Petitioners-appellants herein seek to review by  way of certiorari a decision  of the Court of  Appeals, dated June 18,  1957, which in effect affirmed  the  order of the trial court of October 18, 1956, for immediate execution  of  its order of January 3, 1956, ordering the defendants herein petitioners, to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P2,238.50, which was found to be their share in the income of the property  in controversy.  The assignment of errors presented before us is as follows:

I

"THE HONORABLE  COURT OF APPEALS  ERRED IN HOLDING  THAT THE  PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS  HAVE  CONSISTENTLY  DENIED  TO THE  RESPONDENTS THE RIGHT TO SHARE IN THE INCOME  IN THE PARCEL  OF LAND SUBJECT  OF  LITIGATION  IN  THE  CIVIL  CASE NO. 813 IN THE  COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE  OF RIZAL,  PASAY CITY BRANCH.

II

"THE HONORABLE  COURT OF APPEALS  ERRED IN HOLDING  THAT THE  SAID CIVIL  CASE NO. 313 HAS BEEN DRAGGING ON SINCE 1947.

Ill

"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE COURT  OF ORIGIN ERRED AND  COMMITTED  A SERIOUS ABUSE  OF DISCRETION  IN  NOT  COMPLETING "WITH  THE REQUIREMENTS  OF RULE 39, SECTION 2 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

It is apparent that the first two errors assigned involve findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which under the law we may not change or modify.   The remaining alleged error  is as  to whether or  not  both courts committed  a serious abuse of discretion "in not completing [complying] with the requirements of Rule 39, Section  2, of the Rules of Court."

The facts in this case as found by the Court  of Appeals are  contained  in  its  decision, the pertinent portions  of which we are  quoting below for purposes of reference:

"It appears that on March 13, 1954 the respondent Judge  ordered the parties  in the aforesaid Civil Case  No. 313  to present  their evidence before a Deputy Clerk  of Court, who was duly authorized as commissioner  to  receive the evidence, in order to resolve the question of accounting of  the income from the salt and fish products of the parcel  of land object  of said case; that hearings were subsequently held before said commissioner; that on June 21, 1955, the commissioner submitted his report of the hearings on the account; that  on, January 3,  1956 the  respondent Judge  issued an  order approving said report and finding the plaintiffs in the aforementioned case,  respondents herein,  entitled to  the  amount of P2,238.80  as their share in the  income of  the land controverted therein, and ordering the defendants to pay to the  plaintiffs the above-mentioned amount; that on April 17, 1956, the defendants therein petitioners here filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which motion was  denied by the respondent court;  that on September  3,  1956 plaintiffs filed a motion for  immediate execution  of  the order  of January 3, 1956; that  on October 18, 1956  the respondent Judge issued  an order granting the motion for   immediate  execution; that  on November 14, 1956,  defendants filed a motion  for reconsideration  of the order of October 18, 1956;  that  on December 14, 1956, the  respondent  Judge  issued an order denying  the motion for reconsideration and the  filing of a supersedeas bond;  that on January 8, 1957, defendant filed the  present petition  for certiorari with  this  Court; and  that, while said petition was pending here, or on February 28, 1957, the respondent court approved the amended record  on  appeal filed by defendants,  herein  petitioners."

The position taken by the petitioners-appellants is that the order granting the order for  immediate execution did not  contain specific and good reasons te  qualify  it as "special" and that,  furthermore, neither could  the bond filed by the respondents be considered  as special reasons considering its meager amount which is inadequate to cover the consequential damages that may be  suffered by  reason of the immediate execution of the order; and, lastly, that the trial  court had no sufficient  justification  for denying the  supersedeas bond  offered  by petitioners.

It may be  that the  order  granting the  motion  for immediate execution did not exactly mention the good  and special reasons  required  by Rule 39,  Section  2  of  the Rules  of Court and that  it could well  have  mentioned the  same.  However, we have authorities ^[1]  to the  effect that statement by reference in the order is sufficient.   In this  case, the order made  reference to the  motion  for execution itself which motion  stated or alleged the reasons justifying immediate execution.   Furthermore,  said good reasons may be found in the  record of the  case and were found as facts  in the  decision of  the Court of Appeals, thus:

"The  main action in said  Case  No.  313 has been dragging  on since 1947.  It  has already been decided therein by final  judgment that the respondents are co-owners of the land in question. As a consequence, the respondents  are entitled to share  in the income of the parcels of land.  The petitioners have consistently denied to the respondents the right  to  share in the income of  the  said parcel of  land.   Petitioners took  their own  sweet time  to perfect their appeal.  Respondents have offered to file and did file a bond to answer for any damage which the petitioners may suffer by reason of  the enforcement of the writ  of  execution.  These  are among the reasons alleged in  their motion for immediate  execution of the judgment  (Annex "7" of respondent's Answer) which the respondent Judge granted.   We believe and hold that the same are  good  and valid reasons for the issuances of the  order of execution complained of  It has been held by the Supreme  Court that where  an intestate proceeding has  been pending  for several years, an immediate execution of  the judgment  is in  order (Crisanto de Borja vs. Judge Encarnacion et al, L-4179, May  30,  1951), and that the filing of bond by  the successful  party is  a  special ground for ordering execution.  (Hacienda Navarra, Inc. vs. Labrador, et al., 70 Phil., 48.)

