Appeal from the order of the court of first instance of Manila, Branch IV, requiring respondent-appellant to surrender to  the  register  of  deeds  of  Manila, petitioner-appellee,  the owner's  copies of various certificates of title for the  purpose of   annotating thereon a notice of  lis pendens.

On January  19, 1955, a notice of lis pendens in connection with civil case No. 25111 of the  court of first instance of Manila, entitled Carlos Ysmael, et al., versus  Magdalena  Hashim, et al., was filed with the office of the register of deeds of Manila,  and duly recorded.   On  January 25, 1955, said register of deeds, in pursuance of the provisions of Sec.  72 of  the  Land Registration  Act,  addressed  a letter to, Magdalena   Estate, Inc.,  requiring  the latter to submit, within five days, the  owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates  of Title Nos. 5969 to 5978 for the purpose of annotating  thereon  said notice of lis pendens.  Two days  thereafter, appellant,  through counsel, instead of complying with the demand, registered its opposition thereto, alleging that

(1)  the request is improper as plaintiffs' complaint in civil case No. 25111  does not involve a real action but a personal one, as could be inferred from the relief sought for therein, to wit,

(a) accounting;
(b) dissolution  and liquidation; and
(c)  determination  of plaintiffs' participation in terms of percentage, in  the corporation; and

(2)  that the annotation of the notice would work incalculable harm and prejudice to the  defendant corporation which is primarily engaged in the sale  and lease of real estate.

In view  of this opposition,  the  register of deeds,  who had already annotated  the notice of lis pendens  on the corresponding original certificates, reported the matter, through the Chief,  Land Registration  Commission, to the presiding Judge  of Branch IV of the court of first instance of Manila, in a  letter dated  January 28, 1955, which reads as follows:

"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 72 of the Land Registration Act, I have the honor to report that Magdalena Estate, Inc., of 348 Echague, Manila and 1340 Tarlac  St., has failed to comply  with the request of this office for the submission of the owner's duplicates of Transfer  Certificates of Title Nos. 5969 to 5978.  The copy of the letter of this office, dated  January  25, 1955 and  mailed on the same date is hereto attached, together with a  copy of the letter of Atty. Felipe  Ysmael, attorney for the Magdalena Estate, Inc., dated January 27, 1955.

"This report is submitted for whatever action this court may deem proper to take in the  premises."

On the  basis of this  report,  the court set  the case for hearing, and before  it counsel for appellant renewed his objections,  further alleging that

(1)  Branch IV of the court of first instance of Manila has no more jurisdiction over the matter by virtue of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1161; and

(2)  that under said  Act, the Land Registration  Commissioner has already ruled against such annotation in Consultas Nos. 32 and 34 of the register of deeds of  Quezon City, also in connection with civil case No. 25111.

After hearing, the  court  ruled  that Republic Act No.  1151 simply transferred the powers and functions  of the defunct General Land Registration Office to the newly created Land  Registration  Commission,   and  has  not  deprived Branch  IV of the powers  and  jurisdiction  it formerly possessed, except as to  "Consultas;"  and  that the complaint for partition filed by plaintiffs in civil case No. 25111 was  a real  action, the  accounting, dissolution and liquidation of the corporations prayed for being merely corollaries to the main action.  Thus, on March  21,  1955, the court approved the action  taken by the register of deeds, and ordered appellant to surrender the  owner's duplicates of the Transfer Certificates  involved for annotation purposes. Hence  this appeal,  predicated  on  the  ground  that the lower court erred:

1. In holding  that  Branch IV  of  the court of  first  instance  of Manila and not  the Land Registration Commission has the jurisdiction over the pertinent subject matter involved in this case  despite the  passage  of  Republic  Act No. 1151, entitled "An Act Creating The Land Registration Commission And Authorizing And Appropriating  The Necessary Funds Therefor;"
2. In holding that the notice of  LIS PENDENS is proper because plaintiff's complaint  in  civil  case No. 25111 of the court of first instance of Manila is  a real action;
3. In holding that the Register of Deeds of Manila acted correctly in annotating the notice  of LIS PENDENS  on  the  originals  of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 5969 to 5978; and
4. In ordering the  respondent-appellant to surrender  its owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 5969 to 5978 to the Register of Deeds of  Manila for the  purpose of enabling the latter to annotate thereon the notice of LIS  PENDENS.

There is no dispute  that  the  powers  and functions  of Branch IV of the  court of first instance of Manila as  to "consultas" under  Sec.  200  of  the Administrative  Code, have  been  transferred to the Land  Registration Commission by virtue of Republic Act No. 1151 which  took effect in 1954, section 3 thereof providing as follows:

"SEC. 3. GENERAL FUNCTIONS OP THE COMMISSION. The Commissioner of Land  Registration shall take  over  all  the  powers and functions as  are now  conferred upon  the Chief  of the General Land Registration  Office, which position is hereby abolished, as well  as the  powers and functions of the Judge of  the Fourth Branch of the Court  of First Instance of Manila, in all matters heretofore submitted  to it for resolution under section  two hundred  of the Administrative Code.  *   *  *."

