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[STANDARD VACUUM OIL COMPANY v. LUZON STEVEDORING CO.](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2f6e?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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98 Phil. 817

[ G.R. No. L-5203, April 18, 1956 ]

STANDARD VACUUM OIL COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff entered  into  a  contract  with defendant  to transport between the ports of Manila and Nin Bay, Sagay, Iloilo, 2,916.44  barrels of bulk gasoline belonging to plaintiff.  The  gasoline was delivered in accordance with the contract  but defendant  failed to transport it  to  its place of destination and  so plaintiff brought  this  action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the sum of P75,578.50 as damages.

Defendant, in  its answer,  pleaded that its  failure  to deliver the gasoline was due to fortuitous event or caused by  circumstances beyond  its control  and not to its fault or negligence or that of any of its employees.  The court, after receiving the evidence,  rendered  decision  finding that the disaster that had  befallen the tugboat was the result of an unavoidable accident and the loss of the gasoline was due to a fortuitous even  which was beyond the control of defendant and,  consequently, dismissed the case with costs against the plaintiff.

The facts as found by the trial court are:  "that pursuant to an agreement had  between the parties, defendant's barge No. L-522 was  laden  with gasoline belonging to the  plaintiff to  be  transported from Manila  to the Port of Iloilo;  that  early in the morning of February 2, 1947, defendant's tugboat "Snapper'  picked up  the barge outside  the breakwater; that the barge was placed behind the tugboat, it being connected to the latter by  a tow rope ten inches in circumference; that behind the barge, three other barges were  likewise placed, one laden  with some cargo while the other two containing hardly  any cargo at all; that the weather was good when on that  day the tugboat with its tow started on its voyage; that the weather remained good  on February 3, 1947,  when it passed Santiago Point  in Batangas; that at about 8:00  o'clock in the morning of February 4,  1947,  the  engine  of the tugboat came to a dead stop; that the engineer on board the tugboat found out that the trouble was due to a broken idler;  that a  message was then sent to the' defendant's radio station  in Manila  informing its officials .of the engine trouble;  that upon  the receipt of the. message the defendant called up several shipping companies  in Manila to find out if they had any vessels in the vicinity where the "Snapper' had stalled but said companies  replied in the negative;  that thereupon  the defendant radioed  its tugboat Tamban' which  was docked at Batangas, ordering it to  proceed to the  place where  the 'Snapper'  was; that at about  6:00 o'clock  in the same morning of  February  4,  1947, the master of the 'Snapper'  attempted to cast anchor but  the water areas around Elefante Island were so deep  that the anchor did not touch bottom; that in the afternoon  of  the same  day the  weather become worse as  the  wind increased in intensity and  the waves were  likewise increased  in size and  force; that due to the rough condition of the sea the anchor chains of the 'Snapper' and the  four barges, broke  one by one and as a consequence thereof they were drifted  and were finally dashed against the  rocks  off  Banton  Island; that  on striking the rocks a  hole was opened in the hull of the 'Snapper', which ultimately caused it to sink,  while the barge  No. L-522 was so badly damaged that  the gasoline  it had on board leaked out; and that the  'Tamban' arrived at the place after the gasoline had already leaked out."

Defendant  is a  private stevedoring company  engaged in transporting local  products, including  gasoline in  bulk and has  a fleet of about 140 tugboats and about 90 per cent of its business is devoted to transportation.  Though it is engaged in a limited contract of carriage in the sense that it chooses its. customers  and  is not opened to the public, nevertheless,  the  continuity of its operations in this kind of  business have earned  for it the  level  of a public utility The  contract between the  plaintiff  and defendant comes  therefore under the provisions of the Code of Commerce.  The pertinent law is article 361 which provides:
"Art.  361. The merchandise shall be  transported at the  risk and venture  of  the shipper, if the contrary was not expressly stipulated.

"Therefore, all damages and impairment  suffered by the goods during the transportation, by reason of accident, force majeure, or by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles, shall be for the account and  risk of the  shipper.

