Januario Hermitano,   as  grantee  of  original  plaintiff Tomasa Aguilar,  who died pendente  lite,  seeks to recover from defendants the possession of the portions of land they are occupying, plus damages representing the value  of the produce of the land since he acquired it to  the time they are surrendered to him.   Alberta Aguilar, as heir of Tomasa Aguilar, likewise  seeks to  recover from  defendants damages  representing the value of the produce of the land from 1947, when  defendants took possession  thereof, until it was sold to Januario Hermitano.

Plaintiff's action is based on the claim that the land in question  originally belonged to Tomasa Aguilar to  whom was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.  10499 of the land records of the province of Tarlac; that  when Aguilar died on August 4, 1952, it was inherited by her only heir Alberta Aguilar; and that the property was later sold to Januario Hermitano,  who is now the present owner thereof.

Defendants  seek to  defeat the  action  of plaintiffs  by claiming that the certificate of title issued to the predecessor in  interest of Januario  Hermitano is  null  and  void because it was issued by a court that  had no jurisdiction over  the land and,  therefore, the title  upon which  the action of plaintiffs is based  is also null and void.

The trial court  overruled the  claim  of defendants and sustained the action  of plaintiffs.   It  ordered defendants to vacate the portions of land occupied  by them and to pay plaintiffs damages representing the value  of the produce of the land since they took possession thereof in 1947 until its possession is actually surrendered to  Januario  Hermitano.

The facts of this case are  not disputed.   They  appear in the  decision of the trial court  as follows:

"The registered land in question is the same identical property object  of Registration Case No. 494 of this Court, G.L.R.O. Record No. 15951, filed  in 1919, wherein  the Director of Lands  was the principal oppositor claiming the land as  part  of the public domain. The applicants therein were the spouses Simon  Castro y Rufo  and Tomasa  Aguilar.  In  1924, this  Court rendered  therein  a  decision declaring the land in question a part  of the public domain.  However, on appeal  by  the  applicants, our  Supreme  Court, in 1926, reversed the decision of this lot covered by Plan Psu-15730, with the exception of the Canoac Creek,  in  favor of the  applicants.  In 1927, the corresponding decree and title was  accordingly issued to the applicants (Original Certificate of Title No. 19960 Exhibit 'A'; Records of Registration Case No. 494 Exhibit 'L').  Said certificate of title was cancelled  in  1936 and,  in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title  No. 10499  (Exhibit 'B')  was  duly issued  in  the name of original plaintiff Tomasa Aguilar,  who died on August 4, 1952.  Before she died, however, she sold pendente lite the land in question to plaintiff Januario Hermitano, and by virtue of said sale Transfer Certificate  of Title No.  10499  was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title  No. 15763  (Exhibit 'C') was issued in favor of Januario Hermitano  on April 8, 1953.

"Sometime before  the commencement of this case, the defendants had  filed individual free patent applications  with  the Bureau of Lands over several lots comprised within Plan Pls-84 (Exhibit '4') covering a big mass of land  situated in Mangatarem, Pangasinan. The  Bureau of  Lands, however,  in  January to March,  1947,  after due  investigation and  relocation  of the  registered  property in question, ordered the exclusion from the  respective free patent applications of the defendants (Exhibits 'E', 'E-1' to 'E-31' ) of all portions thereof that were included and comprised within pls-84 (exhibit 4 there is no question that the portions excluded by bureau lands from respective free patent applications defendants, containing a total area 419,824 square meters, more or less, are part and parcel the registered land in question, (exhibits 'D' and 'D-1' ).  Notwithstanding aforesaid action of the Bureau of Lands, the defendants still insist that the several lots applied for by them in their respective individual free patent applications are part of the public domain.  They also insist that the land applied for by them are actually situated  within the municipality of Mangatarem, Province of Pangasinan, and, therefore, outside territorial jurisdiction this Court.  It is  this alleged fact, on which the defendants based their contention that this Court, acting as  a land  registration court, had no jurisdiction to decree the original registration of the land in question, because the jurisdiction of the Court proceedings is confined  and limited only to the territorial limits this province.  In contending that the title to the land in question was procured by the  original registered owners in bad faith,  the defendants claimed  that they were not personally notified of the initial registration proceedings in the aforementioned Registration Case No. 494 and that they were misled and deceived by the pendency of another registration case filed by the applicants before the Court of First  Instance  of Pangasinan over a  bigger mass includes several now dispute.  "

Appellants claim that the  decree  issued in Registration Case No. 4940 of the Court of First  Instance of Tarlac in 1919,  which  is more  than 30  years  upon  the filing of the complaint,  adjudicating the land in question to Januario Hermitano's predecessor in interest is invalid for the reason that the court that had issued the decree had no jurisdiction  to act on the case.   In support of this claim, appellants advance the  following reasons:

1.  When the petition for registration of the land in  question was filed  in  the  Court of First  Instance of Tarlac  in 1919, there  was already pending  in the  Court  of First  Instance of  Pangasinan another registration case involving a bigger portion of land which embraces certain portion of the land subject of the Tarlac  registration case,  it being the  theory of applicants  that  the Pangasinan court  acquired original jurisdiction  to the exclusion of all other courts with respect to the land covered by the  registration case;

2. Appellants or  their predecessor in interest were not included in the notice of the initial hearing of the registration case pending in the Tarlac  court and, therefore,  were not  personally notified of the proceedings  as required by  law; and 3. A bigger portion  of  land which  one  Antonia  Fuster sought. to register  in her  name in a later registration case  before the Court  of First Instance  of Pangasinan  and  which happens to embrace, the portions now in  dispute was subsequently declared public land  by  the  Supreme Court in  G. R. No. 40129.

