This is  a petition for certiorari filed  by the Pangasinan Transportation  Company,  Inc.   (pantranco) ' seeking  to review the order of  the  Court of  Industrial  Relations dated June 14, 1955, finding said Company guilty of unfair labor practice under  Section  4  of Republic Act No.  875.  The facts of the case may be abridgedly stated ,as follows:

On November 3, 1953,  a complaint was filed with the Court  of Industrial Relations  by the  Acting Prosecutor of said Court, upon charges filed by the pelta (Pangasinan Employees, Laborers & Tenants Association)  against the panteanco (Pangasinan Transportation Co.), its Traffic and Shop Superintendents, John McGuinness and Juan Andreu, respectively (Case  No. 67-ULP).  The  complaint alleged that on March 20, 1953, a petition for compulsory arbitration of certain demands was filed by complainant pelta against the respondent pantranco (Case No. 842-V) ; that during the pendency of said case, and  with the filing of case No. 28-ULP  (wherein the petitioning Union charged the defendant Company of committing unfair labor practices), respondent Corporation through Traffic Superintendent John McGuinness, arbitrarily dismissed Patricio Tuliao on August 13, 1953, Santiago Asido on September  12, 1953, and that Shop Superintendent Juan Andreu refused to give work to Cornelio Reyes from September 16 to  30,  19S3, allegedly for being members of the Union, said Prosecutor certifying that he had conducted  an investigation  of the complained acts and that there were reasonable grounds to believe that same  had been committed by the  respondents.

The  record  further  shows that before  this complaint was filed, the Union, through counsel, filed  an "Amended Complaint" with the CIR, dated September  24, 1953,  and bearing Case No. 67-ULP, alleging that complaining Union had no  less than 500 members  employed in the Company, among whom are Patricio Tuliao, conductor, Santiago Asido, driver, and Cornelio Reyes, blacksmith; that John McGuinness and Juan Andreu arbitrarily dismissed the said  employees  allegedly  for being  members of the Union; that there was a labor dispute pending before  that Court  bet- ween the same parties. (Case No. 842-V), and praying that defendant be ordered to cease  and desist  from such acts of unfair labor practices; that the maximum penalty be imposed on the person responsible for  such acts;  that if the person responsible was a foreigner, after investigation, the  records  of the ease  be forwarded to the  Deportation Board  for  appropriate proceedings;  and that the  aforementioned members of the Union be ordered reinstated immediately with back wages and for such  other relief that may be just and equitable in the premises.  It seems that this "Amended Complaint" was the basis  of the complaint filed  by the  Acting Prosecutor of the Court of  Industrial Relations, both being numbered Case No. 67-ULP.

It  also appears  on record  that on  October 23,  1953 before  the institution of the complaint by the Prosecutor, the petitioning Union  and its  members declared a  strike and  that  the President of the Philippines certified the case to the  Court  of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration  pursuant to  Section 10 of  Republic Act No. 875, docketed  as  Case  No.  1-IPA.  Consequently,  the  Court of Industrial Relations, en banc, issued a  resolution dated January  14,  1954,  ordering the members  of the Union to return  to work not later than January 18, 1964, stating that  upon agreement  of the parties "those workers who are subject of ULP cases pending in this Court and those under criminal investigation or accused in any  court  of justice, shall not be. readmitted by the  management for the present, but  their cases shall be heard by the  corresponding courts until final determination".

After trial on the merits, the lower Court issued an order dated June  14, 1955,  finding that  unfair labor practices were committed by John McGuinness in  suspending Patricio Tuliao and by Juan Andreu in  suspending Cornelio Reyes,  but upheld the dismissal of Santiago Asido.  It, therefore, ordered respondents:   

1. To cease and desist from dismissing-, discharging or otherwise prejudice or discriminate  against their employees for their union affiliations  and/or for having; filed charges or  for having given or being  about to give testimony under Republic Act No. 875; and
   
2. To make whole  Patricio Tuliao and Cornolio Reyes for any loss of pay each may have suffered by reason of the respondents' discrimination  against  them,  by  payment  to  each of them of a sum equal to the  amount which each normally would have earned as wages from the date of respondents'  discrimination to the date they  are actually re-admitted.  Tuliao  and Reyes  are  entitled to the benefit of vacation and sick leave with pay from the date of their re-admission computed on a  basis of continuous service which covers the period  between the  date of their suspension up to the date  of their re-admission, without prejudice to seniority or other rights or privileges".
   