It has  been held  that the  dilatory nature of  an  appeal and the  filing of a bond by the  appellee may be regarded as  good and special  reason  within the meaning of Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules  of Court:

"The above section simplifies and clarifies the old provision.  It provides  that prior to  the expiration of  the time  to  appeal,  the court may issue  execution on motion of  the prevailing party  and with notice to the adverse  party, upon good reasons  to be stated in a special order, regardless of  whether such order is  issued before or after the filing of the record on appeal.  The good reasons  are required to be stated in the special order, but it has been  held that statement by reference is  sufficient, as when such reasons appear in  a motion for execution, and reference thereto  is made in  the special order as  ground therefor.  The element that give  validity to an order of  execution  is  the  existence of the  good reasons if they may  be found distinctly  somewhere in the  record.   In  this connection, it has been held that the filing of bond by the successful party is a good reason for  ordering  execution.  That the appeal is being taken for purposes of delay, is also a good reason."   (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I,  pp. 539-540, 1957  Edition; Italics is supplied,)

In the cases of Presbitero, et al. vs. Rodas, et al-, 73 Phil., 300 and Iloilo Trading vs. Rodas,  73 Phil., 327, this Court had already passed upon  the same question  and had ruled that the appeal being taken for  purposes  of delay, is  a good and special  reason for  ordering execution pending appeal.   The rulings  in those cases are  as follows:

"*  *  *.  The court stated in its order that the appeal was being taken for  the purpose of delay.  Assuming, as we must, that such statement  is  true, it  not having been  assailed in  the petition, we consider it good and  sufficient reason upon which to issue execution of the judgment pending appeal.   Dilatory tactics constitute a great drawback  to  the administration  of  justice and  cannot be countenanced by the courts.  We hold that the trial court neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor  committed a  grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution  of its judgment pending  appeal, upon the reason given."  (Presbitero, et al. vs.  Rodas, et al., supra.)

"The  question raised herein  has been decided by  us adversely to the petitioner in the recent case of Jacinto  Presbitero, et al. vs. Judge Sotero  Rodas,  et al.   (October 11, 1941)', G.  R. No. 48121, 40  Off.  Gaz.,  3673, wherein  we held  that  section 2  of Rule 39 empowers  the Court  of First Instance, in its discretion, to  order the execution  of its judgment pending  appeal provided it states. good reasons  for so doing;  and that the  statement of the court in its order that the appeal was being taken for  the purpose of delay is good  and sufficient reason  upon which to issue execution of the judgment pending appeal, because dilatory tactics constitute a great drawback  to  the administration of  justice and  cannot be  countenanced by the courts."  (Iloilo Trading Center and Exchange vs. Rodas, supra.)

And in the  cases of Hacienda Navarra, Inc.  vs. Labrador, et al., 65 Phil.,  536, and Peoples Bank vs.  San Jose,  96 Phil., 895, this Court held that  the filing of bond by the prevailing party is a good and special reason for ordering execution pending  appeal.  Said this Court in those cases:

"*  *  *  The filing of the bond required by the respondent judge in the order  sought  to be annulled constitutes a  special  ground authorizing  the court to issue a writ of execution  pending appeal, in conformity with the provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure."   (Hacienda Navarra,  Inc. vs. Labrador, supra.)

"Furthermore and this is conclusive there is the bond promising return of all such allowances (not exceeding P33,250.00)  'should it be decreed later that' Sophie M. Seffert 'was  not entitled thereto'. It should be observed in this connection  that the order of December 29  expressly provides 'that the  payments of the said  monthly allowances  shall not  exceed  the aforesaid amount  of  P33,250.00'." (Peoples Bank vs. San Jose, supra.)

As  to the  offer of  petitioners-appellants  in  the lower court to file the  supersedeas  bond to stay execution, it is a well-settled  doctrine that the approval and  acceptance of  a supersedeas bond to  stay execution lies within the sound discretion  of the trial court:

"Stay  of  execution; supersedeas  bond;  courts  discretion. The power  to grant a motion for execution before the expiration of the period for appeal is discretionary before trial  courts.  All  that the law requires is  that there be good reason which  must be stated in the order, Rule 39, section 2, Rules of  Court.  Execution of course may be stayed upon approval by the  Court of a  sufficient bond. But the  court is not obliged to  approve any kind of supersedeas bond filed by the parties.  It has the  right  to determine in its discretion whether the supersedeas bond would sufficiently  protect the rights of the winning party and  accomplish the  ends  of justice. And in the determination of this matter  the  court may avail  of reasons found in the record.  Alliance Insurance & Surety Co. vs. Hon. Tan, et al., 52  Off.  Gaz., 7634., December  31, 1956."   (Velayo' Digest, 1956 Supplement  [A], pp. 429-430).

and that  even after  the supersedeas  bond  is  filed, the lower court may  still  disregard it  and  order  immediate execution.   In the case of De Leon vs.  Soriano, 95 Phil, 806, we said:

"Even  after the filing of supersedeas bond by an appellant, intended to stay  execution, the trial  court may  in its  discretion still disregard said supersedeas bond and order  immediate execution provided  that there  are  special and compelling reasons  justifying immediate execution."

In view of the foregoing",  we find that the trial court committed no error in granting the motion for  immediate execution and that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition seeking  to review  and  annul  said writ of immediate execution.  Consequently, the appealed decision of the  Court   of  Appeal  is  hereby  affirmed, with costs against petitioners.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Reyes, A., Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Concepcion,  J., concurs in the  result.

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^[1] Joven vs. Boncan, 67 Phil., 252; Lusk vs. Stevens, 64 Phil., 154; Guevara, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 70 Phil., 48; The Peoples Bank and  Trust Co. vs. San Jose, et al. 96 Phil., 895; 51 Off. Gaz., (6) 2918