On  January 25, 1955,  plaintiffs  instituted  this  action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the  defendants, alleging in  the  complaint  that  they were  employees of the Philippine  National Red Cross;  that since March 22, 1947, they had rendered overtime services from 2 to 16 hours every day, including Sundays and holidays, for which each of the plaintiffs  should be  paid  the sum of P5,000, more or less, value of their overtime work already earned; that in the case of Esteban  Madera said amount of P5,000 includes underpayment  not  paid to him as provided for in the Minimum Wage  Law, and  as defendants allegedly  failed and  refused to pay  said overtime work and underpayment, they prayed the Court to render judgment (a) enjoining defendants from dismissing or threatening to dismiss plaintiffs;  (b) ordering the  defendants to pay each plaintiff the sum of  P5,000, more or  less;  (c) compelling the defendants  to pay additional sum of P6,400 as attorney's fees; and  (d) granting unto  the  plaintiffs such other reliefs as may be deemed proper in the premises.

Before  answering the  complaint the Solicitor  General's office filed for the defendants for motion for bill of particulars in order to enable them to plead intelligently or prepare adequately their responsive pleading thereto, giving as a reason for the motion that aside from  the fact that the demand of P5,000 for  each of the plaintiffs (P60,000 for all of them) is fantastic, the complaint does not state who among the said plaintiffs have  rendered 16 hours' work during the  said  number  of years and did not specify the number of supposed overtime hours rendered by each of them, the rate of salaries and wages during the entire period for which such overtime is claimed; the time during which regular and  overtime  work have been performed during Sundays and official holidays; and the exact amount of undertime, apart from  the overtime, supposedly due to plaintiff Esteban  Madera.

This motion for a bill of particulars was objected to by the plaintiffs- and their  opposition  was retorted by  the defendants, after  which the Court  by order  of  February 18, 1955, directed plaintiffs to amend their complaint by making sufficient  allegations  on  the points  indicated by the  defendants  in paragraph  5  of their  motion for  bill of particulars.  After plaintiffs'  motion for  reconsideration of this order was denied, plaintiffs submitted a  so-called bill  of particulars indicating the alleged aggregate total  of overtime  hours  rendered by each  plaintiff (such as 14,000 hours, 12,000 hours, 10,000 hours, 8,000 hours or 5,000, more or less, without reference to the dates in which the laborer actually rendered said overtime  hours),  the rates  of salaries  per  month during the entire period of their  employment (or daily,  as  in  the case  of  Esteban Madera), and the overtime performed by  plaintiffs (undoubtedly, referring  to all of  them) during Sundays and holidays, which started  at 8:00  a.m., Sunday or  holiday till 4:00 p.m., the  next day Monday or otherwise equivalent to 32 hours'  continuous service,  and stating that the underpayment  of  Esteban Madera  amounted to  P2,000, more  or  less.

Upon receipt of this bill of particulars and without considering  if it was sufficiently  explicit or  clear to  enable defendants to answer, counsel  for the latter filed on March 23,  1955 a motion to dismiss on  the ground that the complaint did  not  allege facts sufficient to constitute  a valid cause of action.

This motion was  objected  to  by plaintiffs, and after both parties exhausted their arguments in support of their respective contentions, the  Court by order of  April  18, 1955, dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs without special  pronouncement as to costs.  The  Court reasoned out its  order as  follows:

