This is an appeal by way of certiorari against the judgment of  the Court of  Appeals denying a  petition  for mandamus to compel the respondent judge of the Court of  First  Instance  of Manila to  certify the  record on appeal in Civil Case No. 21363, entitled  "William Golangco vs.  Genoveva S. Villalon and Augusto  Villalon.

The proceedings had in the  Court  of First Instance leading  to  the  petition for  mandamus are  as follows, . according to the decision of the Court of  Appeals:

"In Civil  Case No.  21363  of the Court  of First Instance, of Manila,  in  "which herein respondent  William Golangco was  plaintiff  and  herein  petitioners  were  defendants, trial  was  set  for March 25,  1954.  When the case was  called, defendant's counsel Signified that he  was ready and plaintiff forthwith proceeded to present his  evidence.  After plaintiff  rested his case  it turned  out that neither of defendants was present and for the first time their counsel moved for continuance, alleging that he agreed  to  go to trial  in  the belief that  plaintiff would  not be able to finish with his witnesses.  The motion was  denied and the case was considered submitted for  decision.  Counsel moved  in open  Court  for.  a  reconsideration and stated that his client, Mrs. Genoveva S. Villalon, was sick. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

"The  next day, March 26,   1954, defendants  filed an urgent motion for reopening on the  same ground,  to wit, that Mrs.  Villalon was ill  in  bed  and had been ill for three days, for  which reason she was not able to appear at the trial.  Plaintiff opposed the  motion   and the same was  subsequently denied, defendants receiving notice of the denial on March 30, 1954.  On the following June  10  the Court  rendered   its  decision,  copy of which was received by the defendants on June 15, 1954.  On June 25, 1954, they filed a.motion to set aside the judgment  and  for a new trial  based on the  same  ground  as the previous motions, and again it was denied.1  Copy of the order of  denial was served  on counsel  for defendants  on  July  7,  1954.  On July  16;,' 1954,  defendants filed a  motion of appeal  from the  judgment of the Court  as  well  as from  the order  denying the. motion to  set aside  the judgment and for  new trial. An  appeal  bond  was filed the  same day and the record on appeal the next day, July  17, 1954.  Plaintiff opposed the approval of the  appeal bond and move to dismiss the appeal on the ground that  it  was filed out ,of time. * * *"

The Court of Appeals  ruled that  the record on  appeal was presented beyond the 30-day period provided by the Rules inasmuch  as petitioner's motion dated June 25, 1954 did not  suspend the  running of the period for  the perfection of the appeal.  The reason  given for  this  ruling is that the grounds asserted in petitioner's motion of June 25,  1954 had already been previously raised,  first  in  a motion for continuance, then  in the motion for reconsideration denying such continuance,  and  lastly in a motion for reopening, all before the  judgment  was rendered. Cited to support its ruling is Sawit, et al. vs. Rodas, et al., 73 Phil., 310.

The issue presented to us is as follows:  Does a motion for new trial  or reconsideration, filed after judgment, on the ground  that the  defendants  were hot present at the time of the trial because of illness, which reason or ground was presented before judgment first in a motion  for continuance, then in a motion for reconsideration, and lastly in a motion for reopening, suspend the 30-day period for perfecting  an appeal or not?  The trial judge held that such motion was pro forma and therefore did not suspend or interrupt the running  of the period for perfecting the appeal.  While the Court of  Appeals also held that the presentation of said motion for new trial did not suspend or interrupt  said period for  appeal, it did  so,  not  on the ground that the motion for new trial was pro forma but on the ground that the  said motion was for the purpose of delay.  Stated differently, the  question is, should the pro forma rule  be extended to a motion for new trial on the ground,  of which has already been raised  previously in a motion  before judgment?  The  Rules are silent  in this respect.  Neither  have  we  rendered  any decision on the matter.

Our ruling  that a pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the  running of  the  period of  appeal  finds support in  an express provision of the Rules  requiring the movant for  new trial to  point  out  specifically the findings or conclusions of the  judgment which  are contrary to law,  or  which are not sufficiently, borne out  by the evidence.   (Section 2 of Rule 37.)

Under section  146 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.  190), it was not necessary  in a motion for new.  trial  to point out the  specific conclusions  or findings of fact which were  not supported  by the evidence or by the law.  The  motion entitled the  movant or appellant to a review  of  the judgment  or decision,  even if the alleged conclusion  of law or  finding  of act  disputed  is  not specially set forth  in  the  motion  for  new trial  (provided that an exception to the order denying the  motion for new trial above-mentioned was made),   So the real purpose of the motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or on the ground that it is contrary to law, under the old Rule, was to secure a review of the decision  by  the appellate court,  not to make  the  trial court  rendering the  decision re-examine  the questioned finding of. fact or conclusion of  law  with a view to  its reconsideration.

Since the  adoption of  the new Rules, motions  on the ground of insufficiency  of evidence or on the ground that the judgment is contrary to law  which  do not point out the supposed defects in the judgment, permitted under the. Code of Civil .Procedure as above  set  forth, have  been called  pro forma.   Such motions are not permitted under the new Rules.   This requires  the movant  for the new trial based on the ground of insufficiency  or contrariness to law to point out the findings of fact  or conclusions of law supposed to be insufficiently borne out  by the evidence or contrary to law; and we .have held that they do not interrupt the period of'' appeal because they  merely cause delay.

While we feel justified in ruling that a pro forma motion for new trial does not interrupt the period of appeal, because  such a motion is  not authorized or permitted by the Rules, we do not feel so as to motions for new trial which may cause delay merely but whose use has net  been outlawed  by us.  We have not prohibited the presentation of a motion for new trial on grounds previously raised in a motion prior to the rendition of the judgment.   A ground may be insufficient for  granting a continuance, but it may be  sufficient for the setting aside  of a judgment rendered after denial  of the continuance, as when the judgment is very unjust.or unreasonable and its unreasonableness was not expected at the time the continuance is being prayed for.  So it does not  follow  necessarily that  because  a motion for continuance had been denied, the ground used for demanding such continuance, like illness, may not be sufficient ground for obtaining a reconsideration or setting aside of a judgment.

Considering the above possibilities  and the general rule that the presentation of  a  motion  for new  trial after judgment ordinarily suspends the period  of appeal,  and there being no express prohibition against the presentation of a motion for  new trial on grounds already previously raised, we are loathe to penalize a party for taking" advantage  of the remedy expressly authorized  him by the Rules,  even if it may cause some delay, by holding that his motion for new trial does not suspend the period of appeal.  Were we to, hold that his motion for new trial did  not  suspend the  period  of appeal, we will  be depriving him of his day in court, a constitutional right, on a ground of dubious justice, and  soundness.  We feel that the ends of justice would be better subserved  by an opportunity for  the  review of the  orders  of the court denying  continuance and denying petitioners the  right to present their evidence.

The  certiorari prayed for  is hereby granted  and the order of the Court of Appeals reversed  and the record on appeal  ordered  to  be certified to the latter court for, proceedings in accordance  with the Rules.   Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,  Reyes, J.  B.  L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.