Petitioner Ponciano Primero is  the  owner of a riceland situated in the barrio, of San Juan, municipality  of  Gen, Trias,  province  of  Civite,  containing  an  area  of 27,837 square meters, with Torrens title registered in the Registry of  Deeds  for  the province of  Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso  Quion is his tenant in  said land.   Desiring  to lease said  riceland to  one Porfirio  Potente for the purpose of. raising thereon Zacate  (a species of grass for horses' feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner served a written notice thereof to  respondent and requested  him  to vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do  so.  On March  7, 1956, the petitioner  executed the contract of lease  in favor of Porflrio Potente, but the respondent still continued in. the land thereby hindering its delivery to the lessea, hence the petitioner filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations the petition under consideration to  secure an order  directing' the respondent to vacate the premises in question so that it  may  be delivered to  the lessee.   After  summons, the respondent filed his answer to the petition and on March 20, 1956,  moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground  (1)  that  it states  no cause  of action, the facts stated therein not being constitutive  of  any of the causes for the  dispossession  of a  tenant enumerated in section 50 of Republic Act No. 1199;  (2)  that under section 49 of the same Act,  no  tenant  could  be  dispossessed  of his holding  except for any of the causes enumerated in section  50  of said  Act, and  ('6)  that under section 9 of the same  Act,  the lease of  the  land in  question  did not  of itself  extinguish the relationship between the  respondent as  tenant and  the  petitioner as landowner.   After due hearing, the motion was grunted,  Executive Judge Guillermo S.  Santos ruling as follows:

"*  *  *  that the petition states no cause of action because petitioner seeks the dispossession of respondent-tenant  on a ground which is not one of the causes recognized by law.  As a rule, dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land  can only be "allowed for any of the causes enumerated in  Sec. 50  of  Rep, Act  No.  1199. Lease of  a holding  to another person who will convert it to  a zacatal is not one  of those grounds.   Neither  is the conversion of the holding into a zacatal.   The reason advanced by  petitioner is without merit."

Thereupon,  petitioner appealed- from  the  order of dis- missal, and  in this  instance claims (1)  that  he  has the right to dispossess .his tenant in  case he  leases  his  land for purposes of converting it into a ZACATAL; (2)  that the lessee Potente, as new landholder,  has  the right to employ a man of his choice in the Zacatal; and (3) that Zacate (horses' feed)  is not  an  agricultural product within the purview of Republic Act No.  1199.

Carefully  considered, the  question  involved in this case is simply whether,  under  the  facts stated in  the petition, the  petitioner has right to secure from, the Court of Agrarian Relations  authority  to  eject  the  respondent  tenant from the riceland held  in tenancy by him only because said land was leased to one Porfirio Potente who will convert the same  into  a Zacatal,  and said  respondent refused   to vacate it thereby hampering its delivery to the  lessee.

The controlling law on  the case  are sections 9, 49 and 50  of  Republic  Act No.  1199, which read  as follows:

"Sec. 9. Severance  of Relationship. The tenancy  relationship is extinguished  by the voluntary surrender  of the  land  by, or  the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his  heirs  or the members of .  his immediate farm  household may continue to work the land until the  close  of the agricultural year.  The  expiration of the period of the  contract  as fixed by the  parties, and the sale or alienation of the  land  do not of themselves extinguish the  relationship.  In  the latter case, the purchaser  or transferee shall assume  the rights and obligations of the former-landholder  in  relation  to the  tenant.   Tn case of  death  of  the  landholder,  his heir or heirs shall  likewise assume his  rights  and obligations.

"Sec. 49. Ejectment,  of  Tenant. Notwithstanding  any agreement or provision of law as  to the  period, in all cases  where land devoted to any agricultural  purpose is  held under any system  of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his  holdings except  for any of  the  causes hereinafter enumerated  and  only  after  the same  has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by, the  court.

"Sec. 50. Causes  for the Dispossession of a  Tenant. Any of  the  following  shall he a sufficient cause for the dispossession  of a tenant from his holdings:

(a)  The bona  fide intention of the  landholder  to cultivate  the land himself personally or through the employment of farm machinery and  implements:  * *  *.
(b)  When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of  the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply  when the  tenant has substantially  complied with the contract  or v/ith the  provisions  of this  Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the  agreed  rental or to deliver the landholder's share: Provided, however, That (his shall not  apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land  for  a  purpose other  than that specified by agreement of  the parties.
(e) When a  share-tenant fails  to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the proper care of the land  and increased agricultural production.
(f) When  the tenant through  negligence permits serious in jury to  the land which will impair its productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a  tenant or any member ox his immediate family or farm household of  a  crime against the landholder or a member of  his immediate family."

Under the foregoing  clear provisions of law,  we  find that the agrarian court committed no reversible error when ii: dismissed the petition, firstly,  because under the aforequoted section  9 of Rep.  Act 1199,  the  contract  of  lease entered into by the petitioner and Porfirio  Potente did  not of itself extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner  and the respondent, and  the lessee Potente should assume the obligations of the former landholder, the herein petitioner, in relation to his  tenant,  the herein,  respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a tenant  cannot be dispossessed  of his  holding  except  for any of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and  certainly the lease  of the  land in  question to Potente is  not one  of those  causes for the  dispossession  of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of the Tenancy Law quoted above. Consequently,  we  hold  that  under the provisions  of  law governing the  case,  the petition under consideration  is completely  untenable, for once a tenancy  relationship  is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure with right to  continue  working  on  arid  cultivating the  land until he  is  dispossessed of  his  holdings  for  just cause provided  by  law  or the  tenancy  relationship  is  legally terminated.

Petitioner contends, however,  that sections 9 and 50 of Republic  Act 1199 are  unconstitutional and void  for  they are against paragraph 1, section 1 of Article III Bill of Rights of our Constitution.  It is argued that the petitioner has a  perfect right to dispossess  his  tenant because he wants to lease his land to a third person for the purpose of converting it into a ZACATAL  and that "the lessee has a perfect right to employ laborers  of his own choice and to deny a lessee that right will be tantamount to a deprivation  of the right of the owner to  lease his land for a better income, for no lessee will  enter  into  a contract of lease of a  riceland to  convert the same into a ZACATAL if  he  will be denied the  freedom to employ a tenant of his own choice."   We find  no merit in this contention.   The provisions of law assailed  as unconstitutional do not impair the right  of the landowner to  dispose or  alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease,  as in  the instant  case,  the  tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in  order to insure the  well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the  land; in  other words,  the purpose of the law in  question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation  of the land or afford them protection against  unjustified dismissal from their  holdings. Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.  It is a statute relating to  public  subjects within the domain  of the general legislative powers of the State and. involving the public rights and public welfare of the  entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like  the previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed by Congress  in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be  the concern of the State" (Art.  II, see. 5)  and that  "the  State  shall regulate  the relations between landlord and tenant  *  *  *  in agriculture   *   * *."   (Art.  XIV, sec.  6).

As  to  the "last question raised by the petitioner, to wit, whether  the Zacatal is an agricultural product as contemplated by Act 1199, we find unnecessary to  discuss it  in view  of  the foregoing conclusion  we  arrived at, for the true question involved  in the case  is whether the lease  of petitioner's land to Porfirio Potente constitutes just cause for  dispossessing the respondent of his holding on the land as tenant thereof.

Wherefore, finding no error in the order  appealed from, the  same is hereby affirmed with  costs against  the petitioner-appellant.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,  A.  Bautdsta Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion,  Reyes,  J. B.  L.,  and  Felix, JJ.,  concur. Order  affirmed.