This is an action to  recover the sum of  P790.00, plus damages and  attorney's fees,  filed before the Municipal Court of Quezon  City.   Judgment having been rendered against defendants', the latter appealed to the court of first instance.

When the case was called for hearing on July 14, 1955, the case was dismissed due to plaintiff's  failure to appear. However,  upon plaintiff's motion,  the order of dismissal was lifted  and the case was set for hearing on December 12, 1955.   On said date, only  the plaintiff appeared, the defendants or  their counsel having failed to do so, in spite of the notice given to them on November 4, 1955.  They have however filed a motion for postponement on the same date stating that their  counsel could not come because he had to appear in another case before the Court of First Instance  of Pampanga.  This motion  was  denied.   The subject matter of the complaint being one which involves accounting, the trial court commissioned its clerk of court to receive  the evidence for  the plaintiff.   Subsequently, the court rendered judgment  ordering defendants  to  pay the amount prayed for  in the complaint.   Their  motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants  took the present appeal.

The  main claim of appellants  is that the  trial court committed  a grave abuse of  discretion  in  denying their motion for postponement on the ground that their counsel could not come because he had to appear on the same date before  the  Court  of First  Instance  of Pampanga.   In denying said motion,  the trial court said in part: "Atty. Penañflor should have filed this motion within the reglementary period and not at the last moment", which evidently means that counsel should have filed his  motion in accordance with  Section  4, Rule 26,  which requires that  copy of the  motion be  served on the other party  at least 3 days before the hearing thereof, which was not  complied with by appellants. Indeed, here it appears that  the trial court set the case for hearing  on December 12, 1955, and notice  thereof  was  received  by appellants'  counsel on November 4,  1955, and yet he  filed his motion only at the eleventh hour.   Even assuming to be true what appellants claim that their counsel  had to appear on the same date before the Court of First  Instance of Pampanga, they have not however satisfactorily explained why their counsel had to  file their motion only on the very morning of the hearing considering that they had  been notified thereof more than one month in advance.   The fact that one of the defendants promised to go to their counsel's office one week before the date of the hearing to get the motion for submission to the court but failed to do so because he was then  busy with certain military maneuver somewhere in Luzon, does  not  constitute a sufficient excuse  for  the counsel's failure to  comply with the rules.  In  fact, the trial  court found  said  excuse  without  merit,  considering that this case had been pending for over one  year and a half  since  it  was originally  instituted.  In  the circumstances, we find no  plausible reason for holding that the trial  court has acted on the matter with abuse of discretion.

Motion for continuance are  addressed to the sound discretion of the court.   The exercise of such discretion is generally upheld  unless  good  reasons  are shown to the contrary. Thus, in Gayon vs. Ubaldo, G. R. No. L-7650, December 28,  1955, this Court had  occasion to uphold this ruling  in the  following wise:

"It is urged, in the  first place,  that the lower court abused its discretion  in denying defendants'  motion for continuance-  But it appears that there had already been two prior postponements granted, both at defendants' own instance and that the last motion for that purpose, though sent five days before the date set for trial, did not conform to the Rules and gave no notice to the adverse party or counsel. Moreover, the only ground therein stated was that the parties were  on  their  way to  an  amicable  settlement.  But  it would appear that opposing counsel informed the court that there was no truth about that  statement as no proposal for settlement had ever been made.  In the circumstances we do not  think the lower court abused  its  discretion in denying a continuance.

"Defendants cannot now be heard to say that because trial was not postponed they were deprived  of  their day in court.  No one deprived them of  their  day in  court.  Of their  own volition they preferred not to  come to  the hearing on the day  set, presumably assuming that their  motion for continuance would be granted.  Defendants had  no right  to make  such assumption, for continuance  are granted for good cause  alleged and proved  and not  merely  at the will of either or both  of the parties to  the  ease."  (Italics supplied)

Appellants next assail the  decision of the trial court for having commissioned its  clerk of court to  receive the evidence  for the  plaintiff  instead  of receiving itself  said evidence.  We see nothing  irregular in  this proceeding especially when the  case involves matters of accounting This is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 34, which authorizes the court, even  upon its own motion, to  designate a commissioner to receive the evidence in some cases,  as  (a) when the trial of an issue  of fact requires  the examination of a  long  account, or  (b)  when the taking of an account is necessary  for the information of the court. In fact, this was done in  the case above referred to wherein on this matter this Court said:

"It  is next contended that the  trial court erred in delegating the reception  of  evidence  to the clerk of court as  the court had no authority  to do  so.  But no showing  having been  made that the clerk of court committed any error in the performance of the work intrusted to him  or that the court  did not  make a correct appreciation  of  the  evidence because  it was received by  another person, the error allege is non-prejudicial and should be no ground for a re-trial."  (Gayon vs.  Ubaldo, supra)

With regard  to the  claim that  the trial court erred in admitting certain  exhibits even if they were tampered with, or were marked paid,  the claim must be  disregarded, for the simple reason that it involves questions of fact which cannot now be raised at this instance.   This appeal was taken on purely questions of law.

Finally,  with regard to Exhibits C and B-l, which are claimed not to have been presented as evidence, assuming this to be  true, the claim is insubstantial, for it appears that the decision of the court was based on evidence different from the exhibits above referred to.

Wherefore, the  decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.