Respondent-appellant contends that the case at bar falls within  the subject matter of "consulta" and should  have been  referred  to the  Commissioner of Land Registration for resolution, and not  before  the  Fourth  Branch,  inasmuch as Sec. 4 of Republic Act 1151  (formerly Sec. 200  of the Administrative Code) provides that where the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken,  or Register  of Deeds of Manila  vs.  Magdalena  Estate, Inc. when the party in interest does not agree with said register of deeds, as in the instant case, the matter must be decided by  way of "consulta" by the Land  Registration Commissioner.  In  other words, it is contended that even  if  the register of deeds does not entertain  any doubt, the matter must perforce be submitted and passed upon by  the Commissioner just because the party in  interest, which is  the respondent-appellant in this  case, does not agree with  the register of deeds.  This contention compels us to refer to Sec. 4 of Republic Act 1151,  particularly the portion relied upon,  which we emphasized.  Said section reads as follows:

"REFERENCE OF DOUBTFUL MATTERS TO COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION. When  the  Register of Deeds  is in  doubt with regard to the  proper step  to be taken or memorandum to be made  in pursuance of  any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of  Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to  the Commissioner of Land Registration either  upon the certification of the Register of Deeds,  stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion  in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified  to him, and in case  of registered lands, after notice to the parties  and hearing,  shall enter an order  prescribing the step  to be taken or memorandum to be made.  His decision in such cases shall be  conclusive and binding upon all Register of Deeds, Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the  Supreme  Court within thirty days from and  after  receipt of the notice thereof."

At  first blush, it would seem that there are two alternative instances  whereby a "consulta"  must be sought: first,  when the  register of deeds is  "in  doubt with  regard to  the proper step to, be taken or memorandum to be made in  pursuance  of any deed,  mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration," or, second, "where  any party in interest does not  agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter."  A closer analysis of the provision, however,  reveals  that the essential  element which must exist in order that the matter may be brought to the  Commissioner by  way of "consulta,"  is the doubt on the  part of the register of deeds as to "the proper step to be taken  (by him)  or memorandum to be made  (by him) in pursuance  of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument  presented to  him  for registration" by the  party interested in it.   It refers to a step or act still undone by the register of deeds by reason of his doubt, which he must bring to the attention of his superior, the Commissioner, "either  upon his certification  stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest."

Respondent-appellant's  contention that even without the existence of doubt on the part  of the register of deeds the matter must be brought to the  Commissioner in "consulta" because the "party in interest (appellant)  does not agree with the register of deeds,"  is untenable.   The expression "or where any party in interest does not agree  . . ."  is hot in itself an independent requisite whereby a matter must be brought in "consulta," but that  this disagreement must arise from the doubt existing in the mind of the register of deeds by reason of  which he has not as yet taken any step or acted upon the registration sought for, because if the register of deeds has no doubt as to the step he  has to take or memorandum he has to make, then there would be  no occasion for the party in  interest to disagree.

In the present case the register  of deeds did not entertain any doubt as to the  registrability of the notice of Iis pendens presented to him for registration,  and he did not hesitate to annotate the  same on the originals of the Transfer Certificates of Title in question; in fact,  after recording the lis  pendens he  forthwith sent  a letter to respondent-appellant requesting the submission of the owner's duplicates for annotation  purposes.  It  was  the  refusal  of appellant to submit said  owner's copies that gave rise to the action taken by the register  of deeds in reporting the matter  to the Fourth Branch of the court of first instance of Manila, in pursuance to Sec.  72 of the Land Registration Act, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"*  *  *.  If the owner neglects or refuses to comply within a reasonable time, the register of deeds shall  suggest the  fact to  the court, and the court, after notice, shall enter an order to the owner to produce his certificate at  a time and place to be named therein, and may enforce the order by suitable process."

Appellant contends that the court of first instance of Manila, Branch IV, cannot act on the report of the register of deeds, much less to order  the  surrender by appellant of the  owner's copies of the  Titles in  question  for the annotation of lis pendens, because under Republic Act 1151, only the Commissioner of Land  Registration could do  so.

This  is untenable.   If  at all, the Commissioner may have some concurrent, but  not exclusive, jurisdiction on the matter;  and were we to  interpret strictly the provision of Sec. 72 of the Land Registration Act, it is only the court of first  instance  that  could compel the herein appellant to surrender  its duplicates  of  the certificates in question to the register of deeds  for  the purposes already  stated annotation  of  lis pendens for, we  believe that  Sec.  72 above quoted has not been repealed by Republic Act 1151, the repealing clause of which only refers to existing laws or parts thereof that may be  inconsistent therewith, and certainly Sec. 72 of Act 496 is not inconsistent with Republic Act 1151.

Anent the question raised in the  second assignment of error regarding the propriety of the annotation of the notice, it is contended that,  under Sec. 24 of Rule  7 of the Rules of Court,  a notice of  lis pendens is proper only in an action affecting  the title  or right of possession of real property and  in real actions  (Saavedra vs. Martinez, et al., 58  Phil., 767);  that the complaint filed in civil case No. 25111 being for an accounting, dissolution and liquidation,  and a determination of the  plaintiffs'  participation in terms of percentage in the  defendant corporations,  is not a real action.  We have  carefully examined said complaint as quoted in appellant's brief, and we find that the plaintiffs therein seek not only the accounting of all the transactions and funds of herein appellant, but  also of all its properties, which naturally include the land covered by the transfer certificates of title already mentioned.   The complaint, therefore,  involves a real  action and not a personal one.  In it plaintiffs pray that they be declared entitled to 25 per cent interest in all the assets of the defendant corporations Juan Ysmael  & Co., Inc., and Magdalena Estate, Inc., and the notice of lis pendens in question refers to the properties of appellant  Magdalena Estate,  Inc., which  are precisely affected and involved in the complaint.  Therefore, under  Sec. 24 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, plaintiffs in  civil case No. 25111 have the right to record in the office of the register  of deeds of the place  in  which  the property is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against respondent and appellant.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Bengzon, Montemayor,  Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.