Inocencio Aquino and his children  brought this action against Jose G.  Tamayo, holder of  a  certificate of public convenience  to operate two trucks  for  damages for the death  of Inocencio's wife, Epifania  Gonzales, while riding aboard Tamayo's truck.  It is alleged that while  his (Inocencio Aquino) wife was making a trip aboard truck with Plate No .TPU-735, it bumped against a culvert on the side of the road in Bugallon, Pangasinan; that as a consequence of this accident Epifania Gonzales was thrown away from the  vehicle and two pieces of  wood embedded  in her skull. as a result of which she died; that the impact of the truck against  the  culvert was so violent that  the  roof of the vehicle was ripped  off  from its body,  one  fender was smashed and the engine damaged  beyond repair.  Complaint  was filed for  the  recovery  of P10,000 as  actual damages, P10,000 as  moral damages, and costs.

Upon being  summoned, defendant  Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is owned by  Silvestre Rayos, so he filed a third-party complaint against the latter,  alleging that he no longer had any interest whatsoever in  the said truck, as he had sold the same before the accident to the third-party defendant Silvestre  Rayos.  Answering  the third-party complaint, Rayos alleged that if any indemnity is due, it should come from Jose G. Tamayo, because he did not have any transaction with him regarding such sale.

The  Court of First Instance found that the truck with plate No. TPU-735 was one of the trucks of Tamayo under a certificate of  public convenience issued to him; that he had sold it to Rayos in March, 1953, but did not inform the Public Service Commission of the sale until June 30, 1953,  one month after the accident.  On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance ordered the defend-. ant Tamayo and the third-party defendant Rayos to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum  of P6,000  as compensatory damages, and another sum of P5,000 as  moral damages, with interest, and authorized the defendant or third-party defendant,  whoever  should pay  the  entire amount, to  recover from the  other  any sum  in excess of one-half of  the  amount ordered to be paid, with  interest.

The court also  dismissed the third-party  complaint.

Appeal against the above decision  was made to  the Court of Appeals.   This court affirmed the judgment of the Court of  First  Instance  in all  respects,  and against this judgment certiorari was issued by  us  on separate petitions of Tamayo  and  Rayos.

Tamayo claims exemption  from liability, arguing that the owner  and operator of  the  truck at the time  the accident was not he but Rayos.  In answer we state that we have already held in the cases of Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz., (11) 4606; Timbol vs. Osias, 98 98 Phil., 432; 52 Off. Gaz. (3)  1392; Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182; 50 Off. Gaz., 108, and Roque  vs. Malibay, L-8561,  Nov.  18,  1955, that  the  registered  owner of a public service vehicle is  responsible for damages that may be caused  to any  of the passengers therein,  even if the said vehicle had already been  sold leased  or transferred to another person who  was, at the time of the accident, actually  operating  the vehicle.   This  principle was  also reafirmed  in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil.,  103. The reason  given  by us for the above liability imposed upon the registered owner of the  vehicle  under a certificate of  public convenience  is  as  follows:

"*  *   *   we hold  with  the trial court that  the law  does not allow him to do  so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law  fixes and places upon  him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed  to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or  owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with others  or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to  one  who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.  A victim of  recklessness  on the public highways is usually without  means to discover or identify the person, actually causing the injury or damage.  He has no' means other than  by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles  Office to determine who is the  owner.  The protection that the law  aims to extend to him would  become illusory were the  registered  owner  given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.  If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is,  to prove that a third person or another has become the  owner, so that he may thereby  be  relieved of the responsibility  to the  injured."  (Erezo vs. Jepte, supra).

The decision of  the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it holds  that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the truck) on a route not covered by the registered owner's  franchise,  both the registered owner and the actual owner and operator should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made liable in accordance  with Article 2194 of the  Civil Code.  This  Article is as  follows:

"Art.. 2194. , The responsibility of two or more persons  who are liable  for. a quasi-relict is  solidary."

But the action  instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of contract, for  failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased to her destination.  The liability for which he is made responsible, i. e., for the death of the passenger,  may  not  be  considered  as arising from  a quasi delict.  As the  registered  owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may  not be held  guilty  of  tort  or a quasi-delict; their responsibility is  not solidary as  held by the Court of Appeals.