"It will  be noted from the above provisions  (Sec. 2 of Common- wealth Act No. 444)  that the law  'shall  apply only to all persons employed in any  industry or occupation, whether public or private *   *   *.'   The  plaintiffs themselves admit that  the  defendant, in truth and  in fact  is  an organization entirely devoted to charity. It  is not  a  profit  making   organization;  its  funds are dependent on  the voluntary contributions  of  the  public.  Plaintiffs maintain that the Philippine National Eed Gross,  Inc.,  is not among  those mentioned  in  the exception and  therefore should  be  deemed to ' be  one  of those upon  whom  the provisions  of the  law  shall apply.  The contention is,  in the opinion  of the  Court, unfounded.  The Court  believes and bo holds that the laws, in referring to persons employed in an industry or occupation, does not refer  to the  EMPLOYEE HIMSELF but to the  EMPLOYER  who must  be engaged  in an industry  or  occupation.   The exception  mentioned in  Section  2 aforecited  refer to  the  employees  who, although employed  in an industry  or occupation, do not fall under the general  provision  and are not entitled to the benefits: of the law if they are 'farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on weekly basis, and persons in the  personal  service  of another and  members of the family  of the employer working  for  him.   To  hold  the  National Eed  Cross, Inc., subject to the operation of the law would be tantamount to curtailing its  activities  to the prejudice of the welfare and  interest  of the general public,  particularly the victims of a catastrophe.  One may imagine,  for instance, the  result if those persons  now engaged by  the Red  Cross  in its  relief work  among  the  victims  of the recent earthquakes should refuse  to work overtime unless paid.   The funds1 of the  Red Cross,  meager  as  they are, would be consumed in overtime  pay instead of being spent for the relief of those afflicted. Such a result certainly  cannot  be  said to have  been intended by the Legislature."

After plaintiffs'  motion to set  aside the order and  for trial was  denied,  plaintiffs brought up this case to Us and in  this  instance  their  counsel  maintains  that the  lower Court erred:

1.  In holding that  the Philippine National Eed Cross Is  not covered by  Commonwealth. Act No. 444 otherwise known as  the  Eight-Hour Labor  Law;

 2. In holding that the Philippine National Red Cross; is not covered by Republic Act No. 602 otherwise known as the Minimum  'Wages Law;  and
 
 3. In dismissing  plaintiffs-appelants' complaint.

As may be seen from the foregoing, the only question at issue in this appeal  refers to the applicability  of the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor  Law to charitable  institutions like the defendant Philippine National  Red Cross.
 
Section 2 of Commonwealth  Act No. 444  upon which plaintiffs base their  cause of action, reads as follows:

"Sec. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in an industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who' prefer  to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family  of the  employer working  for him."

The solution of the whole  controversy  depends  upon whether defendant Philippine National Red Cross is engaged "in an industry or  occupation", as this phrase  is  used in the section just quoted.

Plaintiffs  submit  to  Our  consideration  the following: (1)  are  plaintiffs-appellants the persons  excepted  from the operation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law as provided for in Section 2 thereof?; and (2) are plaintiffs-appellants employed in  any industry or occupation?  Answering these questions counsel for plaintiffs states that with regard to the first, the answer is too obvious to require proof, for plaintiffs-appellants have been in the employ of the  Philippine National Red Cross as janitors, drivers, technicians and manual laborers.  "Occupation", as defined, is a trade, calling, vocation,  profession, employment or business  by which one generally earns his living (67 C.J.S. 76), and under this definition  plaintiffs'  employment with the  Philippine National  Red Cross is   certainly an occupation. Hence, counsel argues,  plaintiffs are not the presons excepted in said  Section  2 of  the law.

As  to the  second question, plaintiffs do not dispute that the Philippine  National Red Cross "is not engaged  in any industry, for the soJe purpose for which this  institution has been created, as known the world over, is to perform purely  humanitarian  work.  Hence, it couid not be  said that plaintiffs-appellants  are employed in  any  industry engaged in by the Philippine NationaJ Red Cross."  What plaintiffs,  however, maintain is that they are employed by the Philippine National  Red Cross in  its  occupation of performing humanitarian work.   Viewed  in the light of the meaning1 of the word "occupation" as given before, plaintiffs ask  may it then be said that the Philippine National Red Cross  is engaged  in an occupation?   Plaintiffs also claim that the answer is obvious, for performance of humanitarian work by the Philippine National Red Cross, though not for any financial reward, does not cease to be an occupation.  In support of their contention plaintiffs submitted in the lower  court  the  communication  of the Secretary  of Labor, Jose  Fig'ueras, dated  November 18, 1952,  wherein this Department Head  held  the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 444 applies "to all persons employed in  any  industry or occupation", whether  public or private,  with  the  exception  enumerated  in the law, such as farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants, etc., and that on the basis of this  provision, the fact that the Philippine National Red Cross is a charitable or non-profit institution does not draw its workers away from the coverage of the law.  This question, according to  said Secretary,  has been settled by this Court in the case of Elks  Club  vs.  Rovira,  (80 Phil., 272, 45 Off.  Gaz. No. 9, p. 3829).¹  

Plaintiffs further argue that the aims and purposes for which the  Philippine  National  Red  Cross was created certainly are noble and lofty  and become more so when viewed against the background of a material world.  But in the attainment  of the same, however noble and lofty, such end should never justify the means.  If the Philippine National Red Cross must be uncharitable to its employees in order that it may be  charitable to  others, this institution would cease to be consistent with the purpose for  which it was  created.  But  the  Philippine National Red Cross can attain its noble aims and purposes without being uncharitable  to its lowest paid employees.

