This  is  an appeal taken by  defendant William  Ernest Jolliffe  from a decision of the Court of  First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of a violation of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one  (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs,  as well as decreeing the forfeiture,  in favor of the  Government, of four (4) pieces of gold  bullion valued  P35,305.46, and a travellers' check in the sum of $100.00.

There is no  dispute about the main facts,  which  are set forth in  the  decision  appealed  from  in   the following language:

"The accused, Mr. William  Ernest  Joliiffe is a Canadian subject, born  in  China and residing permanently  in Hongkong. He is the son of a former  Chancellor of the  West China  Union University and  had been Trade' Commissioner  for. Canada  in Shanghai and Hongkong, until 1948.  The accused belongs to a good and reputable family and is quite well-known in Hongkong.  The accused had made several trips to Manila, sometimes on business and three times to meet  his wife and children passing thru Manila.  He also  came to collect the  debt  owed  to him  by one T.  W. Woo, a prominent businessman in Hongkong.  He came back to Manila on December 4, 1953 to try to collect the debt owed him by T.  Y. Woo, although he had no idea how said debt  was to be paid, whether in peso or in gold.  He was paid in gold which he brought with him by messenger to his room in  the Bay View Hotel.  At  about  plane  time he went  back to his  hotel room and  carried  his gold around  his body underneath his shirt.  When he was  going towards the door leading to the runway he was  accosted  by  a woman,  Amada Arimbay, a secret  service agent,  and was  told to go  to the search room" (Quoted  from the statement of facts in the memorandum for the accused.)

"When the  accused  was searched  four  pieces  of  gold bullion were  found  tied  to his body a few inches above the waist.  There was also found in his  possession  a  $100.00 travelers check issued by  R. McGinty.  While  he  was  under arrest he  made  an offer to settle  the case by offering to  pay the  agents  who were then arresting him.  He stated also that Mr. Manikan, Deputy Collector of Customs, told  him during the  search  that the case could have been  fixed had he  told him  before  hand of  his desire to export gold from the Philippines.  Mr. Manikan, on  the other hand, said that when the  accused was  about to be  searched he offered him P30,000.00  provided the case  be settled  and forgotten.  The Court accepts the testimony of Mr.  Manikan as the true version of the incident because  the accused himself  said  in the  course of his testimony that Mr. Manikan told him that he could say anything  in private to him after he (accused) had signed the written  statement, Exhibit I,  certifying to the things found  in  the  possession, of the accused, among which, were the four pieces of gold bullion.  These facts show that when Mr.  Manikan consented to  allow the accused to talk with him  about the case after signing Exhibit I, there was no other desire on the part of Mr. Manikan but to give the accused every  opportunity to explain his side of the  case but not for any illegitimate purpose.  Mr.  Manikan's acts in  this case  are above board  and the only logical steps  that  an  honest official could take  in the present case.   But these minor incidents  relating to  the case are of no  importance, taking into consideration  the  fact  that the accused himself has admitted that on December 7,  1953 when he was about  to board in one of the planes of the  Pan  American World Airways he.had  with  him four pieces  of gold bullion of  the approximate value of P35,305.46.  This being a fact, the only question before the Court  is purely  a question of law."

Appellant alleges that:

"1. That the trial court  erred in not  ruling that Circular 21  of the Central Bank is the only law in point, and that, being  a special law, it does not penalize attempted or frustrated  violations thereof, but merely consummated violations and, therefore,  under the facts  of this case, the accused  cannot be held liable;

"2. That the trial court erred in not ruling that even if attempted violation  of  Circular  21  is  punishable, still the  accused is not criminally liable  because  there was no  wilful  violation   of  said circular;

"3. That the  trial court  erred in ruling that mere possession  of gold is made illegal by Circular 21 of the Central Bank, the  truth being  that the said circular in  fact  specifically authorizes  sales  of gold within the Philippines even without the  benefit of license;

"4. That the trial court erred in not ruling that  Circular 21 of the Central Bank is  not a valid penal law, because  it did not comply with the provisions of section 74  of Republic Act 265, in that:

(a)  It was not approved by the President of the Philippines;

(b)  In its  promulgation, the  Monetary Board  exceeded  the authority granted it by  the  Central Bank Act, because the context of the circular does not indicate that  it was a temporary emergency measure;

