On October 16, 1956, the plaintiff Rosendo Lequigan filed with the Court  of  First  Instance of  Negros Occidental a complaint for injunction and  damages against defendants Pedro, Quintin, Rosela, Otelia, all surnamed Katalbas, and the spouses Jovito and Constancia Carmales, docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 4095.  Among other things, plaintiff's complaint alleges that he is the lawful possessor and actual  occupant of a parcel of land described therein; that  defendants have, since 1947, repeatedly disturbed and molested him in his free use and  enjoyment of the property; and that, by reason of such intrusions, several criminal complaints  were filed,  some decided  adversely against them, others  resulting in  acquittal and one still pending.  Plaintiff, therefore, prays that his peaceful possession over  the  property in  question  be recognized by defendants; that  a permanent injunction issue enjoining them from further molesting  and disturbing him in his possession; that defendants, spouses Jovito and Constancia Carmales,  be ordered to remove their  house built on the said  property; and  finally,  that  plaintiff  be  awarded damages and such other relief as may be due him under the premises.

In due time, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint  on the  ground that  (1) the  complaint states no  cause of  action,  (2)  the cause of action, if any, is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and (3)  the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.  An opposition  to  this motion was  interposed  by  plaintiff's counsel.

Acting favorably on the  aforesaid  motion, the  lower court, in an  order dated November 27, 1956,  dismissed the complaint in this wise:

"Acting on the motion to dismiss dated November  12, 1956, filer by Atty. Januario L. Jison, for the defendants, and the opposition thereto dated November 23,  1956 filed  by  Attys. Tupas and del Castillo, for  the plaintiff, this  Court, finding said  motion well founded, hereby grants the same,  and  order this case dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs."  (Rec. App. 50-51)

Against this order, plaintiff perfected an appeal to this Court.

The  appeal  must  be  sustained.   The  complaint  avers that plaintiff is  in the actual and  peaceful possession of the property described therein, subsequent to  plaintiff's application  for a  residence permit with the  Bureau  of Forestry in  1924, a  sales application with  the Bureau of Lands  in 1927, and a free patent application in 1954 and that defendants have been and are continuously and unlawfully interfering1 with his  physical  and  peaceful occupation of the same.   The  absence  of allegation that  the Bureau of  Lands had already made an award on  these applications or  authorized  an entry does not justify defendants'  interference with  plaintiff's  occupancy.   It is to be noted that plaintiff seeks not a recognition of title or ownership, but of his prior actual possession over the same, which the law and the courts protect  against subsequent and baseless  acts  of dispossession,  in order  to prevent or  settle  disorders  of breaches  of  the  peace.  "Possession of a piece of property may wholly be  precarious of unrighteous, yet if me possessor has in his  favor priority of  time, he has the  security, that he is entitled to stay on the property until he  is  lawfully  ejected by a person having a better right."  (Mediran vs. Villanueva, [Syllabus,]  37 Phil.,  752)

In a prior case, the question arose as to whether  or not a public land applicant may be considered  as having any right  to the land  occupied before  award thereof,  which may entitle him to  a possessory  action.  In  answering the query in the affirmative, this Court ruled:

"There are compelling reasons of policy supporting1 the recognition of  a right in a bona, fide applicant who has occupied the land applied  for.   Recognition of the right encourages actual settlement; it discourages speculation and land-grabbing.   It is in accord with well established practices in the  United State's.  It  prevents conflicts and the overlapping  of claims.  It is  an  act  of  simple  justice to the enterprise and diligence  of the pioneer, without which land settlement can not be encouraged  or emigration from thickly populated areas hastened.

Our  answer to the second problem is also  in  the  affirmative, and we hold that even pending the investigation of, and resolution on, an  application by a bona fide occupant, such  as plaintiff-appellee herein, by the priority of his application and record oi his  entry, he acquires a right  to the possession of the public  land he applied for  against any  other public  land applicant, which right  may be protected by  the possessory action  of forcible entry  or  by any other  suitable  remedy that  our  rules provide."   (Andres Pitargue vs.  Leandro  Sorilla, 92 Phil., 5;  48  Off. Gaz.  [9],  3849; 'see also Bohayang vs.  Maceren, et al., 53 Off. Gaz. No. 13, 4105.)

On  the question of  the  court's  jurisdiction over the case,  it was  further held:

"Resuming  the consideration we have  set  forth  above, we hold that the  grant of power and duty  to the Lands  Department  to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the courts of their  duty  or power to take cognizance of actions instituted by settlers or occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective  possessions and occupations, more  especially  the actions of trespass,  forcible entry  and  unlawful  detainer, and  that the exercise of  such jurisdiction,  and control  of  public lands.  The question we  have proposed  to consider must be answered  in the affirmative."   (Pitargue vs. Sorilla, supra.)

It  is contended that the  patent  application  made only in  1954  was illegal because public lands in Negros are no  longer open for patent application after  December 31, 1938   under  section 45  of the Public Land  Act.  Besides the fact that the principle of protection  of  prior possession  or  occupation against  subsequent ones  not showing a better  right  (as already mentioned above) would  have sufficed to dispose of this  assertion.   It is well to remember  that the section cited  by the  defendants was  later amended by  Republic Act No. 107 enacted in 1947, which extended the privilege to file  applications  to not later than December 31,  1957 (see  also Proclamation No.  70,  series of 1948 of the President of  the  Philippines,  declaring all regions opened to free  patent up to December 31, 1957). At any rate, it is only the government that can question plaintiff's entry  and  occupancy  of  lands of  the public domain.

Lastly,  defendants assail the  action for  damages, in that  the  same is  unauthorized  under  article 33^[1] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and that, moreover, assuming  that  it  is  sanctioned,  it had already prescribed,  invoking articles 1146^[2]  and  1149^[3]  of the  same  Code.

This  contention is, however, premised on the  wrong assumption  that  plaintiff's  suit is  based on the criminal convictions of some of the  defendants years before  this suit  was filed.   This is  not so, for, as stated by  the plaintiff, the complaint is based on the continuous and repeated acts  of dispossession of defendants, which  acts are sought to be enjoined  in the case.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case ordered remanded for further proceedings.   Costs   against   defendants-appellees.  So ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Bengzon, Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, and  Endencia, JJ.,  concur.

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^[1] Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party, Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a proponderance  of evidence

^[2] Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

^[3] Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.