The petitioner seeks a review and the  setting aside of a resolution in bane of the Court of Industrial Relations adopted on 23 June-1954 which held that there exists no employer-employee relationship  between  the  respondent and the driver complainants represented by the petitioner and for  that  reason  the  Court  of  Industrial Relations dismissed the complaint filed  by the  acting  prosecutor of the Court.   The resolution in bane complained of reversed an order of  an Associate Judge of the Court which declared that  there was  such  relationship  of employer-employee  between  the  respondent  and  the complainants represented by the petitioner.   The last mentioned order of 16 February 1954  was  just  interlocutory  but  it was set aside by the resolution of 23 June 1954.  The National Labor  Union in representation of the  complainants appealed from said resolution dismissing its complaint charging  the respondent with the commission of  unfair labor practices.

In the resolution  complained of there are  no findings of facts, ; It merely  states that

* * *the Court, in bane,  finds that the  said motion for  reconsideration  is  well-taken  and, therefore, it hereby reconsider  the order of February  16, 1954, and thereby declares that there is no employer-employee relation between  respondent, Benedicto Dinglasan, and the driver-complainants in his  case.  As  a consequence, the motion to dismiss the complaint, dated October 31, 1953, filed by the Acting Prosecutor of the Court, is hereby granted.   (Annex D.)

This, resolution was  adopted upon  a motion  for  reconsideration  of the  previous order  of 16 February 1954. As  there are no  findings of fact in the resolution those, bet  forth in the previous order  must  have  been  relied. upon by the Court.   They are as follows:

(a) Respondent Dinglasan is , the  owner and  operator of TPU jeepneys plying between  España-Quiapo-Pier and vice versa.

(b) Petitioners  are  drivers  who  had verbal  contracts  with respondent for the use of the  latter's  jeepneys upon  payment  of P7 50 for 10  hours use, otherwise known as the "boundary system".

(c) Said drivers  did  not receive salaries  or wages from Mr. Dinglasan; their day's' earnings  being  the excess over the P7.50 that they paid .for the  use of the jeepneys.  In  the event  that they did not  earn  more,  respondent did not have  to  pay them anything;

(d) Mr. Dinglasan's  supervision  over the  drivers  consisted  in inspection of the  jeepneys.  that they took out, when  they passed his gasoline station for water, checking the route prescribed by tho Public  Service Commission,  or whether any driver  was  driving recklessly and washing and changing the tires  of jeepneys.  (Annex c.)

The  main  question to determine is whether there exists a relationship  of employer-employee between  the drivers of the jeeps and the owner thereof.   The  findings contained  in the first order  are  not disputed by both  parties except the  last to which the respondent  took exception. But in the resolution setting aside the order of 16 February 1954 the Court  of Industrial Relations in  banc did not state.that such finding is not supported by evidence.  It merely "declares that there is no employer-employee  relation between respondent, Benedicts Dinglasan, and  the driver-complainants in this case."   If the findings to which . the  respondent took exception is unsupported by  the evidence, a pronouncement to that effect would have been made  by the  Court in  bane.  In; the absence  of such pronouncement we are not at liberty to ignore or disregard said  finding.   The  findings of the  Court  of Industrial Relations with respect to question of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record shall be conclusive." ^[1] Taking into consideration the  findings of fact made by the  Court of Industrial  Relations we find  it difficult to  uphold the  conclusion of the  Court set forth  in its resolution of 23  June  1954.  The drivers did not invest a single centavo in the business and the  respondent  is the exclusive owner  of the jeeps.  The management of  the business is in the  respondent's hands.   For even  if  the drivers of the jeeps take material possession of the jeeps, still the  respondent as owner thereof and holder of a certificate of public convenience is entitled to  exercise, as he  does  and under the law he  must, supervision over the drivers by seeing to it that they follow the route prescribed by the Public Service Commission and  the rules and regulations promulgated by it  as regards their  operation.  And when they pass by the gasoline  station  of  the respondent checking by Ms employees on the water tank, oil and  tire  pressure  is done.  The only  features that would make the relationship of lessor  and lessee between the  respondent and the drivers,  members of the  union, as contended by the respondent, are the fact that he does not  pay them  any  fixed  wage but their compensation is  the excess of the total amount of fares earned or collected  by them over and above  the amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent,  the  owner of the jeeps, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is  for the account of the drivers:  These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them  from  that of  employer-employee,  because the  estimated earnings for  fares must be over  and above  the amount they agreed to pay to the  respondent for  a ten hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps.  Not having any  interest in the business because  they did  not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in  the  management  thereof,  their service as drivers  of the  jeeps  being their only contribution  to  the business, the relationship of  lessor and  lessee cannot be sustained.^[1]  In the lease of chattels the  lessor loses complete control over  the chattel leased  although the  lessee cannot make bad use thereof, for he would be responsible for damages to the lessor should he do  so.  In  this case there  is a  supervision  and a  sort of  control  that  the owner  of the jeeps exercises over  the drivers. It  is an attempt by  ingenious scheme to withdraw  the  relationship between the  owner of  the jeeps  and  the. drivers thereof  from the operation of the  labor laws enacted to promote industrial peace.

As to the point  that the National Labor Union  is  not the real  party in interest to  bring the complaint,  suffice it to say that " 'representative' includes a legitimate labor .organization or any officer or agent of such  organization, whether or  not employed  by the employer or employees whom he represents." ^[2]  And whenever  it is' charged by an offended  party or his representative that any person has engaged or  is  engaging in any unfair labor practice, the Court of Industrial Relations must investigate such charge.^[3] Therefore, the objection to the institution of the charge for unfair labor practice by the  National Labor Union is not well taken.

The order  of 23  June  1954 is reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations for such further  proceedings as  may be required by law, with  costs  against the respondent.

Parás,  C. J., Bengzon, Reyes,  A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and  Endencia,  J.J., concur.

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^[1] Section 6, Republic Act Ho. 875.

^[1] In the matter of the Park Floral Company, etc., 19 NLEB 403;
Radley et al. vs. Commonwealth, 161 SW (2d) 417; Jones vs. Goodson et al., 121 Fed. Rep. (2d) 176; Mitehel vs. Gibbson  et al., 172  Fed. Eep. (2d) 970.

^[2] Section 6, Republic Act No.  875.

^[3]Section 5 (b), Republic Act No. 875.