This  is an appeal, taken by  defendant Honorato  Asunsion from  an order denying a  petition  for relief  from an order declaring him in  default  and a judgment by default.

On June  12, 1953, plaintiff, Vicenta Pantaleon, instituted this action, in the  Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, to  recover, from  said  Asuncion, the sum of  P2,000.00, with interest thereon, in addition to attorney's  fees.   The summons originally issued  was returned by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija unserved, with the statement that, according to  reliable  information, Asuncion  was residing  in  B-24 Tala Estate,  Caloocan,  Rizal.  An alias  summons  was issued,  therefore, for  service in the place last mentioned.

However, the  provincial sheriff of Rizal returned  it unserved,  with the  information that  Asuncion had left the Tala Estate since February 18, 1952, and that diligent efforts  to locate him proved to no avail.   On  plaintiff's motion, the court ordered,  on March 9, 1955, that defendant be  summoned by publication, and  the summons was published on March 21 and 28, and April 4, 1955, in the "Examiner", said to be  a newspaper of general  circulation in Nueva Ecija.   Having failed to appear  or answer the complaint within the period stated in the summons, defendant was, by  an order dated July  12,  1955, declared in default.   Subsequently,  or on September 8, 1955,  after a hearing held in the absence of the defendant and  without  notice to him, the  court rendered judgment for the plaintiff  and against  said  defendant,  for  the  sum  of P2,300.00, with interest thereon at the legal  rate, from October 28, 1948, and costs.

About forty-six (46) days later, or on October 24, 1955, the  defendant filed a petition for relief from said order of July 12, 1955, and from said judgment, dated September 8, 1955, upon the  ground of mistake and excusable negligence.   Annexed to said petition were defendant's affidavit and  his  verified  answer.  In the affidavit,  Asuncion stated that, on September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San  Francisco  del  Monte  Quezon  City,  which  is  his residence, he received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office  in  San  Jose,  Nueva  Ecija, his  old  family residence; that he proceeded  immediately  to the  latter municipality to claim  said  letter,  which he received  on September 28, 1955; that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12, 1955, and of the judgment  of September 8, 1955, much to his  surprise,  for he had not been summoned  or notified  of the hearing of this case;  that had copy of the summons and of the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule 7, section 21,  of the Rules of Court said  summons and order would have reached him, "as  the  judgment herein had"; and that his  failure to appear before the court is  excusable it being due to the mistake  of the  authorities concerned in not complying with the provisions of  said section.

Upon denial of said petition  for relief, defendant perfected his  present appeal, which is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned summons by publication had not been made in conformity with the Rules of Court. More specifically, defendant maintains that copy of the summons and of the order for the publication thereof were not  deposited "in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant  by  ordinary mail  to  his last  known address", in violation of Rule  7, section 21, of the Rules of Court, and that, had this provision been complied with, said summons and order of publication would have reached him, as had the  decision appealed from.  Said section 21 reads:

"If the service has  been made by  publication, service  may be proved  by the affidavit  of  the printer, his  foreman  or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the  publication shall be attached,  and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post  office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address**   (Italics supplied.)

Plaintiff alleges,  however, that the provision applicable to the case at bar  is not this section 21, but section  16, of Rule 7, of the Rules of Court, which  provides:

"Whenever the defendant  is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever  the address  of a defendant is  unknown  and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,  be effect upon  him by  publication in  such places  and  for such times as the court may order."

It is, moreover, urged by the plaintiff that the requirement, in Said section 21, of an affidavit showing that copy of the summons  and  of the order for its publication had been sent by  mail  to  defendant's  last known  address, refers  to the  extraterritorial service of summons,  provided for in section 17 of  said Rule 7, pursuant to which:

"When  the defendant  does not  reside and  is not found in  the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which  the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded  consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the  defendant from  any interest therein, or  the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service  may,  by leave  of court, be effected out of the  Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by registered mail; or by publication in such  places and  for such time as the court may order, in which case a  copy of the  summons and order of the court shall be sent by ordinary mail to the  last  known address of  the defendant; or  in any other  manner the court may deem sufficient. Any  order granting such  leave shall  specify a  reasonable time, which shall  not be  less than sixty (60) days after  notice, within which the defendant must answer."

Said section 21, however, is unqualified.  It  prescribes the "proof of service by publication", regardless of whether the  defendant is a  resident  of  the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21,  which complements it.  Then, too, we conceive of no reason, and plaintiff  has suggested none,  why  copy of the  summons and of the  order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants,  but not to resident defendants. We can not  even say that defendant herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly residing  in  Rizal where he,  in fact (San Francisco del Monte and  Quezon City  used  to  be part  of Rizal), was residing could reasonably be  expected to read  the  summons published in a  newspaper said to be a general circulation in Nueva Ecija.