The question that poses,  therefore, is how  should the holder of the  certificate  of public convenience Tamayo participate  with his transferee, operator  Rayos,  in the damages recoverable by the heirs of the  deceased  passenger, if their liability is  not  that of joint tortfeasors in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code.  The. following considerations must be borne in mind in determining this question.  As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck,  his responsibility  to the public  or to any passenger riding in the vehicle  or truck must be  direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the  case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above.   But as the transferee, who operated the  vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident  and  death  he should in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay.  In operating the truck without transfer thereof having  been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted  merely as agent of the registered owner and  should be responsible  to him  (the  registered owner),  for  any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence. In the case at bar, the court  found, furthermore,  that inspite of the fact  that the  agreement between Tamayo and Rayos was for Rayos to use the truck in carrying of gasoline, the latter used the same in transporting passengers  outside  the route  covered  by the  franchise  of Tamayo.  For this  additional reason, the agent or Rayos must be held responsible to the registered owner, to the extent that the  latter may suffer damage by reason  of the death caused during the accident.  The responsibility of the transferee was  already  adverted to by us in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra,  when we held expressly:

"In synthesis, we hold  that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage  caused to the vehicle of the  plaintiff-appellee,  but he  (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified  by the real or actual owner  of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant."  (Erezo vs. Jepte,  supra.)

We hereby affirm that the responsibility of the transferee of the public  vehicle be as above denied.

The procedural means  by which the  liability of  the transferee to the holder of the certificate should be enforced is that indicated by us in the above-quoted portion of the case of Erezo vs. Jepte.  This procedure was adopted by  Tamayo,  the  defendant herein, when he presented a third-party complaint against Rayos.   The courts below should not have dismissed  this third-party complaint, and should have  adjudged the responsibility to make indemnity in accordance  therewith.   The  transferee is  liable to indemnify  the registered owner for the damages that the latter may be required to pay for the accident, hence the remedy is by third-party  complaint  (See Rule  12, Rules of Court).

We now come  to  the  question of the damages that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance awarded to the plaintiffs.   The actual or compensatory damage of P6,000 is not seriously questioned by any of the defendants, but the award of P5,000 as moral damages is questioned by them in this appeal.  We agree  with the appellants that as the responsibility of Tamayo and his agent Rayos is culpa-contractual,  no award  of moral damages can be given.  The  law on this matter is  expressed in Article 2220 of the  Civil Code, which provides:

"Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies, to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."

Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals considered the violation of the rules of the Public Service Commission prohibiting transfer of public vehicles without  approval by the  Commission as  justifying the award of moral damages.  We  believe4 that both courts erred.  The law expressly provides that award of moral damages can be made  in a suit for breach  of  contract only  when the  defendants  acted fraudulently or in bad faith.  We do not believe that the holder of the certificate, defendant  Tamayo, was guilty  of fraud  or bad faith. There appears to be no fraud at all in the transfer.  Transfers are prohibited only if made without approval by the Public Service Commission.  There may have  been a violation of the regulations because Tamayo did not  secure a previous authority  to transfer from said Commission, but he  actually applied for  and obtained said permission  or approval about a month after the accident.  Besides, the truck was transferred  to Rayos with the understanding that the same was not to be used as  a public convenience, so that insofar as Tamayo is concerned, there could have been no shade or tint of bad faith at all.  Consequently, the ground upon which moral damages may be demanded from him by the plaintiffs  does  not exist.

Neither can we find that there was fraud or bad  faith committed on the part of the transferee or agent. There may have been  a breach of the agreement between Tamayo and  Rayos, but this  was not the immediate cause of  the  accident.  It  was  the negligence of  the driver. What the law would seem to consider as bad faith which may furnish a ground  for  the  award of moral  damages in the case at bar would be bad faith in the securing and in the execution of the contract and in the enforcement of its terms (Article 1338, Civil Code),  or any other kind of deceit which may have been used  by both defendants. None can be said to have been  present in the case at bar. There was  no bad faith on the part of the agent Rayos; there was negligence of the driver employed by him, but this is certainly not bad faith on defendants' part  contemplated by law.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, in that the defendant-appellant Tamayo is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff-appellees the sum of P6,000 as compensatory damages for the death of the deceased, but that he  (Tamayo) has the right to be indemnified by third-party defendant-appellant Rayos of the  amount he is  hereby  ordered to  pay.  With  costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ.,  concur.