Petitioner is the justice of the peace of the Municipality of Pamplona, Province of Negros Oriental, and  one of the respondents is the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province, while the other respondent,  Ricardo Teves, is  the municipal mayor  of Tanjay, also  of said province. On November 18, 1954, respondent  Teves filed an  administrative complaint against petitioner (No. 90 of the Court of First  Instance of Negros Oriental), charging petitioner herein with electioneering, abuse of position and immorality. On January 12,  1955, upon petition  of complainant Ricardo Teves, respondent judge issued ah  order suspending petitioner from office immediately.  The pertinent  portion of the order  of. suspension is  as follow.

"1.   Complaint having been filed against  Justice  of the  Peace Jose A. Suelto of  Pamplona, this province for alleged electioneering and oppression  in the performance of his duties as such Justice of  the Peace  (Administrative  Case No. 90),  which complaint is now the subject of an  administrative investigation; and it appearing that Mr.  Suelto's continuance in office  pending such investigation may effectively obstruct the presentation  of. evidences which are part of the records of the Office  of the  Justice  of the Peace of Pamplona and hamper  in one way  or another the conduct of such investigation;" (Annex A to Petition.)

On January 24, 1955,  petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order of suspension, but the same was denied. On March. 15, 1955, petitioner again  filed a  motion with the respondent judge, that time asking for his reinstatement on the ground  that the purpose of the suspension has already been accomplished and  that the continuance thereof will prevent him from fully  defending  himself in the investigation. This motion  was also denied,  and  upon denial of a motion to reconsider the order the petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed.  It  is claimed in the petition that the respondent judge has gravely abused her authority and unlawfully neglected the performance of an  act clearly enjoined  her  by law;  that the suspension of the petitioner causes  irreparable  injury to him because he is not receiving his salary and the prospective witnesses in his behalf are demoralized;  and that the petitioner was, therefore,  prevented from defending  himself in the case. In answer  respondent Ricardo  Teves alleges that petitioner Justice of the Peace  had used the powers  of  his  office to threaten, coerce and intimidate one witness  against him; that the suspension of the petitioner is still necessary because it may become necessary for the complainant mayor to utilize witnesses  and  the  records of  the justice of the peace court of Pamplona in rebuttal, after the petitioner herein has terminated the presentation  of evidence in his defense; that the suspension was not an abuse of authority or unlawful neglect in the performance of duty  enjoined by law, but was ordered by respondent judge in the exercise of her powers of  supervision over the petitioner; and that  the petitioner herein  does not need the salary of the office, because he has  means to support himself  including his extensive practice of law.

The suspension of the petitioner  herein is a preventive suspension and appears to  have been decided upon by respondent judge in  order to grant opportunity to the complainant in the administrative case to prove the charges filed against the petitioner.  That the  need of such suspension could not have terminated with the closing of the evidence of the complainant is apparent, because the justice of the peace, if holding office, could easily influence witnesses to testify in his favor in view of his office and position.   There is, therefore, no sufficient ground for claiming that the respondent  judge abused her discretion in  refusing to end the suspension  and allow the petitioner herein to continue in  his office.  The suspension was continued  after the judge  had  examined one of the witnesses of the complainant  in  the  administrative  case; she must have found sufficient reasons for continuing the suspension.  In the same manner, apparently she must have found the same reasons for continuing the  suspension, when she denied petitioner's request for reinstatement in  office.

Preventive suspension is adopted with respect  to executive officials (section 2189, Revised  Administrative Code). In the preventive suspension of  municipal  officials  under section 2189, a  limit of 30 days for such preventive suspension is established.  The Judiciary Act of  1948 (Republic Act No. 296) contains no similar provision, although the use of the  procedure  of preventive  suspension must have been  found by the respondent judge to be useful and  convenient.  In  the  absence of a provision limiting preventive suspension for a period of time, it is evident that such  suspension should depend upon the sound discretion of the investigating officer.

An additional consideration with  respect  to the preventive suspension  now under consideration is the fact that the person conducting the investigation is a judicial officer herself and by  law has administrative supervision over  the suspended official.  It is to be presumed that the  refusal to grant  the  motion for reinstatement must have been decided upon by  her  not only for the purpose  of the  administrative investigation  but in  the interest of an impartial and efficient administration of  justice.  The petition contains no fact or circumstance from which we may infer that she had abused her discretion.  We are in no position to interfere in the exercise of her sound discretion not only in view of the absence  of allegation of abuse but also  because  of the administrative  supervision  that she exercises over the  petitioner herein.

It  is also to be  noted that unlike  officials holding  office by virtue of popular mandate, petitioner herein must have been  appointed  on the basis of his reputation for honesty .and  impartiality   and sense  of justice.  The  fact  that respondent judge did not dismiss the  administrative case against him upon  the  submission of the evidence for the Complainant proves the existence  prima facie of the acts imputed to him.   Under such circumstances,  it is hardly proper to allow the petitioner to be placed back in office, delicate as the position of justice of the peace is.  There is no law that limits the  period of preventive suspension such  as exists in  cases of elective officials.  The absence of such limitation or of a  procedure in administrative cases against justices  of the peace implies legislative intent;  to deny  the right to a limited preventive suspension and the grant of full and ample discretion in administrative investigations.  There is, therefore, no clear, legal  right on the part of the petitioner herein to be  returned to his position after a  certain period of preventive suspension and neither is there a  corresponding legal  duty on the part of the judicial official suspending him to return  him now to the position from which he was suspended.  The petitioner, furthermore, can not claim abuse of discretion on the part of the  respondent judge in denying his reinstatement as the case is still pending and the  complainant in the administrative case has  evidently proved a  prima facie case.

The  petition  is  hereby denied,  with costs  against the petitioner.

Parás, C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista  Angelo, Concepcion,  Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.