The  motion  for  reconsideration  filed by  the  Company having been denied by the Court en  bane, said defendant filed the present certiorari case, and in this instance alleges that the respondent Court committed grave and serious error of law and grave and serious abuse of discretion in ignoring and disregarding evidence  favorable to  herein petitioners; in  concluding  that  petitioners John McGuinness and  Juan  Andreu committed  unfair labor practices; and  in ordering petitioners  to  pay  respondents Patricio Tuliao and Cornelio Reyes  their wages from the time they were suspended up to the  date of their actual readmission to service.

Pending the action of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed by the  PANTRANCO, respondents pelta, Patricio Tuliao and Cornelio Reyes filed with the lower court  a motion for execution  of  judgment,  which was opposed by the Company.   Before said motion  was resolved by the court below, this Court gave due  course  to the present certiorari  case by resolution  of  October 5, 1955, and upon motion of  the respondent Prosecutor, he was excluded on the  ground that  he was  not a necessary  party  to this action.   Respondents  PELTA,  Reyes and  Tuliao filed their answer within  the reglementary  period, admitting some of the allegations of the petition and denying others, maintaining that  no error or  abuse  of  discretion  had  been committed by the trial court in  promulgating the order in question,  and praying  that the  petition  be  dismissed  and that they  be  granted such other relief that may  be just and equitable in the premises.

The respondent  Court of Industrial Relations, represented by counsel, also timely  filed its answer contending  that there had been no abuse  of discretion  on the part of said Court; that the respondent Court did not intend to declare that  Cornelio  Reyes was suspended for being lazy, and as could be inferred from the succeeding sentences, there must have been a  clerical error in the omission  of the word "allegedly" which should properly appear before the phrase "for being  lazy";  that  the order  sought to  be reviewed involves purely findings of fact,  and, therefore, prayed for the dismissal  of the  petition.

Meanwhile, or  on December  8, 1955, the lower  court issued an order in  connection with the motion for execution previously filed by petitioners  therein, holding that  in virtue of the express provisions  of  Section  6 of Republic Act  No.  875, said Court  had no other alternative but  to execute the order  of June 14, 1955,  in  the absence of any writ  of  injunction from  the Supreme  Court restraining the former from  enforcing the  same.   Herein  petitioner moved to reconsider said  order which was denied by resolution of that  Court of  February  6,  1956,  with Acting Presiding  Judge Jose S. Bautista dissenting.

Petitioner, therefore, filed  with this Court  an urgent- petition for a  writ  of injunction on the ground that the execution of the decision appealed from during the pendency of the present action will  not  only cause the herein petitioners  irreparable injury but  would  also  work  injustice to them, further aggravating and multiplying the issues in this  case.  However,  said petition was denied by this Court by resolution of February 22,  1956.

It was alleged  by petitioner  that Cornelio  Reyes  was suspended by Juan Andreu  from September  16 to September 30, 1953, for  laziness, which, according to the trial court, was not proved.  The proof of the Company to this effect consisted  merely of the testimony of  Juan Andreu, the Shop Superintendent  who  suspended him, which  was denied by said  employee.  This is a question of  fact which

Pangasinan  Trans.  Co., Inc.  et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. concern's the credibility of witnesses and  We cannot disturb the finding of the lower court not only because it had the opportunity to hear them testify and observe their demeanor while so testifying,  but also because "the findings of fact of the  Court of Industrial  Relations  with respect to questions  of fact, if supported by substantial  evidence on the record  shall be conclusive.  The  appeal to the Supreme Court shall be limited to questions of law"  (Section 6, Rep. Act  No. 875).  This  Court is not empowered  to look into the  correctness of  the findings of fact  in an award, order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, *  * *.   (Carmen de  la Paz Vda. de Ongsiako vs. Teodoro  Galnban et al., 86 Phil., 50, 47 Off.  Gaz.,  5612).