Considering  that strict compliance with the  terms  of the statute  is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by publication  (Bachrach Garage  and Taxi Co. vs. Hotchkiss  and Co.,  34  Phil.,  506;  Banco  Espanol-Filipino  vs. Palanca, 37  Phil., 921; Mills  vs.  Smiley,  9 Idaho 317,  325,  76  Pac.  785; Charles  vs. Marrow, 99 Mo.  638; Sunderland,  Cases  on  Procedure, Annotated, Trial  Practice,'p. 51), the conclusion is inescapable that the lower court had no authority  whatsoever  to  Issue the order of  July 12,  1955, declaring the defendant  in default and  to render the decision of September 8,  1955, and that  both are null and void ab initio.

Apart  from the foregoing, it is a well-settled  principle of Constitutional Law that,  in an action strictly in personam, like  the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction  over the  person of  the  defendant,  who  does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the  court. In other  words,  summons  by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon  the court jurisdiction over said defendant.

"Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine  the  personal rights and  obligations  of the parties, personal  service within  the state  or  a voluntary appearance in the case  is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement  of due process. *  * *

"Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its  own residents than nonresidents, it  has  been  held that  in actions in personam * * * service by publication on resident defendants, who are personally within the state and can be found therein is  not 'due process of law',  and a statute allowing it is unconstitutional"  (16A CJ.S., pp. 786, 789; Italics ours.)

Lastly, from  the  viewpoint of  substantial  justice  and equity,  we  are  of the opinion  that defendant's  petition for  relief should  have been   granted.   To begin  with, it was  filed well within the  periods  provided in the Rules of Court.  Secondly, and, this is more important, defendant's verified answer, which  was attached to said petition, contains  allegations  which,   if  true,  constitute  a  good defense.  Thus, for  instance, in  paragraph  (2)  of  the "special denials" therein, he  alleged:

"That  it is not true that he failed to pay the said indebtedness of his said  wife,  as alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint,  for as a matter of  fact, plaintiff and defendant  agreed upon a settlement of the said indebtedness of the latter's  deceased wife on December 5, 1948, whereby defendant was allowed to pay it out of his monthly salary by  installment of P10.00 monthly beginning January, 1949, and  in  accordance therewith,  defendant paid  unto  plaintiff  the following sums:

Instalment for January February, 1948
March		1949	P 30.00	paid personally
April	2,	1949	10.00	by money order	7483
May	11,	1949	10.00	by money order	7921
June	10,	1949	10.00	by money order	8230
July	11,	1949	10.00	by money order	8595
August	10,	1949	10.00	by money order	8943
September		1949	10.00	paid personally
October		1949	10.00	paid personally
November	14,	1949	10.00	by money order	9776
December	13,	1949	10.00	by money order	10076
January	10,	1950	10.00	by money order	10445
February	9,	1950	10.00	by money order	10731
March	10,	1950	10.00	by money order	1149
April	10,	1950	10.00	by money order	11387
May	11,	1950	10.00	by money order	11990
June	12,	1950	10.00	by money order	61055
July	11,	1950	10.00	by money order	58850
August	11,	1950	10.00	by money order	59293
September	6,	1950	10.00	by money order	59618
October	10,	1950	10.00	by money order	60008
November	8,	1950	10.00	by money order	60369
December		1950	10.00	paid personally
January	2,	1951	10.00	paid personally
February	10,	1951	10.00	paid personally
March	12,	1951	10.00	paid personally
April		1951	10.00	paid personally
May		1951	10.00	paid personally
June		1951	10.00	paid personally
July		1951	10.00	paid personally
August		1951	10.00	paid personally
September		1951	10.00	paid personally
November		1951	10.00	paid personally
December		1951	10.00	paid personally
September		1952	30.00	paid personally
December		1952	20.00	paid personally
January		1953	10.00	paid personally
February		1953	10.00	paid personally
March		1953	10.00	paid personally
April		1953	10.00	paid personally
May		1953	10.00
Total paid		P460.00"

The specification of the dates of payment, of the amounts paid each time,  of the  manner  in which  each  payment was made, and of the number of the money orders in which eighteen  (18)  payments had  been  effected, constitutes a strong indication of the probable veracity of said allegation, fully justifying the grant of  an opportunity to prove the same.

Wherefore, said order of July  12,  1955, and the aforementioned decision of  September  8, 1955, are hereby  set aside  and annulled,  and  let the  record  of  this  case  be remanded  to  the lower  court  for further  proceedings, with costs against plaintiff-appellee.  It is so  ordered.

Paras, C, J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.