(c)  It  can only  be issued  as  an emergency measure or during crisis, and as issued, has no force and effect, because the emergency it seeks to remedy never existed or no longer exists;

(d)  That the publications of the circular  (original and amended) in the November i951 and October 1952 issues of the Official Gazette are not the adequate publications required by law, because said publications oh their faces showed them to be incomplete and defective;

(e)  That granting, without  admitting, that the power to promulgate it was granted to the Monetary Board by Republic Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the power to so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid because  it constitutes an invalid delegation of  legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

"5. That the trial court erred in ordering forfeiture of the four (4) packages  of gold, Exhibits G-l, G-2, G-3 and G-4, in  favor of the Government.

"6. That  the trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the travellers' check for $100, Exhibit K, in favor of the Government, in spite of the fact that the accused was acquitted on the charge  of illegal possession of dollars under Circulars 20 and 42."

Appellant does  not deny that he had no license to export the gold  bullions  above referred to.  Under his first assignment  of error, he maintains,  however, that  Central Bank Circular No. 21  requiring said license and  section  34 of Republic Act No. 265, prescribing the penalty for violations of said Circular,  refer to consummated exportation, not to "attempted or frustrated exportation."  Section 4 of said Circular provides:

"Any person desiring to export gold in any form,  including jewelry, whether for  refining abroad or otherwise, must  obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicants for export licenses must present satisfactory evidence that the import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be in  violation of the rules  and regulations of such country."

This section explicitly applies to "any  person desiring to  export gold" and,  hence,  it contemplates  the situation existing prior to the consummation of the exportation.  Indeed,  its purpose would be defeated if the penal sanction were  deferred until after  the article  in question had  left the Philippines, for jurisdiction over it, and over, the guilty party, would be lost thereby.

Appellant's avowed ignorance of the necessity of license and of the illegality  of the act performed by him,  alleged in support of the second assignment of error, is belied by the fact that he had  the gold bullions under his shirt; that by objecting, at first, to being searched, he tried to prevent that the presence of said articles upon his person  be discovered ; and that he tried to bribe the public officers who searched him.

As regards the third assignment of error, it is not necessary for us to determine whether mere possession of gold bullions is illegal under Circular No. 21, for his conviction was due, not to such possession alone, but to the fact that appellant tried to export said gold bullions without  the requisite license.

Let us now consider the fourth assignment of error which is based upon several grounds. The first is that the aforementioned circular has not  merited the approval  of  the President of the Philippines,' which is required in  section 74 of Republic Act No. 265.   This pretense  is untenable. It would appear from Exhibits S  and S-l that the practice of the Monetary Board was to obtain said approval before the formal enactment and promulgation of circulars necessitating presidential  sanction.  Indeed, since it  has no authority to subject transactions in  gold to license, unless the President agrees  thereto, it  is, in effect, the duty of the Board to obtain the  assent of the Executive to the policy of requiring said  license  at  a particular time, either upon adoption of the resolution to this effect,  or prior thereto. As  a consequence, it must  be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, which is wanting that such duty has been fulfilled  in the case at bar.

"It is frequently said that a presumption of regularity attends the performance of administrative duties.  That is, when an act has been completed,  it is to  be  supposed  that the  act was done in the manner prescribed and by an  officer authorized  by law  to  do it.     The presumption is of course a rebuttable one, but the bare allegation that there has been  a failure  to  observe  statutory requirements has been regarded as a mere conclusion of the pleader; where the administrative  order  is  accompanied by  a  statement  that there has been compliance and there is no showing of fact to the  contrary,    the presumption of regularity is ordinarily sufficient to support the official act of a public . officer."   (Administrative Law Cases  and   Comments by Gellhorn, pp. 315-316.)

Contrary to appellant's pretense, it is not  essential that the administrative acts of the President be made in writing, unless the law says  so.  Thus, for  instance, in Ykalina vs. Oricio,   (93 Phil.,  1076;  49  Off.  Gaz.,  [12], 5431),  this Court quoted  approvingly the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum:

"While the appointment of an officer is usually  evidenced by a commission,  as  a general rule  it is not  essential  to  the validity of an appointment that a commission issue, and an appointment may he made by  an oral  announcement of his determination by  the   : appointing power."

