On October 5,  1953, the  City Fiscal filed in the Municipal  Court, of Manila  an information  reading  as follows:

"The undersigned accuses Bernardo Reyes and Mariano Beyes of the erime of  coercion committed as follows:

"That on or about the 26th  dayf of August, 1953, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,  conspiring, confederating together  and mutually' helping  each other, through deceit  and misrepresentation, did  then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously seize, take and hold possession of passenger jeep bearing plate No. TPU-2695 belonging to Ag'ustin Blasco, without the knowledge and  consent of the latter, for the purpose  of  answering for the debt of the said  owner, and despite repeated demands made upon them to return the  said jeep, they refused and still refuse to do  so, to the damage and prejudice of the said  owner."

Upon  motion of the defendants, the court dismissed the information because  it did pot allege the  use  of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged was coercion under Article 287 of  the Revised Penal Code which provides, in  the  first paragraph, that  "Any person  who, by means of violence, shall seize  anything belonging  to his debtor,  for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the  debt, shall suffer  the penalty of arresto mayor in its minirnum period and a fine "equivalent to the value of the thing, but  in no case  less than  75 pesos." An appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila having been dismissed for lack of merit,  the prosecution has elevated the case to us in third instance,  contending that the offense charged is  coercion or unjust vexation under the second, paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto  menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both," under which violence is not, an  essential element.

We  agree  with  appellant's  contention.  Although the offense named in the information is coercion,  it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first paragraph, since  the  second  paragraph  also  speaks  of "coercions".  Inasmuch as the recitals  in  the information do  not include violence,  the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that  described and penalized in the second paragraph.  The offense falling under the second paragraph  cannot include  violence as an element; otherwise it would come under the first paragraph.'

Another view we take of the case is that the information, though wrongly calling the offense  charged as coercion,  alleges  facts sufficiently constituting  unjust vexation, now mixed with coercion and also penalized under the second  paragraph of  Article  287.   Under  the old. Penal  Code,  other coercions  and unjust  vexations  were considered misdemeanors against persons treated under a separate chapter., The principal feature of coercion under the first paragraph is  that there be a taking by a person of his debtor's' property for the purpose of applying it to the payment  of debt.  This feature is recited  in the information,  consummated not by violence (distinguishing element specified in the  first paragraph  of Article 287), but thru deceit and misrepresentation no less effective than actual force in depriving the offended party of his free will. The decision in U. S. vs. Tupular, 7 Phil., 8, relied upon by the court of origin, is not controlling, because the offense involved therein was  coercion defined  in Article 498 of the old Penal Code which expressly called for violence, and which is the counterpart of the first paragraph of Article 287 of the  Revised Penal  Code.

The contention of defendant-appellees that the present appeal would place them in double jeopardy is unfounded. "Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient,, but the  case  is  dismissed upon petition of the accused on  the ground that the complaint or information is invalid and insufficient,  such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same offense and  the defendant is estopped from alleging  in the  second prosecution .that the former  dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was  valid."   (Morgan, Comments on the Rules of Court 52 ed., Vol. II, p. 802.)

Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the .case is ordered remanded to the Municipal Court of Manila for further proceedings.:  So ordered, without costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A.,  Bautista. Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.