between the municipalities and the seats of the six (6) branches of  the said courts, and the probable number of cases to be filed in the respective branches, the cases coming from the different municipalities  of the province, are hereby distributed among the six  (6) branches of the court, as follows:

The Judges  of  the  First and Second Branches,  with  station in Tacloban City, shall take cognizance of the cases coming from the following municipalities:

1. Tacloban City

The Judge of the sixth Branch, with station in Carigara, Leyte, shall take cognizance of the cases coming from the following municipalities:

1. Carigara

provided, however, that whenever the interest of the administration of Justice so requires, any judge of the six (6) branches of the Court of First Instance of the province of Leyte, Tacloban and Ormoc cities may try any cases coming from the municipality, with the previous approval of this Department.
The above arrangement is without prejudice to the assignment

*       *        *       *       *       *       *

from time to time or any of the Judges presiding the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Branches to hold court in Tacloban City as the occasion demands."

The above order has evidently been promulgated in pursuance of Section 57 of Republic Act No 296, superseding Section  164  of the  Revised  Administrative Code,  which reads as follows:

"Where court is appointed to be held at more than one place in a district, the District Judge may, with the approval of the Department Head, define the territory over which the court held at a particular place shall exercise its authority, and cases arising in the territory thus defined  shall be triable at  such court accordingly. The power herein granted shall be  exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the district and with  a view to making the attendance of litigations and witnesses as inexpensive as possible."

Upon  inquiry from the Department  of Justice, we have been advised by  the  Secretary that:

"*** the apportioning of the different municipalities of Leyte among the six branches of the  Court of First Instance  was taken up during a conference held  in Tacloban City among the  district judges, the justices of  the peace, the representatives of the local bar association, and myself, before the promulgation of our  Administrative  Order No. 175,  dated December  13,  1954,  and that the groupings embodied during the  conference  as the  most  feasible under the conditions obtaining  in the province."

It  is  in  accordance  with the above quoted  administrative order,  approved  pursuant to the provisions of Section 57 of the Judiciary  Act, superseding Section  164  of the Revised  Administrative Code, that the Secretary of Justice in his telegram, Annex "K",  ordered that the case  of the petitioners  be transferred to the Sixth branch at Carigara, for trial.

We agree  with the  argument of the court  below that jurisdiction is fixed by law  and that once jurisdiction has attached by the filing of a  complaint or information with a court  of  concurrent  jurisdiction, the latter may not be divested thereof  especially  by an administrative  order or circular.  But the court below predicates the argument on the incorrect premise that  the six branches of the court of first instance of Leyte are six different courts.   There is only  one court of first instance of Leyte;  each  of its six branches is not a court  separate and distinct from the five other branches.  Jurisdiction, furthermore, is vested in the court, not in the judges.   So, when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone, to the  exclusion of the others.  Trial may be had or proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge.  It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act, expressly grants the Secretary of  Justice,  upon recommendation of the district  judge,  the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work  by the six branches and the judges presiding each branch.  The apportionment does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction;  this continues to be vested in the court of first  instance of the province as a whole and trial may be had by any branch or judge of the court.

We find, therefore, that the judge below erred in considering each of the six branches  of the court of first instance of Leyte as independent and  different  courts, distinct and separate from all the others.   So did it err in holding that once a judge has started  to try a case, this may no longer be transferred to and tried  by another.   Administrative Order No. 175 and the law under which it is adopted are based on the theory that authority to try cases is vested in the whole court, or in all or any of the branches or judges of  the province or  judicial  district, and  that  the actual determination of who among the judges should try a  given case is  an administrative matter  to be made pursuant to the arrangement to be adopted in accordance with Section 57 of the Judiciary Act.  Cognizant of the difficulties that may arise in  the  apportionment  of the cases among the different branches of the court sitting in different municipalities, the legislature has authorized the district judge and the  Secretary of Justice  to  adopt an  apportionment best suited to the  interests of a speedy administration  of justice.   This apportionment must be respected  by the Judges in the interest  of order and coordination in the dispatch of cases.  The administrative  arrangement does not violate jurisdiction because  as we have stated above jurisdiction to try cases is vested in the court or in all the branches thereof in the province or judicial district. Considering that the  case  of  the  petitioner should be tried by the Sixth branch sitting  at Carigara in accordance with Administrative Order No. 175 of the Department of Justice, we hereby hold that the judge below erred in refusing to comply with said administrative order and in  not transferring the case to the said  Sixth branch at Carigara especially upon the order of the Secretary of Justice.

The order sought  to be reviewed is hereby set aside, said the case is hereby  ordered  transferred to the Sixth Branch of the Court  of First Instance of Leyte, sitting at Carigara.  Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, arid Endencia, JJ., concur.