In  U.S. vs. Fletcher  (148  U.S.  84,  89-90, 37 Law Ed. 378,  379-380), the Federal Supreme  Court said:

"The presumption is that the Secretary and the President performed the duties devolved upon  them respectively, and it  would be unreasonable  to construe the Secretary's  indorsement  as  meaning that he had reviewed  the proceedings for the action of the President in conformity with Article 65, and had approved them himself and ordered  execution of  the sentence in  contravention of the article. * * * While in  the case on hand it is not said that  the proceedings were submitted  to  the President, it is  stated that  they had been forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of the President, and as that is  followed by  an  approval and the direction of  the execution of the sentence, which approval and sentence could only, emanate from the President, the conclusion follows  that the action taken  was the action of the President.

"We regard the  certification of the Secretary  of War  * * * as perceive  no  ground upon which  the  order of that date can be a  sufficient certification of  the  judgment  of the  President, and treated as null  and void for want of the required approval."

What is  more, in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451, 463), the majority of the members  of this Court expressed the view that:

"After serious reflection, we have (decided to sustain the contention of the  government in this case on the  broad proposition, albeit  not suggested, that  under the presidential type  of government  which we  have adopted and considering the departmental  organization established and continued in force by paragraph 19 section 21 Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive  and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,  the heads of  the various executive departments a/re assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is  required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the  Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United  States [1887], 122 U.S. 543; 30 Law ed.  1167; 7 Sup. Ct.  Rep. 1141;  see also U.S. vs.  Eliason [1839], 16 Pet. 291; 10 Law ed. 968; Pones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law  ed.  691; 11 Supp. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey  vs.  Chapman  [1880] 101 U. S.  755;  25 Law  ed. 916; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law ed.  264.)"

Needless to  say, the cases cited  by  appellant herein  refer to  the  presidential approval of legislative  enactments, which the  Constitution explicitly  requires to  be evidenced by the signature of the Executive  (Art. VI, section 20 [1]) There is no similar provision in Republic Act No.  265.

It is urged, however, that the authority of the Monetary Board to suspend or restrict the  sales of exchange by the Central Bank and to subject all transactions  involving foreign exchange to license, is temporary in nature and may be exercised only during an exchange  crisis, as an emergency measure to combat such crisis, and that the context of the circular in  question, as amended, does not  indicate that it  was a temporary  emergency measure.   It is  not necessary,  however, for the legality of said  circular that its temporary character be stated on its face, so  long as the circular has  been issued during  an  exchange crisis, for the purpose of combating the same.   In the  absence of evidence to the contrary, which has not been  introduced or offered  in  the present  case,  it  is  presumed that  the provision  of section 74  of Republic Act No. 265, under the authority of which  the  aforementioned  circular was issued, has authority of which the aforementioned circular was issued, has been complied with.  Besides, the fact that there has been an exchange crisis in the Philippines and that such crisis, not only existed at the time of the issuance of said circular in 1949 and 1950, but, also, has  remained in  existence up to the present, may be taken judicial cognizance of.

Although, from a purely theoretical and legal viewpoint, the Monetary Board and the President could have specified in Circular 21 the period of  its effectivity, their failure to do  so  did not necessarily impair its validity.  As  a measure taken under the police power of the state, said period had to  be commensurate with the crisis that led to its adoption, and the duration of said crisis  could not be anticipated with reasonable certainty.  Upon the termination  of the aforementioned crisis, as determined  by competent authority, the circular would become inoperative. Thus, in Rutter  vs. Esteban,  (49 Off. Gaz., 1807), Commercial Investment vs. Garcia (49 Off. Gaz.,  1801), Salvador vs. Locsin, (93 Phil., 225),  and Nicolas vs. Matias, L-5250 (May 29, 1953), we held that, although the moratorium laws enacted in the Philippines, upon its liberation from the  Japanese forces, could not be permanent in character and did not specify the duration thereof, it was Valid and effective until the emergency for which it was intended had already disappeared.

