This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul the auction sale of the certificate of public  convenience of Virginia Sembrano in favor of the Estate of Florencio P.  Buan, conducted by the Deputy Sheriff of Ilocos  Norte on  November 18,  1957, pursuant to a third alias writ of  execution issued  by the judge  of the Court of First Instance of the same province, all made respondents herein, and  to prevent the approval  of the sale by the respondent Public Service Commission.

In  a compromise agreement conditionally approved  by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in Civil Case No.  1377, Alfredo  Formoso and Virginia R.  Sembrano transferred to Isabel, Miguela and Maximo, all surnamed Quirit, all their rights and interests in a Public Convenience covered by Certificate No. 69144.  On March  23, 1953,  all the said Quirits executed  in favor of above  petitioner a Deed  of  Sale  of the rights over the said certificate  of public convenience.   On June 27, 1956,  the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of the same court, in  accordance with a second alias writ of execution  issued by the said court in Civil Case  No. 1734, levied on  the  lines covered  by the aforesaid  certificate.  Petitioner immediately  filed a "Third Party Claim" with the said sheriff as a consequence of which the  movant for the second alias writ of execution was required  to file a  bond of P1,000 so  as not  to stay execution.  On August 4,  1956, petitioner  filed with same court, against the said deputy sheriff,  a  complaint for damages with preliminary injunction, which was subsequently dismissed for  lack of cause  of action.  On appeal to this Court,  the  order of dismissal was  affirmed. Upon the issuance of a  third alias writ of execution (in the said Civil  Case No. 1734), the lines were conditionally sold  at public auction.  Thus  the present petition  with this Court.

Petitioner insists that he  is a party in  interest and  is entitled to all  his prayers, because there exists a "speed of Sale of Rights" by which the Quirits had transferred and sold to him their rights and interests in the said lines; that the order  of the respondent sheriff fixing the bond  in the amount of P2,000 to be  filed by the plaintiffs  in  Civil Case  No. 1734 is null and  void.

The primary consideration in the resolution of the case at bar is the  determination of the petitioner's right  to institute the case.  Petitioner premises his action on the Deed of Transfer executed in  his favor  by the  Quirits.

By virtue thereof, he claims that he has acquired ownership of the certificate  in question. We  are  brought therefore  to the question did  the said Deed  of Transfer ever become effective as to yield the desired consequences?   The  deed in question recited the transfer of the Quirits rights over the said certificate which  were to have been acquired for the Sembranos by virtue  of a  compromise settlement, the validity and  effectivity of which was in  turn conditioned on its approval by the court before which the case involving the said compromise settlement was  pending.  The court's  approval was further subject to a prior approval of the transfer by  the Public Service Commission.  The said compromise settlement conditionally approved  by the said  court did  not therefore become  effective,  the conditions  imposed for its approval not having been fulfilled. There was no approval by the  Public Service  Commission.   Our Civil Code provides:

"Article 1181.  In conditional obligations, the acquisition of  rights, as well as the  extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall  depend upon the happening  of  the  event  which constitutes the  condition."

Inasmuch as petitioner's grantors or transferors acquired no rights over the said certificate, nothing passed unto the former.  A grantee cannot acquire better rights than what his  grantor  had.

We have  pointed out that the transfer  without the approval and  consent  of the Public  Service  Commission, of a property covered by a franchise  is not binding against said  Commission  and against third persons, and that the original grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise.   (See case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182; 50 Off. Gaz. [1], 108; Flores vs.  Miranda, supra, p. 266;  57 Off. Gaz. [44], 7938).

In view of the foregoing the  present petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.   So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur. .
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.