This case was initiated by a petition dated February 27, 1956, which was amended on March 8, 1956, whereby the above-named petitioners asked the Court of Agrarian Relations  to  intervene for the settlement of their  issue with respondent Crispin Paras, upon the ground that they re his tenants on several parcels of land situated in the municipality of Zaragoza, province of Nueva Ecija, and that he has refused to allow them to thresh their respective crops and  is charging  them certain  expenses they  had never agreed to defray.   Respondent filed an answer  admitting the formal allegations of the petition, denying its other allegations and  setting up special  defenses,  as  well as  a "counterclaim".  After the filing of petitioners' "answer to counterclaim,"  respondent moved for  a "judgment on the pleadings", referring to those relative to his "counter-claim,"  upon the  ground that  the  principal  allegations thereof  had  not been denied by the petitioners.  There-upon, the case was set for hearing on June 4,  1956, which, on motion  of petitioners, was postponed to June 15, 1956, by an order dated  June 5, 1956.   The same, likewise, deferred  the resolution of respondent's motion for  a judgment  on the pleadings.   As  neither the petitioners,  nor their counsel, appeared on June 15, 1956, the petition was dismissed for "lack of interest on the part of petitioners to prosecute their petition", and  respondent was allowed to  introduce  evidence  on  his  "counterclaim".  Subsequently, or  on June  21,  1956, a decision  was  rendered thereon, the dispositive part of  which reads:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment should be as it is rendered in favor of  respondent  against petitioners  herein.  The  Court hereby authorizes respondent Crispin  Paras to eject petitioners from their  respective  landholdings belonging to  him, said  respondent, situated  at  Sta. Lucia,  Zaragosa,  Nueva Ecija, authorizing him also to contract with other tenants to  cultivate said landholdings."

A motion for reconsideration  and new trial of the petitioners  having been denied by an order  dated September 5, 1956, petitioners sought a reconsideration of said order, with  the same result.  Hence,  the  present petition  for review by certiorari, filed by the petitioners, who maintain that the lower court erred:  (1) in dismissing their petition;  (2) in authorizing petitioners'  ejectment from the land in  question;  (3)  in granting respondent's motion for a judgment on the pleadings; and (4) in denying the aforementioned  motions for reconsiderations and  new trial  of petitioners herein.

Petitioners  allege that their  failure to appear at the hearing held on June  15, 1956,  was due to  the  fact that notice thereof  was not served upon their  counsel,  Nicomedes Cristobal, until one day later, or on June 16,  1956. However, petitioners have not attached to the record before us the pertinent portion of the record  in the lower  court allegedly bearing out their aforementioned allegation, which is contested by the respondent, who asserts that petitioners "were informed in advance of the scheduled hearing set for June 15,  1956 * * *.",

Moreover, petitioners' motions for reconsideration and new trial were not supported by  any  affidavit of merit. Although they attached to their motion for reconsideration and  new trial, dated June 26,  1956, the sworn statements of Nicomedes Cristobal and Juan  de la Cruz, said statements referred merely to the question whether or not they had been notified of the hearing on June 15,1956.  Nothing was said, in those  affidavits, regarding the  merits of petitioners' claim against the respondent, or the evidence available thereon.  In other words, the aforementioned sworn statements  do  not  partake  of the nature of affidavits  of merits.

With respect to respondent's motion  for a judgment  on the pleadings pertinent to his "counterclaim", it should  be noted that  respondent's "counterclaim"  consisted  of  six (6)  paragraphs.  The first referred to the, residence  of the petitioners.  The  second alleged:

"That  after the termination of the planting season,  all the Petitioners abandoned their landholdings and  left the  same to the care of nature and were it  not for the farm guards and other tenants  including the overseer, their respective landholdings would have been destroyed or "would have produced almost  nothing."  (Italics ours.)

The third averred  that  petitioners  had  not  complied with their obligations  as tenants, in that  they failed  to take care  of their respective  farmholdings and of the growing crops  and other improvements entrusted to them with the diligence of a good father of family.  The fourth stated that on  February 14, 1956,  petitioners took  about 20 cavanes of palay from the stocks still unthreshed in the land in  question without the consent of, either respondent or his representative.   In the fifth and sixth paragraphs, respondent asserted that petitioners had, moreover, violated their contracts  of tenancy with him and  failed to comply with their obligations under Republic Act  No.  1199, and that they were "working damage to the  interest of the respondent without any legal justification and *  *  * proved themselves * * * unworthy  to be retained further as tenants * * *  of  the  respondent".  Premised  upon  these allegations,  respondent prayed, among  other things, that petitioners be ejected from the land in question, that their relationship as  landholder and tenants be terminated and that a liquidation of accounts be ordered.

In their, answer  to this "counterclaim", petitioners admitted paragraphs 1 and 4 thereof and  denied paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of the same.  Having failed to specifically deny the allegations  in  the above-quoted  paragraph 2 of  the "counterclaim", the lower court held that the truth thereof was deemed admitted by the petitioners and  that  a judgment on the pleadings was, therefore, proper.  Petitioners assail this conclusion upon the ground that, under Rule 11, section  1, of the Rules  of Court, if the  plaintiff  fails to make a  "reply" in denial or in avoidance of any affirmative averment made  in  the defendant's "answer",  all  new matters alleged therein are deemed controverted, and that, consequently, the aforementioned allegation in paragraph 2 of respondent's "counterclaim" should be deemed denied.

Said provision of the  Rules of Court refers,  however, to new  matters  alleged or special  defenses set up  in  the "answer" proper, in respect of which plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to "reply". It does not apply to the allegations in  a "counterclaim", for the  pleading that  plaintiff  or petitioner may file  in response thereto is legally known as "answer", not "reply".  The provision applicable to counterclaims is found  in Rule 10, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, which is to  the effect that

"A counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered in accordance with Rule 9 within ten (10) days from service."  (Italics ours.)

Hence, not having been specifically denied in petitioners'
"answer to counterclaim", the allegations in said paragraph 2 of respondent's counterclaim  are deemed admitted by the petitioners, pursuant to Rule 9, section 8, of said Rules of  Court, which provides that

"Material averment in the complaint, other than  those as to the amount of damage,  shall be deemed admitted when not  specifically denied.  Allegations of usury  are deemed admitted if  not denied specifically and under oath."  (Italics ours.)

At any rate, the decision appealed from was rendered after the introduction of evidence, which was found by the lower court to have established the truth of the allegations in  the counterclaim.  Hence, said decision is not in the nature of a judgment on the pleadings.   It  may not be amiss to note that petitioners do not question the accuracy of the aforementioned finding.

Wherefore, the decision appealed  from  is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.  It is so ordered.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.