"The proof of these accidents is  incumbent on the carrier.''
It therefore  appears  that  whenever  merchandise  is transported on the  sea by virtue  of  a contract entered into between  the shipper and  the carrier, the  merchandies is  deemed transported at  the risk  and  venture of the  shipper, if the  contrary  is not  stipulated, and all damages  suffered by  the merchandise during the  transportation by  reason of  accident or force  majeure shall be for the account and risk of the shipper, but the proof of these accidents is incumbent on the  carrier.  Implementing this provision, our Supreme Court has  held  that all  a shipper has to  prove in  connection  with sea  carriage is delivery of the  merchandise  in  good  condition and  its  non-delivery  at the place  of destination in order that the  burden of proof  may shift to the carrier to prove any  of  the accidents above  adverted  to.   Thus,  it  was held that "Shippers who are forced to ship goods  on an ocean liner or any other  ship have some legal  rights,  and when goods are delivered on board a  ship  in  good order and  condition, and  the shipowner delivers them  to  the shipper  in  bad  order and condition, it  then devolves upon the shipowner to both  allege and prove that  the goods were damaged by reason of some fact which legally exempts  him  from liability"  ( Mirasol  vs.  Robert Dollar Co.,  53 Phil., 129).

The  issue to be determined is:  Has defendant  proven. that its failure to deliver the gasoline  to its place of  destination is due to accident or force majeure or to a cause beyond  its control?  This  would  require an analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transportation of said gasoline.

It appears that the  tugboat "Snapper"  was  acquired by  defendant from the Foreign Liquidation Commission. It was  a surplus property.  It was a  deep-sea  tugboat that had been in the service of the United  States Armed Forces prior to its  purchase by the  Luzon Stevedoring Co.  The tugboat was put into operation  without  first submitting it to an overhaul in a dry-dock. It also appears that this tugboat had previously made several trips and each time.it had to obtain a special permit from the Bureau  of  Customs because it had never been dry-docked and did  not  have complete equipment  to be able to obtain a permanent permit.  The special permits that were issued  by  said Bureau specifically state that they were issued  "pending submission  of plans  and load  line certificate,  including test and final inspection of equipment." It further  appears that, when  the tugboat was  inspected by the Bureau of Customs on  October 18, 1946,  it found it to be inadequately equipped and so the Bureau  required defendant to provide it with the requisite equipment but it was  never able to complete it.  The fact that  the tugboat was a surplus property,  has not  been dry-docked, and was not  provided with the requisite  equipment to make it seaworthy, shows  that defendant  did  not use reasonable  diligence in putting the tugboat in such a condition as would make its  use  safe  for  operation.  It is true, as defendant  contends,  that there were  then no dry-dock facilities in the Philippines, but  this  does not mean that they could not be obtained elsewhere.   It being a surplus property, a dry-dock inspection was  a must, to put the  tugboat in  a sea  going condition.   It may also be true, as contended, that the deficiency in the equipment was due to the fact that no such equipment was  available at the time, but this did not justify defendant in putting such tugboat in  business even if unequipped  merely to make a profit.  Nor could  the  fact that the tugboat was given a special permit by the Bureau of Customs to make the trip relieve defendant from liability.
"Where  owner buys old  tug, licensed  coastwise,  and equips it for ocean going, it is negligence to send  tug out without  knowing something  of  her  stability and especially  without  stability  test,' where history  and performance with respect to crankiness  and tenderness are matters of official record.  Sabine  Towing  Co vs. Brennan,  C. C. A.  Tex., 72  F 2d 490, certiorari' denied 55 'S. Ct. 141, 293 U. S. 611, 79 L. Ed. 701, rehearing denied  55  S. Ct. 212, 293 U. S. 632, 79 L. Ed. 717."  (80 C.'J. Si 803  Footnote)
There are other circumstances which show the  lack of precaution and diligence taken by defendant  to  make the travel of the tugboat safe. One is the failure to carry on board the necessary  spare  parts.  When   the  idler was broken,  the  engineer of the tugboat examined it for the first  time and it was only then  that  he found  that there were no spare parts to use except a worn  out spare driving chain. And  the necessity of carrying such spare parts was emphasized by the  very  defendant's witness, Mr. Depree, who said that in vessels motored  by diesel engines it is necessary always to carry spare chains, ball bearings  and chain drives.  And this  was  not done.
"A  tug  engaged  to tow  a barge  is liable for damage to the cargo  of the barge caused  by faulty equipment  of  the tug.  The Raleigh, D. C. Md. 50  P. Supp.  961."  (80  C.  J.  S. Footnote.)
Another circumstance refers  to  the  deficiency  or incompetence in the man power of the tugboat.  According to law, a tugboat of the tonnage and powers of one like the "Snapper" is  required to  have a complement  composed of  one first mate, one second mate, one third mate, one chief engineer,  one second  engineer,  and  one third engineer,  (section 1203,  Revised Administrative  Code); but when the trip in question  was  undertaken,  it  was only manned by  one master, who was merely licensed as a bay, river, and lake patron, one second  mate, who  was licensed  as  a  third  mate, one  chief  engineer  who  was licensed  as third motor engineer, one assistant  engineer, wh6 was licensed  as  a  bay, river,  and lake  motor  engineer,  and one second assistant  engineer,  who was unlicensed.  The' employment of this  crew to perform  functions beyond its competence and qualifications is not only risky but against the law  and if  a mishap is caused, as in  this case,  one  cannot but  surmise that  such incompetence has something to do with  the mishap.  The fact that 'the tugboat  had  undertaken several, trips before with practically the  same  crew  without  any untoward consequence,  cannot  furnish  any  justification  for  continuing in its employ  a  deficient or incompetent personnel contrary  to  law  and the  regulations of  the Bureau of Customs.
"(1)  Generally, seaworthiness is that strength, durability and engineering skill made a  part of a ship's construction and continued  maintenance, together  with a  competent  and sufficient crew, which would withstand the vicissitudes and dangers of the elements which might reasonably be expected or encountered during her voyage without  loss  or damage/ to  her particular cargo. The Cleveco, D.  C. Ohio,  59  P. Supp. 71, 78, affirmed, -C. C. A., 154 P. 2d 606."  (80  C. J. S. 997, Footnote.)
Let  us now come to  the efforts exerted by defendant in extending help to the tugboat when it  was notified of the breakage  of the idler.   The evidence  shows that the idler was  broken  at  about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of February 4, 1947.  Within  a few minutes, a  message was sent to  defendant by radio informing it of the engine trouble.  The weather was good at the time and the sea  was smooth,  and remained good until 12:00 o'clock noon when the wind  started to blow.   According to defendant, since it  received  the  message,  it called up different shipping lines  in Manila asking them if they had any vessel in  the vicinity where  the  "Snapper" stalled but, unfortunately, none was available  at the time, and as its  tug "Tamban"  was  then docked in Batangas, Batangas, which  was nearest to  the place,  it radioed  said tug to go, to the aid of the "Snapper".  Accordingly, the tug "Tamban" set sail from Batangas for  the rescue only to return to secure a map of the vicinity  where the "Snapper" had stalled, which entailed  a delay  of two hours. In the meantime, the captain of the "Snapper" attempted to cast anchor.  The water areas off Elefante Island were deep and the  anchor would not touch bottom.  Then the sea became rough and the waves increased in size and force and notwithstanding the efforts of the crew  to prevent the tug from drifting away, the force  of the wind and the  violence of the waves dashed the tug and the barges against the rocks.   The tug developed a  hole in her hull and sank.   The barge carrying the gasoline was so badly damaged that the gasoline leaked out. The tug "Tamban"  was finally able to locate the "Snapper"  but it was too  late.