On the  other  hand, defendants call attention  to. the fact  that under  Section 3 of  Republic Act No. 95, the defendant Philippine National  Red Cross  was  created as a  public corporation charged with the duty of assisting the Republic of the Philippines in "discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva  Red Cross  Convention  and to perform such other duties  as are incumbent upon  a national red cross society", its main purposes being, among others:  (a)  to furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces  in time of war, in  accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva Red  Cross Convention;  (b)  to act in matters of voluntary relief and  in accord with the authorities of the Armed Forces as a medium of communication between  the people of the Republic of the Philippines and their Armed Forces; (c)  to establish  and maintain a  system  of national and international relief in time of  peace and in time of war; and  (d) to devise and promote  such other services as may be found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of  the Filipino  people.

Such being the ends and purposes of the creation of the Philippine  National Red Cross, defendants claim that it would be stating the obvious  to  say  that the  defendant Red  Cross  is a  purely charitable organization engaged exclusively in humanitarian work and never as a government entity carrying a trade,  industry or occupation.

Defendants further state that the provisions of the law governing payments of overtime and extra compensation for work done  during Sundays and legal  holidays as, embodied in Commonwealth Act No. 444 shall apply only to persons or corporations, whether public or private, which are engaged in any Occupation or Industry and defendant Red Cross not being a government  entity engaged in any "occupation  or. industry",  but in purely humanitarian and charitable work, it may not be held liable for payment of overtime services to its employees, assuming again arguendo that any such overtime work was  performed.

Besides counsel  for defendants  continues the  funds supporting the Red Cross come from voluntary contribution from  the government  and from every  man, woman and child throughout the world, irrespective of race and creed, and to hold that the Red Cross, like  other public or private entity engaged in  "industry or  occupation",  is liable for overtime pay to its  workers  and employees,  would be to render the noble purposes of its existence useless and illusory, for what should be otherwise  devoted to its mission of mercy, could hardly cover up for such overtime  wages and, certainly, Congress could not have thought of  applying the provisions of the  Eight-Hour Labor  Law, or any other labor  law for that  matter, to  the Red Cross.  As a persuasive authority counsel for  defendants  submits Opinion No.  102, series of 1954, of Secretary of Justice Pedro  Tuazoii holding  the points of view just mentioned.

In passing  upon  these  conflicting contentions,  We can state beforehand that We  fully agree  with the trial  Judge that the phrase employed  (in an institution engaged) "in an industry or occupation", as used in  section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, does  not refer to the employees but to the employer, who  is the  one that shall be engaged in an  industry or occupation.   There is no  dispute that the Philippine National Red Cross is not engaged in any industry  and the Gordian knot of the  problems has to be' cut by Our determination  of whether  the Philippine National  Red  Cross  is  engaged in  an occupation, as this word is used  in, or  according to the  meaning Congress intended  to impart  to  said  section 2  of  Commonwealth Act No. 444.

As stated by  appellants, in  common  parlance We  all may agree  that the Philippine National Red  Cross is engaged or employed in the occupation of performing humanitarian  work.

"Granting  that the 'Salvation  Army"  is not  engaged  in  trade and that it has no profession,  and without deciding whether or not it has a business, it must  be  held .that its activities are  described by the word  'occupation'".   (67 C. J.  S.. 76).

But  is sueh occupation  what was meant by said word in aforementioned provision of  the Eight-Hour Labor  Law?

"OCCUPATION.  The word may be  employed  as referring to the act or process of occupying1, the state of being occupied,  occupancy or tenure; and as used in this sense the word is denned in the C.J.S. title Property, par. 14, also  46  C.J. p. 895 note 72 p-. 896 note 96".

