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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c303b?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. COTO LABOR UNION](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c303b?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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105 Phil. 915

[ G.R. No. L-12394, May 29, 1959 ]

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. COTO LABOR UNION (NLU), RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a  petition for  certiorari  seeking to  set  aside the order entered on December 31,1956 by the Hon. Judge Jose S.  Bautista, Presiding Judge, Court of Industrial Relations, denying the motion to.dismiss filed by petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as well as the resolution of said court en banc dated January ยง, 1957 affirming the aforesaid order.                  

On  May 7, 1956, respondent union declared a  strike against petitioner.  The strike was  preceded  by  negotiations between respondent union  and petitioner regarding the case of 23 union members whom petitioner previously dismissed for cause, and of 12 other union members who were suspended for  absenting themselves without  leave in violation  of the company regulations.

Shortly after the strike  was declared, the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor took cognizance of the dispute and tried to effect a settlement between petitioner and respondent union.  On  July 26, 1956, while the negotiations  were  still  in  progress,  counsel for  respondent union  wrote the Secretary  of Labor requesting that the dispute be referred  to the  Court of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration  pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 (c) of the Minimum Wage Law  (Republic Act 602).  Heeding counsel's request,  the Secretary of Labor, on August 8, 1956', wrote Presiding Judge Jose  S. Bautista of the  Court of Industrial Relations informing him that he is endorsing the dispute to said court pursuant to "Sections 1  and 4,  Commonwealth Act No.  103,  as amended,  in conjunction with Section 16 (c), Republic Act No. 602, as amended,  and  Section 7, Republic Act No.  875."  Acceding to  the  endorsement  of  the Secretary of  Labor,  Judge Bautista accepted the dispute, had it docketed as Case No. 1029-V, and ordered summons to  be issued to petitioner.

Shortly upon receipt of the summons, petitioner filed a motion to  dismiss based, among others, on  the following grounds:  (1)  "that  the demand mentioned  in  Section 16 of the Minimum Wage Law is one for the payment. of minimum wage above the statutory minimum, and not for the recovery of  wage differentials";  and (2)  "That Section 7 of Republic Act 875 has repealed the  provision of Section  16  (c)  of the Minimum Wage Law so that the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction over the case of the union members dismissed and suspended by petitioner."

Respondent union opposed petitioners' motion to dismiss contending,  among others, that its claim 'against petitioner is one  for  payment  of  minimum wage  and since this claim is one of the issues involved in the strike of May 7, 1956,  the Court of Industrial  Relations has jurisdiction over the case under Section 16 (c) of Republic Act 602.

On  December 13,  1956, after hearing, Judge  Bautista issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.  He held that  the dispute between petitioner and  respondent "refers to minimum wages for the members of the petitioning union claim that deductions  from  their wages had been made in violation of the  Minimum Wage Law and consequently, the wages were reduced below the statutory limit", and that all the conditions required by Section 16 (c)  of  the  Minimum Wage Law are present thus giving jurisdiction  to the Court of Industrial  Relations to entertain the case.  He further held that respondent union's claim also refers to "non-payment of overtime premium" and under Section 7  of Republic Act 875,  said court has jurisdiction to act on cases involving the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth  Act No. 444).

Dissatisfied with said  order, petitioner  filed a motion for  reconsideration  reiterating  practically the  grounds already advanced in its motion  to  dismiss, but the  Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied the motion  in a resolution entered on May 21, 1957, Judges Bautista, Villanueva and Tabigne voted to sustain the court's jurisdiction over the case.  Judge Lanting  and Martinez dissented from the majority ruling.  Hence the present petition for review by  way of certiorari.

The questions raised by petitioner are:
"1. Is a claim for the refund of illegal deductions  from salaries and for underpayment of  overtime premium a demand for minimum wage?

"2. Does the Court of Industrial Relations have jurisdiction to try and decide cases for the recovery of illegal deductions and overtime premium?

"3. May a case endorsed  by the Secretary of Labor to the  Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to Section 16 (c)  of the Minimum. Wage Law be heard by a single judge of the said court?

"4. May the Court of Industrial Relations take cognizance of the issue of the reinstatement  of dismissed and  suspended union members  in a case endorsed by the Secretary of Labor  under Section 16 (c)  of the Minimum Wage  Law?"
With regard to the  first point, petitioner argues:  "The claim  of  respondent union for wage  differentials is not a demand for the payment of a minimum wage.  Minimum wage is the  rate of pay, established either by statute or by minimum wage order, payable to a worker  or  to a particular class of worker.   The wage differentials claimed by respondent  union are for alleged illegal deductions, and underpayment." The  first  item consists of amounts deducted by petitioner from the wages of its  employees for the value of the sundry facilities, such as housing, rice, light, water, etc., furnished by petitioner which respondent union claims is not supported by the corresponding evaluation  order of the Department of Labor.  The  second item refers to overtime  compensation  which respondent union claims  has not been   correctly   computed.  From  these arguments, petitioner draws the inference that there  is no dispute as to  the  basic wages paid by petitioner to its employees and so the case does not come within the jurisdiction of the  Court of Industrial Relations.