The foregoing acts  only serve  to  emphasize that the efforts made by defendant fall short of that diligence and precaution  that are demanded by the situation to save the tugboat and the barge it was towing  from  disaster for it appears  that more than twenty-four  hours had  elapsed before the  tug "Tamban" showed up to extend  help. The delay was caused not so much because of the lack of available ships in the vicinity where the "Snapper"  stalled but because defendant did  not have in readiness any tugboat sufficient in tonnage and equipment to attend to  the rescue. The tug  "Tamban" that was ordered to extend help was fully inadequate for  that purpose.  It was a small vessel that was  authorized to operate only within Manila Bay and did not even have any map of the Visayan Islands. A public utility that  is engaged in  sea transportation even for a limited  service with a fleet  of 140  tugboats  should have a competent tug to rush for towing or repairs in the event of  untoward happening Overseas.  If defendant had only such  a tug ready for such an  emergency,  this  disaster  would not have happened.  Defendant could have avoided sending a poorly equipped tug which,  as  it is to be expected, failed to do job.

While the breaking of the idler may be due to an accident, or to something unexpected, the cause of the disaster which resulted in the loss of the gasoline can only be attributed to the negligence or lack of precaution to avert  it  on  the  part  of defendant.  Defendant  had enough time to effectuate the rescue if it had only a competent tug for the purpose because the weather was good from 3:00 o'clock a.m. to 12:00  o'clock noon of February 4, 1947 and it was only in  the  afternoon that the  wind began to  blow  with some  intensity,[1]  but  failed  to do so because of that shortcoming.   The loss of the  gasoline certainly cannot be  said  to be  due to force majeure or unforeseen event but  to the failure of defendant to extend adequate  and  proper help.  Considering these  circumstances,  and those we have discussed elsewhere, we are persuaded to conclude that defendant has failed to  establish  that it is exempt from liability under the law.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.  Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of P75,578.50, with legal interest from the  date of the filing of the complaint, with  costs.

ParĂ¡s, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montentayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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