This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite upholding the validity of an ordinance enacted  by the Municipal Board  of  the  City of Cavite which imposes an annual license tax of P400 upon marine shops located in  said city.

Appellant is  a corporation  engaged in the  lighterage and water transportation business  and in connection with that business it runs  a marine shop in the city of Cavite for the repairs of its own lighters and barges.  Having been  required  to  pay the annual  license  tax  on. the said shop  under the   ordinance  above-mentioned,  appellant brought  an action for declaratory relief to challenge the validity of  said ordinance  on  the  ground, among  others, that it  is  beyond  the power of the Municipal Board of Cavite to enact.   The appellees on the  other hand contend that the ordinance is authorized by paragraphs (a.) and (p)  of section 15 of the, city's charter  (Commonwealth Act No. 547), which  provide:

"Sec. 15.  General powers and duties  of the. Board. Except  as otherwise provided by law, and subject to conditions and limitations thereof, the  Municipal Board  shall have the  following legislative powers:

(a)  To provide for the levy and collection of taxes for  general and special  purposes in  accordance with law including specifically the power to levy real  property tax not to exceed two per cent ad valorem.

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(p) To tax, fix the license fee for, regulate the business and fix the location of, match factories, blacksmith shops, foundries, steam boilers, lumber yards, shipyards, the storage and sale of gunpowder, tar, pitch, resin, coal, oil, gasoline, benzine, turpentine, hemp, cotton, nitroglieerin, petroleum, or any of the products  thereof, and of all other highly combustible or explosive materials, and other establishments likely to endanger the public safety or give rise to conflagrations or explosions,  and, subject to the rules and regulations issued by the Director of  Health in accordance with  law, tanneries, renderies,  tallow chandlerries,  embalmers and  funeral parlors, bone factories, and soap factories."

Reading  the  above  provisions carefully,, we note  that paragraph  (a) merely expresses in  a general  way  the city's  authority1  to  levy.taxes  for  general  and  special purposes, which  authority,  so  the paragraph  says,  must be  exercised "in  accordance with, law."  In  accordance with our decision in Icard vs. City of Baguio, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. No. 11) 320, to the effect that where the  authority to tax is given in  general  terms .and subject to  the qualification that  the authority  is to be exercised  as  provided  by law,  one  must look  elsewhere  in the  statute book for specific  subjects of taxation, that is to  say,  for subjects specifically authorized  by  law to  be taxed.   In. the present case,  those specific subjects excepting realty which is already  mentioned in the paragraph are in fact enumerated  in  various paragraphs  of section ,15, among ' them paragraph  (p)  above,  which  is the one  applicable to the  present  case.

Now, going over paragraph  (p),  we  find "shipyards" to be among the  subjects of  taxation therein enumerated, and  since a shipyard is denned  as  a "yard, place  or inclosure where  ships  are  built  or  repaired"  (Webster's International Dictionary,  2nd ed.), the  term  necessarily includes marine shops, such  as  those sought to  be taxed by the ordinance in  question which are. therein defined as  "establishments engaged in the  repair  of boats  and other marine and water crafts."

It is contended, however, that paragraph (p) authorizes the taxing of a shipyard only when it is conducted as  a business, and in that connection it is; claimed  that appellant's, marine shop is  not in itself, a' business because it is devoted to  the repair  of its own watercraft only and does  not accept work from others.   We  find merit  in this  contention.  Considering the  amount of the charge  imposed by  the  ordinance P400 yearly and the fact that the ordinance itself calls it a tax, we are inclined  to regard  it as  such and not as a  mere fee for regulatory purposes  in  connection with the,exercise of the police  power.  As a tax, it may be imposed by the . ordinance  upon a shipyard only  when this is operated as  a business, that is to  say, when it builds or repairs ships for others, but not when  it  is  devoted  solely to the repair of the owner's own watercraft used by it in its  lighterage  and water transportation business,  which already  pays a tax of its own  as such business.   (See Standard Vacuum Oil Company vs. M.  D. Antigua,  et al., 96  Phil., 909.)

The  above  conclusion,  however, does not  necessarily call for the invalidation of the questioned ordinance, but only for a declaration  that  appellant's marine  shop in the City of Cavite so  long as it is not operated  as a business is not  subject to the payment of the tax provided for in the ordinance.

As the evidence stands,  we cannot say that during the period  preceding  the filing  of  the complaint appellant's marine  shop was engaged in building  or  repairing  watercraft  for  others.

Wherefore,  the decision appealed  from  is affirmed in so much as  it declares  the ordinance in question  valid." But.it  is  also  hereby  declared that appellant's marine shop in the City of Cavite is not  subject to the tax. imposed by said  ordinance so  long  as it is  not  operated as a business.  No costs.

Parás,  C.  J.,   Bengzon,   Padilla,  Montemayor,  Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ.,, concur.