Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against Rufino Adan, Celedonio Ribares, Elena Vda. de Clave and Fabian Samson to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land.  Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the land in question does not belong to plaintiff but  portions thereof belong respectively to them  although their areas have  not been determined.

After  several postponements, the court set the case for hearing  on March  11,  1955.  Notice  of hearing  was received  by  counsel  for defendants on February 17, 1955. When the  case was called for trial on the date first mentioned, counsel for both plaintiff  and defendants informed the court that they were ready to go to trial and, accordingly, plaintiff presented her evidence consisting  of  her testimony and some documentary  evidence.  After plaintiff had rested her case, defendants'  counsel moved for continuance  alleging that his clients  have not come to court although he  had notified them in writing that  the trial was set for  March 11, 1955. Plaintiff  objected to  this motion  contending that defendants'  counsel had informed the court that he was ready to enter trial aside from the fact that he was notified  thereof more than 20  days in advance and  had  given a  written  notice thereof to his clients as he  claimed, and considering  the opposition to be well-taken, the court denied the  motion.   Thereupon, the court rendered judgment declaring plaintiff  owner of the land in question and ordering defendants to pay her the sum of  P7,000.00,  to  restore its possession  to  her,  and deliver  100 cavans of palay each year until the land is fully restored.

On April 14, 1955,  defendants filed a motion for new trial alleging as reasons therefor that "A week  later defendants Rufino Adan and Elena Vda.  de Clave  came. Rufino  Adan said  that he just  received the letter  and Elena  Vda.  de Clave had just  arrived from Olongapo. Fabian Samson could  not come because he was too old and sickly.  Celedonio Ribares was then  in  Camarines Norte."  This  motion  was not verified  nor accompanied by  the requisite  affidavits  of  merits, for  which  reason counsel for plaintiff registered his opposition thereto.  But pending  ruling on said motion, defendants' counsel filed a supplementary memorandum  to  which he attached the affidavits of merits.  The court, however, found the same not well-founded  and denied it.  Whereupon,  defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which in due time rendered a confirmatory decision.  Hence the present petition for review.

The only issue  raised by  appellants is that  respondent court erred in denying their motions  for  postponement and for new trial  based upon mistake and excusable negligence and  in awarding to plaintiff  excessive damages.

In their affidavits  of merits,  appellants  stated that it was agreed between  their counsel and  Rufino Adan that the former would send the notice  of hearing to Adan at Managle, Sipocot, Camarines  Sur,  who would in  turn notify his  co-defendants of  the date of trial; that their counsel had actually  sent a letter to Rufino Adan at said place but  because the latter went to Larap,  Camarines Norte  to work in the  mines, he received the  letter only on  March  13,  1955,  or two days after trial,  for which reason defendants were not able to attend the trial.  Under these facts, appellants contend that their failure to appear was due to mistake or excusable  negligence.   The  trial court however did not consider this conduct  justifiable, more so  when  their counsel was given more than 20 days notice in advance  to prepare for trial.  Neither the  Court of  Appeals considered the  reasons given  justifiable  as may be  seen from the following comment:

"But, resolving the issue on the merits, we find that upon the facts relied upon by appellants in their motion for new trial, they were not entitled  to it and; consequently,  the lower court committed no abuse of discretion in issuing  the order of denial.

"The record discloses that the corresponding notice of trial was served on  appellants' counsel since  February  17,  1955,  that  is, more  than  three weeks before the date set for  the  trial.  He had more  than sufficient time to  notify  his  clients.  That  the  latter did not receive the notice sent by him in  due time must be deemed' due to their  negligence, because a party to an action  in  court is under obligation  to notify  his  attorney  of his  whereabouts,  so that the latter may be in position to contact him readily whenever his presence  in court is  required.

Considering the  circumstances of this  case, we  find  no plausible  reason  for disturbing  the findings made  by the trial court  and by the  Court of  Appeals.   Motions for continuance are addressed at the sound discretion of the court.  The exercise of such discretion is  generally upheld unless  good reasons  are  shown to the  contrary.  Here the reasons given are not satisfactory.

"It is urged, in the first place, that the lower  court  abused  its discretion  in  denying  defendants' motion for continuance.  But it appears that there had already been two prior postponements granted both at defendants' own instance and that the last motion  for that purpose, though sent  five days before the date set for trial, did not conform to the Rules and gave no notice to the adverse party or counsel.   Moreover, the only  ground  therein  stated was that the parties were  on their way to an amicable  settlement.  But it would appear that opposing counsel informed the court  that there was  no  truth about that statement as no proposal  for settlement had  ever  been made.  In the circumstances we do  not think the lower court abused its discretion in denying a continuance.

"Defendants cannot  now be  heard  to say that because trial was not postponed they were deprived of their day in court.  No one deprived them of their day in court. Of their own volition they preferred  not to come to the  hearing on  the day set,  presumably assuming that their motion for continuance would be granted.  Defendants had  no right to make  such  assumption, for continuances are granted for good  cause  alleged and proved and not merely at the will of either or both of the parties  to the case."  (Gayon  vs. Ubaldo, G. R. No. L-7650, Dec.  28, 1955; See also Cruz vs. Malabayasbas,  et  al., supra, p. 708).

With regard to the amount of damages awarded to plaintiff  by  the lower  court and affirmed by the  Court  of Appeals, which  appellants find excessive,  the same cannot now  be  looked into.  This  involves  a  question  of fact which  is not  within  our  province  to  consider  at this instance.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.