"We cannot reverse a decision  or order of the Court of  Industrial Relations  on pure questions of fact" (Central  Azucarera  de Tarlac as. Court  of Industrial Relations, G. R. No. 16843;  Manila  Electric Company  vs. National Labor  Union,  G. R. No. 47279, and many others).

"It "would be idle for "us to  review the findings of the  Industrial Court.  This we  are not  supposed to do both under the Rules  of Court and the law  creating that  body" (Destileria Ayala  y Cia., Inc. vs. Lipa Naeional Obrera de Filipinas and Court of  Industrial Relations, G. R. No. 48346).

There  is one aspect of  petitioner's  defense  that  merits consideration.  It  was  admitted  by  respondent  worker (Cornelio Reyes)  that he was reinstated on October 1 and worked up to October  23, 1953, joining the strike  staged by the members of the respondent Union on  October 24, 1953.  Before  the strike was  settled,  or sometime  in October, 1953, the Company learned that Reyes was convicted of the crime of theft and thus considered him automatically dismissed as of that date, on the ground that the provisions of Section 47,, Rules and Regulations of the Public Service Commission in relation to  Section 21 of the Public Service Act, precluded  them  from  employing him  any  further. . This was disputed by  the  employee who testified that Mr. Andreu knew his previous conviction for it  was even he, Mr. Andreu,  himself who  recommended  him to the  job.  Commonwealth Act No. 146, known as the Public Service Act, provides the following:

"Sec. 21.  Every  public service  violating1 or failing  to  comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any  orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall be  subject to a fine of  not exceeding two hundred pesos per day for every day during which such  default  or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and  empowered to impose  such fine, after  due notice and hearing.

*        *        *."

And in amplification of the above-quoted provision, certain rules and  regulations were  promulgated by  the  Public Service  Commission,  Section 47 of which  prescribes the following:

"Sec. 47. COURTESY, CHARACTER, RECORD, ETC. Each operator shall employ in his  service only such chauffeurs,  conductors, agents, inspectors,  auditors and other employee, who  are courteous and  of good  moral character; and in  no  case shall he employ any  person who has  been  convicted by a  competent  court of homicide and/or serious physical injuries  through reckless imprudence, ordinary serious physical injuries, theft, estafa, robbery and crimes against chastity.   Operators  are prohibited from employing as  chauffeurs persons who  do not  have  professional drivers' license"  (Rules and Regulations of the Public  Service Commission),

The record bears out the fact that Coraelio  Reyes was convicted of the  crime of theft by  the Court  of  First Instance  of  Pangasinan  but  this was  not considered  as a justifiable  ground for  his dismissal  by the Court  of Industrial Relations because "he was accepted by the former  (company) after the  latter  (Reyes) was convicted of such crime".  We fail to see the logic of this  reasoning. It  seems that the lower  court  considered  the  company estopped  from alleging now that said  conviction  could be made the basis of his separation  which is evidently erroneous  under the terms of the law and  regulations aforequoted.

Section 47 of the Rules and Regulations of  the  Publie Service Commission  is couched  in unmistakable mandatory terms; it forbids the employment of persons convicted of  offenses  enumerated therein, one of  them  being  the crime of theft.   We  believe that this  restriction  equally applies  to  those who are  already  employed  as well as those merely seeking  admission to the service.   The allowance  in  this  case  of the operation of the  principle of estoppel  on the  management would set a dangerous  precedent which  could give  a leeway for  the circumvention of said regulation or result in the unnecessary punishment of an employer  who may have taken under his employ a person convicted of  any of the  crime embraced in the regulations and  would thus suffer the penalty imposed by Section 21  of  the Public Service  Act despite his desire to comply therewith upon discovery of the disqualification.