The  first ground has no  merit.   It appears that  the Pangasinan court of, first instance dismissed the registration  case originally filed by appellees when it found that the portions of the land  covered by it which  are now  the subject of  this case were actually situated within the municipality of San Clemente, province of Tarlac, and the dismissal was without  prejudice.  This dismissal has  the effect of relinquishing the jurisdiction originally acquired by the Court of  First Instance  of  Pangasinan  and of transferring it to the court of  Tarlac which is the proper court to take cognizance of the  case.   The fact that  the registration case  in Tarlac was filed  sometime before the dismissal of the  Pangasinan case can have no  legal  adverse consequence.  On the contrary,  it was  a rectification of an error committed as to venue for indeed the court that  should "take cognizance  of this registration  case  is that  which  has territorial jurisdiction over the  property.

This court  is the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.  Thus, Section 10, Act  No. 2347 provides  that "all  jurisdiction and power  heretofore  conferred by Act Numbered Four Hundred and Ninety-Six and  its amendments upon the Court  of Land  Registration and upon the  land registration judges, are hereby conferred upon the Courts of First Instance and judges thereof, of the provinces in which the land which is to be registered is situate."  (Italics  supplied.)

With  regard to the second ground,  it is true that  appellants were not personally notified of the pendency of the present registration  case even  if  they were actually occupying,  as they claim, portions  of  the land, but such procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because  registration proceedings have the nature of actions in rem.   This Court has held time and again that lack of personal notice in a registration proceeding to persons who may claim certain right or interest in the property cannot vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued  therein because proceedings to register land under Act No. 496  are rem and not in personam.

"A land registration proceeding is in rem, and therefore the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its  branches,  irrespective  of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application  for registration or  have  appeared and filed  an answer to said  application, because all  interested parties  are  considered as notified  by the publication required  by law."   (Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil., 259: See also Roxas vs. Enriquez, 20 Phil., 31; Alba vs. Be la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49;  Alcantara, et al. vs. De la Paz, et al.f  92  Phil.,  796; Sepagan vs. Dacillo, 63 Phil., 412; Castelo vs. Director of Lands, 48 Phil., 589.)

Moreover, it appears that appellants based their right to the land merely on the applications for homestead patent they filed with the Bureau of Lands which were then under investigation when the registration  case was filed in the Court  of First Instance of Tarlac wherein the Bureau of Lands was made party respondent.   This Bureau filed an opposition to the registration claiming that 4he land subject of the registration was a portion of the public domain, but  its opposition was overruled.  As a result, the Bureau of  Lands  ordered  a  relocation of  the portions covered by the applications of appellants and, once relocated, they were ordered excluded from  the land covered by the registration case.   It  can therefore be  said that appellants were already indirectly represented in the registration case by the Bureau of Lands because their interest in the land can be considered as derivative of the Bureau's claim that it belong to  the  public domain.

But what  makes the  claim of appellants legally  futile is that they are raising the nullity  or invalidity of the decree and title  of appellees over the property in question after the lapse  of  more than  30 years, which certainly can not  be done considering the purpose of our Torrens system.  As this Court has aptly said: "When once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system and the time has passed within which that  decree may  be questioned, the title is perfect and cannot later be  questioned.   *  *  * The very purpose of  the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a  second action for registration" (Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon  and  Director  of Lands, 50  Phil., 791, 792).

"As the land in dispute is covered  by plaintiff's Torrens certificate  of  Title and was registered  in 1914, the  decree of  registration can no longer  be impugned  on the ground of  fraud, error or lack of notice to defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the decree.  Neither could the decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title  to, or interest  in, the land prior to the  registration  proceedings. (Sorongon vs.  Makalintal, 45 Off.  Gaz. 3819.)"  (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Quirino Bolaños, 95 Phil., 106).

We also find no merit in the third ground, considering the express provision of  Section 45 of Act No.  496 to the effect that land  once registered shall  be and always remain  registered, title thereto becoming indefeasible  after the lapse of  one  year.   As this Court  has said: "No rule is  better settled  in  this  jurisdiction than the one which prohibits the changing, altering or modification of a decree in a land registration proceeding under the Torrens system after the lapse of one year" (Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil., 797).  Following this ruling we may say that the inclusion, perhaps  inadvertently, of the portion  of land here in  dispute in the  Fuster case cannot have the effect of nullifying a  decree issued in a previous registration case giving to appellants a Torrens title to the land.  This is  more so  considering  what said Section 45 provides:  "The obtaining of a  decree of registration  and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running  with the land, and binding upon  the applicant  and all successors in  title that the land  shall be and always remain  registered  land,  and  subject  to  the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof."

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor, Labrador, and Endencia,  JJ.,  concur.
Reyes, A., and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the  result.