In claiming  jurisdiction over the dispute1 between  petitioner and respondent union, the industrial court invokes Section 16 (e)  of the Minimum Wage Law, which provides:
"(c) When the demands of minimum wages involve  an actual strike, the matter shall be submitted  to the Secretary of Labor, who shall attempt to secure a settlement between the parties through conciliation.  Should the Secretary fail within fifteen days to effect    said  settlement, lie  shall indorsed the matter  together  with other issues involved, to  the  Court of Industrial Relations  which  will acquire jurisdiction  on the ease including the minimum wages issue, and after  a hearing where the views of the Secretary of Labor will be given, will decide the case in the same manner as provided in other cases.  The decision shall be rendered by the court in bane within fifteen: days after the case has been submitted for determination, and its "finding of facts, shall be conclusive if  supported by substantial  evidence, and shall be  subject only to an appeal by certiorari"
Analyzing the  above-quoted provision,  it Would  appear that the elements that must concur to confer jurisdiction upon the  Court of Industrial Relations are: (a) a demand for minimum wages: (b)  the demand must involve actual strike; (c) submission of the matter to the Secretary of Labor for settlement; (d) failure of the Secretary of Labor to effect settlement within 15 days; and  (e) endorsement of the dispute "together with other  issues involved" to  the Court of  Industrial Relations.

That these elements are present in the instant case, can not be disputed.  As the respondent court has said, "The dispute in the instant case refers to minimum wages for  the members  of the  petitioning union  claim that deductions from their wages had been made in violation of the Mini mum Wage Law and consequently, the  wages  were  reduced below  the statutory  limit."   This  is  an  incident which really affects the minimum  wages to which union members  are entitled, and the court called upon to deter mine it is certainly the Court of Industrial Relations.  This is more so in this  case where the parties have already fixed the conditions of employment in a collective  bargaining agreement entered into  between  them  and the question that arises  is whether said conditions  had  been complied with.  And this Court has already ruled that the Court of Industrial Relations has the exclusive jurisdiction  to enforce collective bargaining contracts  (Panbujon Sur United  Mine  Workers  vs. Samar  Mining  Co., Inc.,  94 Phil., 932; 50 Off. Gaz., [6] 2449).  This conclusion is also in line with what this Court has said in another case with regard to the extent of jurisdiction of the industrial  court.
"But this board jurisdiction (of the Court of Industrial Relations under Commonwealth  Act No.  163) was somewhat curtailed upon the approval of  Republic Act 875, the purpose being to limit it to certain specific cases, leaving the rest to the  regular courts.   Thus, as the law now stands, that  power is confined  to  the following cases:  (1)  when the  labor  dispute affects an industry which is indispensable  to the national interest  and is so  certified by the President, to the industrial court  (Section  10, Republic Act  875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum  wage  under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602); (3)  when it involves  hours of employment under  the Eight-Hour Labor Law  (Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice (Section 5, (a), Republic  Act 875)."  (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, et al.,  99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz., [13] 5836; Italics supplied)
With respect to  the second point,  it is true that  with regard to  cases  of  underpayment  of  wages, the law provides that the same should be brought to the proper court of first instance and not  to the  Court  of Industrial Relations [Section 16 (a), Republic Act 602], but the  present dispute does not merely involve an underpayment  but the propriety of the deductions made by petitioner from the wages of its employees for sundry facilities extended to them.  Since  these  deductions  may  affect  the  minimum wages which said employees may be  entitled, the incident evidently  comes under the jurisdiction of  the  Court  of Industrial Relations.

We  agree with the claim  of  petitioner that  whenever the Secretary of Labor endorses a dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations  concerning  a  demand  for  minimum wage which involves an actual strike, the same should be acted upon by the  court  en banc as  provided for  by law [Section 16  (c), Republic Act 602], but this claim is now of no consequence it appearing that the decision of Judge Bautista was affirmed by the court en  banc.

Finally, the claim that under Section 7 of Republic Act 875 the  Court of Industrial  Relations has  already been divested  of its power  to take cognizance of other issues involved  in a dispute concerning demand for  minimum wages under Section 16 (c) of the Minimum Wage Law because  said Section 7  provides that "No  court of the Philippines shall have the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of  employment or  conditions of employment", is untenable for  the same overlooks the fact that said section contains  an  exception insofar as minimum wages and over time payments are concerned.   This is inferred from the following clause of said  Section 7: "except as in this Act is otherwise provided  and except as  is  provided in Re public Act  Numbered  Six Hundred  Two and  Common wealth Act Numbered  Four  Hundred Forty-Four as to hours of  work."

Wherefore, petition  is denied, with costs  against petitioner.    

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes,  A., Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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