It is further  argued  that,  as  published in  the Official Gazette, Circular No. 21, in its original, as well as in its amended  form, did not bear the approval of the President and that, accordingly, said publication was not sufficient to give the effect contemplated by law therefore.   This pretence is based upon  false promise.  The original circular subjecting to licensing by the Central Bank "all transactions in gold and foreign exchange", is Circular No. 20, which, as approved and published, states, that, "pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 265',, it  had been adopted by "the Monetary Board, by unanimous vote and with the  approval  of  the President of the Philippines" What is more, the last paragraph of Circular No. 20, provides that "further regulations  in respect to transactions covered by this circular will be  issued separately."  Thus, the President had approved not only the "licensing by the Central Bank"  of "all transactions  in  gold and  foreign exchange," but, also,  the issuance,  subsequently  to  the promulgation of Circular No. 20, of "further regulations in respect" of such transactions.   Said further regulations were incorporated into Circular No.  21, which thus bears the  stamp of  presidential sanction,  although this is not specifically required by law.  It is only the decision of the Monetary Board to subject to license by the Central Bank all transactions in gold and  foreign exchange  that  needs the approval  of the President.  Once the same has been given, the  details in the implementation of said decision may be determined by said Board, through such  regulations  as may be promulgated from time to time.  The assent of the President is not a prerequisite to the validity and effectivity of these regulations, as distinguished from the aforementioned decision thereby sought to be enforced or executed. The authority of the Monetary Board to make regulations is governed, not  by section  74 of  Republic Act No. 265, but by section 14 thereof, in the language of which:

"In order to exercise the authority granted to it under this Act the  Monetary Board  shall:

(a) Prepare and issue such rules  and regulations as it  considers necessary  for the effective discharge of the  responsibilities and exercise of the power assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act."

Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to  issue the same constitutes an undue delegation  of legislative power.  It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local  governments.  However, one thing is to  delegate the  power  to  determine  what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in  the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.  Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall  under the  second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within  which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus  vs. United States, 88  L. ed. 848.)   Referring to the case  at bar, section  74 of  Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the  Monetary Board  and the President the power to subject  to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign  exchange  "in  order  to protect the international reserve  of  the Central  Bank  during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures  to combat such crisis."   The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures  as are appropriate" to protect the international  stability  of the peso,  "whenever the international reserve is falling, as a result  of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the  Monetary Board,  are contrary to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep.  Act No. 265).  It should  be noted, furthermore, that these power must be  construed and  exercised in relation to the  objectives of the law  creating  the  Central  Bank, which are;  among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the  Philippines,"  and "to  promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.)   These standards are sufficiently  concrete and definite to vest  in the delegated authority the character  of administrative details  in the enforcement  of  the law and to place the  grant of said authority beyond  the category of a delegation of legislative powers  (Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil,. 547; Compañia General  de  Tabacos vs. Board  of Utility, 34, Phil., 136; Rubi"vs.  Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; Alegre vs.  Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394;  People vs. Rosenthal, 63 Phil.,  328; Antamok Gold Fields vs. C.I.R., 68 Phil., 340; Calalang vs.. Williams, 70 Phil., 276; Cervantes vs.  Auditor General, 91  Phil.,  359;  Phil., Association of Colleges & Universities vs.  Sec. of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz.,  (12), 6230;  Mutual Films Corp. vs. industrial  Commission,  276  U.S. 230;  Muliord  vs. Smith, 30/ U.S.  48; National Broadcasting  Co. vs. U.S. 319 U.S. 225; Yakus  vs. White, 321  U.S.  414; Ammann vs. Maiionee, 332 U.S. 245).

Under the fifth assignment of error, appellant maintains that Article 45 of the revised Penal code authorizing the forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime  and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, does not apply to the case at bar,  the crime involved herein being covered by a special law.  However, pursuant to section 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the  provisions  of said Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, "unless the latter should specifically  provide the  contrary", and there is no such provision to the contrary in Republic Act No. 265 (U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil., 29; People vs. Moreno,  60 Phil., 712; People vs. Ramayo, 61 Phil., 225; Copiaco vs. Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil., 184).

The last assignment of error refers to the propriety of the order of confiscation of the traveller's check for P100, the lower  court  having  found  that the accused had  no knowledge of the fact that it was in his physical possession, and that therefore, he had no criminal intent in connection therewith.   We feel that this point is well taken, and that, accordingly, said travellers' check should not be forfeited to the Government.

With this modification, the decision, appealed from should be, as it  is hereby affirmed, in all other  respects,  with costs against the defendant-appellant.  It  is  so ordered.


Paras, C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ.,  concur.