"The  word  'occupation' also is  employed as  referring to that which occupies time and  attention; a calling or a trade; and it is only as applied in this sense that the word is discussed in the following paragraphs" (67 C.  J. S. 74).

"OCCUPATION has been  held properly applicable to various activities and pursuits  such as the  practice of medicine or dentistry, farming, undertaking1 and store-keeping,  and in other instances, the term has been held inapplicable."   (67 C. J. S. 76)

"The  word  'occupation'  is  frequently defined  as  meaning the business  in which one principally engages in order  to procure  a living or obtain wealth (Cohen vs.  State, 53 Tex. Cr. 422); the trade, calling,  vocation, profession,  office,  employment,  or business  by which one generally  earns  his  living (Johnson vs. State,  138 Tex. Cr. 370;  Anderson va.  State, 70 Tex. Cr. 250; Shed vs. State, 70 Tex. Cr.  10); whatever one  follows as the means of making a livelihood,"  (Sovereign Camp W.O.W. vs. Craft, 20S  Ala. 467)

"The word  'occupation' has reference to the principal or regular business  of one's life, or that to which  one devotes  his time and attention, such as trade, profession, or other vocation  or calling, or that which principally takes up one's time, thought,  and energy, specially one's regular business, or .employment,  or  whatever one follows as  a  means of making a livelihood  (Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees vs. Seerest, 239 ILj. 400).  The word particularly refers to the vocation, profession, trade, or calling in which a person is engage for hire or for profit (Scott vs. Freeport Motor Cas. Co. of Freeport, 392 111.  332), and  it has  been  repeatedly  held that a person's principal business and chief -means  of obtaining a livelihood constitute his occupation Farmers Automobile and Inter-Insurance Exchange vs. Calkins, 39  Cal. Apr,. 2d 390" (67 C. J.  S. 75-76).

From the foregoing authorities We see  that the word  "occupation" ordinarily implies the idea  of one's employ  ment in a principal or regular business or the dedication of |||j           time and attention to  a trade, profession or calling which is taken up as a means  of making livelihood, or for profit, or for the obtention of wealth.   In other  words, the weight of authority is to the effect that in its legal sense and as used  in labor laws, the term "occupation"  ordinarily involves the idea of gain, profit or return for the time, attention and energies devoted in the performance of the occupation  by either the  master  or the servant concerned. For these reasons We share in the aforementioned opinion of the  Secretary of Justice,  that the Philippine National Red Cross  is  not subject  to the Eight-Hour Labor Law. It  is  neither in  business, nor  an  industrial  enterprise organized for profit,  but engaged in  purely humanitarian work.   Of  course, as  said Secretary of  Justice further explains:

"This does not mean that it  cannot extend the benefits of the Act to its employees.  As pointed out  in Opinion  No. 142,  series' of 1939,  Common wealth Act  No. 444  may be extended to employees and laborers  of the Government as a matter of  administrative policy if (1) tht> current appropriation so allow, and (2)  if it is consistent with publie interest.  (See also Op. of Sec. of Justice No. 175, series of 1939).  Accordingly, a^ ji  matter  of policy and in the exercise of its power to determine  the compensation of the paid staff of the corporation  (Sec. 6,  Rep.  Act No. 95),  the Board of Governors of the  Philippine National Red Cross may extend  the benefits 'of the Eight-Hour Labor Law to its employees if, and to the extent that, the financial  condition of the  corporation would warrant."

We,  therefore, declare  that  plaintiffs-appellants cannot demand as  a matter of right the  application to them of the provisions  of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

Plaintiff's second assignment of error refers to an alleged declaration of the trial Judge "that the Philippine National Red Cross is not governed by Republic Act No. 602 otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law".  We have care- fully gone  over  the order appealed from and We do not find therein any reference to said Act.

Wherefore, the order appealed from being  in consonance with the  law on the matter, the  same is hereby  affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.   It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,  A., Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B.  L., and Endencia, JJ., concur. Order affirmed.

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¹ This  case has  no bearing on the points in  controversy herein, for it refers to whether air not the employees of the Elks  Club could be considered as  domestic servants  within  the  meaning of section 2 of Act No. 444 and not  whether the  Elks Club was an industrial organization,  taking  into consideration  its  purpose and activities.