Finding  that  a public  service  operator has  a  right to refuse employment or terminate  the services of  an  employee so as to comply with the aforementioned regulation. We will now proceed  to determine whether those working in the company's shop  (as Cornelio  Reyes  was at the time of his dismissal)  are included  among those enume- rated therein.

Section 47 of  said regulations speaks of chauffeurs,  conductors,  agents,  inspectors, auditors and  other employees. The  term "other employees" is explicit, and  embraces all persons in  the company's employ  including those working in the shop even if their kind of work is not specifically indicated among the  classes mentioned therein, for they certainly fall within the classification of "other employees". The  reason behind this requirement of courtesy and good moral character cannot be assailed and is understandable. A public service  operator deals directly with the patronizing community  and the  nature  of such undertaking  necessarily demands of the company the maintenance of a personnel with unquestionable record of good moral character, for the public entrust their lives,  properties and interests in said  services and  deserve utmost courtesy, efficiency and  safety in return.  As there  is no question  that the promulgation of these regulations was in consonance with the grant of  authority to issue rules provided for by  Section 16 (d) of the Public Service Law, and as the refusal of the Company to re-employ Cornelio Reyes is apparently based  on this  prohibition (independently of whether his dismissal might also be due to his union activities), said termination  of  employment cannot  be  considered as  an unfair labor practice.

Anent the case of Patricio Tuliao, it was not  disputed that he was  suspended for 30 days for having driven the company's bus No.  221 to  a shed inside the  PANTRANCO terminal at  Alaminos, Pangasinan,  the  distance covered being admittedly about  5 or 6 meters only.  Tuliao was not the authorized driver of said bus, he being  its conductor at the time, and although  this act was a violation of the regulations of the company, yet considering the circumstance  that  it was raining and  that said conductor, who was then unloading cargoes from the vehicle, merely wanted  to  avoid the goods from  being  soaked and damaged, We believe that the  Company was too drastic  in imposing that penalty upon  him.  It was the Company's assertion that Tuliao was with the driver Santiago Asido, who was suspended for having utilized the Company's bus in bringing 2 lady teachers from Santa Cruz to  Candelaria in  the  province of Zambales,  places in which  the Company had no  authority or line, and thus dismissed said conductor after his suspension.  The said  driver's suspension and dismissal  was upheld  and considered  justified by the Court of Industrial Relations but this fact does not imply that the conductor of the bus could likewise be adjudged guilty of the same act.  Even  common sense would dictate that the conductor who was not at  the wheel cannot be made answerable for the  wrongful act of the driver in bringing the  vehicle outside of its authorized route, unless it could be proved that he  instigated or forced the driver  to  commit that violation.  But such  faet  did not come out during the hearing in the court below, nor was it even  alleged therein.  We, therefore, feel  safe  to say that there being no serious  cause  or  irregularity committed by respondent Patricio Tuliao, the trial Court did not err in pronouncing that said employee  does  not deserve the penalty of  suspension  and  later dismissal resorted to by petitioner.  Although no proof was adduced to establish  that  said  steps  were taken  due to  respondent's union affiliation, certainly they are whimsical and unjustified.

Wherefore,  the decision  appealed  from  is reversed in so far as  (a)  it orders the petitioner Pangasinan  Transportation Company  to reinstate  Cornelio Reyes to his position of blacksmith and to pay him for any loss he may have  suffered  by reason  of any  alleged  discrimination made against him as well as a sum  equal  to the amount which he normally would have earned as wages from the date of said petitioner's discrimination to the actual date which (by said decision)  he was to be readmitted (or up to the date when Cornelio Reyes  was  actually admitted to work in virtue of the order of execution  of the judg- ment of the  lower court, as per  its order of  December 8, 1955, if it was ever  carried out p. 181 of  the record); and  (b)  it  declares  that  respondent  Cornelio  Reyes Is entitled to the benefit of vacation and sick  leave with pay from the date of  his readmission computed on a basis of continuous service which involves  the period between the date of his suspension up to the date of his  readmission. The decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without costs.  It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Conception, Reyes,  J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.